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Thesis Summary
This thesis examines the problems that arise when military organisations and 
communities seek to exploit the opportunities provided by Network Enabled 
Capability for resource sharing and collaboration. The research shows that current 
methods o f assessing security do not take account of the temporal nature of real 
communications with ad hoc and policy driven connections. It is contended that this 
results in an overly conservative approach, and that explicit consideration (and 
implementation) of non-persistent and alternative connectivity would provide better 
assessments on which to base risk decisions for ’fit for purpose’ security, enabling 
more flexible and responsive security in rapidly changing environmental conditions.
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Thesis Abstract
This thesis examines the problems that arise when military organisations and 
communities seek to exploit the opportunities provided by Network Enabled 
Capability for resource sharing and collaboration. A key advantage of Network 
Enabled Capability is increased flexibility and adaptability to changing resource 
needs. However, the traditional approach to security, which is suited to static 
operational regimes, is totally out of step with the agile and flexible requirements of 
Network Enabled Capability. In this regime, a different approach to engineering 
security solutions is necessary, which we term f i t  fo r  purpose security. This 
recognises that in contemporary military operational environments, security must 
adapt and respond to the changing needs of an organisation but maintain cognisance 
of appropriately high levels of assurance.
The main contribution of this thesis is the development o f a methodology for 
providing the necessary flexibility in security. The methodology is a synthesis of 
security policy, security architecture and security controls. To implement flexible 
security, a new concept is introduced: the Non-Persistent Capability Concept 
(abbreviated to NPC2), which models the use o f conditional network connectivity, 
installed to provide flexibility. The NPC2 can be regarded as an ‘intelligent’ 
connector, capable of detecting and responding to changes in the environment which 
necessitate a modification to the security policy and user capabilities in the system. 
The thesis provides examples in which the NPC2 is used to enhance graphical state- 
of-the-art models used for system planning -- which are very useful for static 
operational scenarios based on worst-case maximum permitted connectivity -  but less 
so for dynamic scenarios requiring adaptivity, where worst case scenarios may never 
materialise. A fundamental part of the fit for purpose security vision is the provision 
of techniques for reasoning about the level o f potential risk that flexibility introduces 
into the system. It is shown that the NPC2 provides this ability: examples are given 
showing how the NPC2 can be incorporated into the process o f risk analysis to 
calculate the effects of modifying the separation and sharing profile of a system. In an 
attempt to employ analytical techniques that are formalisable -  and therefore 
potentially certifiable -  connectivity matrices are used to model the way sharing can 
take place between the parts of a system. The entries in the matrices are not restricted 
in the conventional way to ‘1’ or ‘0’ (representing the presence or absence of 
connectivity), but can take Boolean values (representing the conditional nature of 
NPC2 connections), or numerical probability values (representing the reliability of 
particular communication links), or numerical penalty values (reflecting the risks 
associated with particular sharing arrangements) -  or all values simultaneously. The 
result of mixing real and Boolean arithmetic in a single matrix is shown to enhance 
the view of the potential and actual risk to a system under dynamically changing 
conditions. In effect, total vulnerability can be decomposed into two elements: 
inevitable and avoidable, the former representing the minimum vulnerability and the 
latter representing the maximum vulnerability which can be controlled using the 
NPC2.
In addition to demonstrating the ways in which the NPC2 can provide the conceptual 
basis for flexible security, the thesis also examines the ways in which the concept can 
be implemented in practice -  but within a technology independent framework, so as to 
allow a wide variety o f hardware and software design options. A small-scale system 
demonstrating the NCP2 architecture hosted on SELinux has been implemented and 
successfully tested in a realistic environment; and the results of the experiment are 
presented.
The research is also taken a stage further by the introduction of another concept, the 
Non-Persistent Domain (NPD), aimed at modelling ad-hoc collaboration activities and 
their impact on potential risk. Although it has not yet been carried through to 
implementation, the NPD is shown to be useful in high-level modelling and risk 
analysis using the same test environment as the NPC2.
The conclusion of this research is that two non-persistent constructs, the Non- 
Persistent Capability Concept and the Non-Persistent Domain, provide an 
improvement in modelling ability needed to move away from static security solutions 
appropriate to fixed operational scenarios towards the flexible fit for purpose security 
solutions suited to Network Enabled Capability -  whilst still retaining the ability to 
control the levels of potentially increased risk that flexibility entails. Together, the 
NPC2 and the NPD provide a means for specifying, designing and analysing flexible 
security; and also a means for implementing it.
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Information Age [1] is characterised by an increasing requirement to share 
resources between communities of users with common interests and objectives. 
These communities may contain members of the same organisation and/or 
collaborative partners depending on need. Collaboration may be ad-hoc in nature 
where groups are formed and dispersed spontaneously and have a rapidly changing 
membership as conditions in the environment dictate. Alternatively the groups may 
evolve over time and have a greater degree of permanence in terms of the partners 
involved and nature of the alliance. In either case the resources that are shared 
between the communities will probably be dispersed across numerous distributed data 
repositories and accessed from a variety of logical and physical locations using a 
range of different electronic devices. This business model undoubtedly enables 
unprecedented opportunities for the rapid collection and dissemination of information 
and collaboration which in turn can be used to competitive advantage by the 
organisations involved. However, opportunity has a price and in this case one notable 
disadvantage arises from balancing the security o f valuable assets against the benefits 
of sharing.
In order to maintain security principles such as confidentiality and integrity 
boundaries between users must be defined. These identify who (or what) may share 
with whom and ‘from whom (or what) information must also be separated. The 
Information Age has extended and blurred these traditional boundaries of the network. 
In a dynamic environment the perimeter of the network, which separates trusted and 
un-trusted communities of users, is not always obvious. The term ‘de- 
perimeterisation’ has been coined by the Jericho forum [2] to describe this 
phenomenon. In this situation, it clearly becomes more difficult to locate appropriate 
security controls to provide adequate protection whilst permitting the capabilities 
required for the organisation to share its resources. Information is regarded as a 
valuable asset and its compromise can have devastating effects on both the owning 
organisation and other communities. It is therefore absolutely fundamental to 
understand and adequately balance the need for sharing against the need to separate in 
a changing environment.
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The desire to participate in electronic collaboration and information sharing is not 
unique to any one particular type of business domain. The defence community, and 
more specifically the military, are affected by the Information Age as much as any 
commercial enterprise [3], although their motivation for participating in collaborative 
relationships naturally differs.
In the United Kingdom, the military are evolving towards ‘Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC)’ where the objective is to enhance military capability through 
improved exploitation of information [4]. In this respect NEC exhibits similar tenets 
to that of the Information Age. The NEC vision is to collect, interpret and share 
information from different sources and system platforms, facilitated by the network. 
Within the overall programme to realise this vision a number o f different themes have 
been identified, some of which are of particular relevance to this research. These 
include the requirement for flexible working and reconfiguration o f systems to meet 
changing needs, support of agile mission groups including dynamic creation and 
configuration of mission groups to share information and a resilient information 
infrastructure which is managed, secured and allows secure access but also provides 
flexibility to meet the needs of the agile mission group.
Traditionally the military has operated on a strict separation and sharing policy for 
resources where a protective marking is applied to identify the potential sensitivity or 
importance of the resource and separate it from other categories. The ability to share 
is controlled using an access control policy where the security context of the 
requesting user is authorised for a set of protective markings. O f course, higher levels 
of sensitivity or protective marking require stronger assurance that separation and 
sharing can be and is indeed maintained in order to prevent the loss of confidentiality 
and integrity. Typically, protective markings and security clearance change very 
rarely. During the design of a system it is necessary to consider the extremes of 
protective markings and clearances which effectively means that the designer is 
always working with the ‘worst case’ scenario in order to cover all possible cases. 
This approach can lead to over-classification of some resources and potentially 
impede access to legitimate users if errors in the design or the labelling of resources 
have occurred.
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With the advent of NEC, a more flexible approach to information security is required 
where deployed systems are architected to deal with adaptations to the separation and 
sharing profile as a result of changing conditions in the environment. For example, an 
agile group may have to collaborate with different and possibly unexpected 
communities as an operation unfolds. Levels of trust between communities may alter 
thus affecting the resources that are both shared and separated. The tempo of 
operations is such that any change to the separation and sharing infrastructure must 
occur in a timely and assured manner where, as far as possible, the ramifications of 
introducing change are fully understood and articulated. It is suggested that the degree 
of flexibility required by the military organisation of the future may be at odds with 
the axioms of high assurance. Furthermore, unless this imbalance is overcome it is 
postulated that for the military, information security may be the most significant risk 
to successful realisation of the network-enabled organisation.
In essence, the Law of Requisite Variety [5] epitomises our research. Simply put, 
Ashby’s law proposes that a flexible system with many options is better able to cope 
with change. There will of course be a level of compromise. Ashby recognised that a 
system tightly optimised for an initial set of conditions may be more efficient, whilst 
those conditions prevail. However, when change occurs the system is likely to fail 
since it does not have the capacity to respond to a different state in an appropriate 
manner. Although this law was applied to the development o f control systems, it is 
believed that the principles are also of merit within the field o f information security 
where the construction of more robust and adaptable solutions is required. Although 
different access control rules may be specified in the security policy to allow changes 
in capability, a flexible solution also requires the capacity to select and enforce these 
different rules or sets of rules when an appropriate change in conditions is detected. It 
is postulated that such an approach would provide security suited to the situation at 
the time it is required.
Flexibility is derived, at least in part, from the ability to modify separation and sharing 
capabilities in accordance with changing conditions in the environment. The research 
described in this thesis indicates that current technologies and approaches are not 
adequate to accommodate the level of flexibility required for both immediate and 
future modes of operation. System design and development are heavily biased
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towards security through separation with no allowance made for temporary deviations 
from the model. It is the opinion of the author that this approach impedes flexibility 
and resource sharing. Of course expediency must be tempered by constraints; 
however this does not change our view that a more radical approach to the challenge 
is required. In response this work builds upon the concept of Ashby’s law to propose 
the creation of f i t  fo r  purpose security within the military. This approach adopts a 
more realistic view o f the system by considering fluctuations in capability (and 
therefore separation and sharing requirements) and thus the option to architect and 
enforce different controls at appropriate points in the system.
The concept of fit for purpose security has been applied, albeit differently from our 
interpretation, in work from Digital Rights Management. In [6, p. 180] Kuhlmann and 
Ghering suggest that:
“ ...in everyday situations, security is a flexible notion rather than an absolute goal. 
In order to be trustworthy a system has to be sufficiently secure to be f i t  fo r  purpose. ”
The above quotation was pait of a general discussion on the role o f trusted platform 
technology [7] and in particular, its potential use in Digital Rights Management. 
Kuhlmann and Gehring suggest that trusted platforms do not insist on provable 
security for all conditions, furthermore the end user may not know, understand and 
therefore trust any proof presented to them. It is therefore deemed more important 
that “ ... a trusted party vouches for the fact that a system configuration and policy is 
fit for a particular purpose ...” [6, p i 80] Although we have an interest in trusted 
platform technologies, the research described in this thesis is not limited to a study of 
the type o f technologies which could be appropriated to construct secure solutions for 
the military. The target platform is only one part of the challenge; the more urgent 
and difficult part to be solved is investigating the way in which secure solutions may 
be manipulated to provide the levels o f flexibility demanded by their human 
operators. Furthermore, it is necessary to incorporate this part of the puzzle at the 
start o f the system design phase so that all stakeholders can make informed decisions 
about the engineering process armed with knowledge about the risks that will 
undoubtedly arise. In short, the research interest of the author lies in embracing the 
principles of fit for purpose security and seeking novel ways in which it can be
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incorporated into the system development cycle in order to derive benefit for users 
with a need to balance flexibility and high assurance.
In our work we use the notion of fit for purpose security to mean that the defined 
security requirement is met or achieved at the time it is required. From this we can 
infer that different security controls, perhaps of varying strengths, can be utilised 
depending on the level of risk, trust, the event or time the control is instantiated. 
Timeliness is critical since the requirement must be met when required; not before, 
nor after. This presupposes that all possible eventualities are known and can be 
accommodated in the planning process which is, o f course, quite unrealistic. When 
designing fit for purpose security it is necessary to recognise that different degrees of 
flexibility both exist and can be achieved. This can be visualised on a scale which 
ranges from adaptation to known, changing conditions right through to addressing 
unexpected and evolutionary events. Given that the defence community operates in a 
security critical environment we contend that any work on flexible security must be 
positioned towards the more deterministic end o f the scale but with a level of 
capability to at least handle unplanned events in a coherent and trustworthy manner. 
This level of flexibility will provide significant advantages over current measures 
since, in harmony with Ashby’s view, it will be possible to deploy a system that can 
change and potentially will operate for longer before external intervention is required.
Fit for purpose security is underpinned by the synthesis of policy, architecture and 
mechanism. Policy forms the core component since it defines and is instrumental in 
the enforcement of rules controlling the behaviour of objects on the system and 
ultimately reflects the intent of the stakeholders. However, as revealed in later 
chapters, the security policy is only one aspect of the fit for purpose solution. If the 
goal of engineering flexibility and a level of robustness whilst minimising the amount 
of human intervention is to be achieved, it is necessary for changes to security policy 
to be driven by external factors which are defined as events of interest. These events 
may include a detected change in the level of trust (when a user joins a different 
community), increased levels of risk caused by network attacks, loss of a community 
member and so on. A level of ‘intelligence’ is required in the system where events of 
interest can be identified in the environment, processed and actioned thus achieving 
necessary modifications to the separation and sharing profile of the system. Our fit
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for purpose solution must therefore exhibit at least a minimal level of intelligence in 
order to deliver this capability.
A pragmatic approach has been taken in that the research seeks to use and augment 
existing technologies and frameworks where possible. Our target community, has a 
strong motivation to incorporate Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) based solutions 
where practical and appropriate in order to reduce cost, avoid ‘lock-in’ to proprietary 
solutions and broaden the base of available products from which to select. By 
recognising this motivation, we have the opportunity to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of current solutions and provide enhancements where limitations are 
identified. Under this regime, technology may be improved for all.
Another aspect of fit for purpose security is concerned with assurance. A level of 
proof and reasoning about the changes brought about by a flexible security solution is 
required in order to instil confidence that flexibility does not result in less security or 
increased and unacceptable risk. This can be achieved through validation.
In [8] McMurran et al observed that as systems become more complex and integrated 
it becomes increasingly difficult to show that the desired properties actually hold. In 
particular, it is hard to detect emergent properties of a System of Systems (SoS) 
because the properties o f individual systems are not necessarily compositional. The 
authors continue by describing the application of formal methods to the description 
and development of large complex systems so that knowledge of individual systems 
can be used to identify weaknesses in the integrated whole. Although the project is 
specific to the development of dependable systems, there are similarities with our 
research on developing fit for purpose security. Part of our approach is developing a 
security policy that adjusts in accordance with monitored changes in the environment. 
Since the overall system embraces a number of relationships between different 
elements o f the whole system it is absolutely fundamental to identify the ramifications 
of introducing flexibility into one or many components. In our work, we use both 
informal and formal approaches to describe and validate the security requirements of 
an interconnected system. Both approaches allow us to analyse different states and 
validate any action taken to mitigate identified risk. Of course it is recognised that a 
formal method, where the analysis can be automated and repeated by an independent
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assessor, will provide greater proof and corresponding assurance that the security 
policy controls the system in the desired and documented manner.
1.1 Definition of Terms
The research areas covered are broad and complex. The purpose of this section is to 
describe how the three key terms of flexibility, high assurance and f i t  fo r  purpose 
security have been interpreted and applied in this study.
The term fit for purpose is used in many different contexts. Essentially it is a measure 
of suitability; that is the object under consideration has an intended purpose for an 
intended consumer. If used as directed for the advertised purpose by the intended 
consumer, the creator of that object may make certain claims about the expected 
behaviour, performance or tolerance of the object. Implicit in this statement is a level 
of confidence and expectation, that is, the intended consumer may reasonably expect 
and ‘trust’ the object to behave in a particular manner under certain conditions. There 
are some interesting tensions in the notion of fit for purpose. For example, in our 
study o f security in agile mission groups, the creator of the system may make 
decisions concerning what is fit for purpose. However, because they are not the actual 
user group, the experience of the recipient may be very different. The security 
applied may not be appropriate for the conditions under which they are operating and 
furthermore those conditions may change. So, we may ask ‘fit for whose purpose?’ 
Central to our work is the assertion that within a system there are different levels of 
‘fit’ dependent on the circumstances at the time security is required. One size does not 
necessarily fit all. We adopt the view that a system can be deployed with a baseline 
set of security policies and controls that will be suited to our expected mode of 
operation. In order to improve the likelihood of security remaining fit for purpose, 
predictions about the future use of that system are made. This allows us to reason 
about necessary changes to the security requirements beforehand and plan for the 
appropriate security controls to be in place that will support those changes. In all cases 
it is necessary to find a balance between those who are designing the security of the 
system and those who actually have to work with it. This can be assisted through the 
application of judicious modelling where the requirements of the system are 
articulated in a medium that can be understood by all stakeholders. If it is assumed
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that changes to these requirements will occur, and possibly very locally and rapidly in 
the case of agile mission groups, it is proposed that this approach provides an 
improved opportunity for engineering appropriate or fit for purpose security which 
can be exploited as a business enabler for the target community.
In the security community the term ‘assurance’ has a very specific meaning however, 
it is often used quite loosely and out of context which may result in confusion. In [9] 
assurance is defined as “ ...the trust that can be placed in a system, and the trusted 
ways the system can be proven to have been developed, tested, documented, 
maintained and delivered to a customer...”. Of particular importance is the word 
‘proven’. In order to achieve a recognised level of assurance it is necessary for 
developers and manufacturers to submit their products to rigorous and independent 
testing against an established and formally accepted set of criteria. It is this testing 
process that essentially provides the ‘proof that a product achieves the criteria. 
Internationally these security criteria differ; for example, the United Kingdom works 
to the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (ITSEC) [10]. However, 
in recognition of the importance of international standardisation, the Common Criteria 
were developed. These are “ ...an alignment and development o f a number o f source 
criteria: the existing European, US and Canadian criteria. ..” [11]. Publications such as 
[12] describe the role and process of Common Criteria certification in the UK which 
is operated by the Communications-Electronic Security Group (CESG) [13]. In order 
for security evaluation certificates issued by individual nations to be recognised 
internationally, the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) [14] was set­
up between participating nations.
In an increasingly security conscious environment it is advantageous for a security 
product to undergo an independent security evaluation programme in order to achieve 
an evaluation assurance level for the product. In the UK, ITSEC certification levels 
range from El (lowest) to E6 (highest). The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) for 
the Common Criteria range from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). There is correspondence 
between the levels from El and EAL2 onwards, that is, there is no equivalent ITSEC 
level for EAL1. In [9, p. 106] the authors observe that at the higher levels of security 
there are few changes in the security features themselves but a definite increase in the 
degree of assurance that a user can place in the system’s architecture and security
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policies. This is derived from the increase level of rigour and possibly the 
requirement for a formal approach to be taken in the design and development of the 
solution. As a result, the user can have greater confidence in the whole production of 
the product they are purchasing over and above the functionality it provides.
The military is a security critical environment and requires a high level of confidence 
in security properties such as confidentiality. It is therefore expected that an assurance 
rating will probably be mandated for any technologies utilised in the system. Yet, this 
returns us to the question of balance between fit for purpose and high assurance since 
there may be occasions where the implementation and configuration of a high 
assurance solution actually prevents the user from conducting a perfectly legitimate 
task. For example, at the start of an operation users may be denied access to particular 
sources of information because under normal circumstances they would not have a 
‘need to know’. As the operation unfolds events in the environment may move on; 
perhaps there is a change in hostilities or collaborative partners. As a result, access to 
these information sources may now be required in order for the user to deal with new 
challenges. The initial security parameters are no longer valid because the original 
assumptions are out of date and the security solution is no longer fit for purpose. 
Interestingly, a system or product is certified against a specific set o f operational 
parameters. Therefore if  the user configures or uses it differently, the level of 
assurance claimed originally may be invalid.
This research assumes that “assurance” is synonymous with “confidence” without the 
connotation of an evaluation level. That said, a significant part of our early research 
focused on separation technologies and architectures which could be employed to 
engineer a higher level of assurance should it be necessary to adopt the formal 
evaluation route. Furthermore, the architecture of our solution has been devised with 
the principles of high assurance and formal evaluation in mind. Ultimately, our 
interest lies in manipulating those technologies through security policy to provide the 
level of flexibility in a highly segregated and controlled world. We believe that 
stakeholder confidence in the solution can be increased if the impact of flexibility and 
behaviour of the system can be quantified through modelling; particularly if  the 
modelling framework used is underpinned by a formal language. Although in the 
lifetime of this research our work will not undergo formal security evaluation testing
Page 9
such as that described in [10], we judge our approach to be a first step in the 
development of a system that balances flexibility in cases where the user also needs a 
high level of assurance or confidence in the properties of that system.
It is possible to engineer different capabilities that will introduce flexibility into a 
system depending on available technology, stakeholder requirements and their attitude 
towards risk. These levels range from the highly flexible and non-deterministic end 
of the scale where a system would adapt, perhaps in unexpected ways, through 
continuous learning and observation of their environment through to a deterministic 
system that allows adjustment in accordance with a pre-defined policy. In the latter, a 
system planner would attempt to predict how changes might reveal themselves and 
design the system components so they are able to change accordingly (perhaps more 
of a traditional control system approach). According to the Penguin English 
Dictionary [15] intelligent:
“...is said o f  electronic equipment: able to respond to change and to initiate action 
based on that response... ”
Our research is intended to have an application in environments where high assurance 
and minimal intervention with deployed devices are both requirements. It is therefore 
necessary to position the work at the more deterministic end o f the scale, where the 
system is still pre-planned but allowed to change when the situation dictates. In 
accordance with the dictionary definition above, we propose that our solution can be 
described as ‘intelligent’.
1.2 Scope
The research was based against the version of DBSy® which was available in 2005. 
Upgrades to DBSy are an on-going process and current versions at the time of issue of 
this thesis may be different from the version used at the time of this research. In the 
opinion of the author there have been no changes that invalidate the interpretation or 
use of the approach and affect the results published in this thesis.
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The experimental work presented in Chapter 6 was based on the Fedora Core Linux 
distribution, version 6.
1.3 Motivation
Our motivation for conducting this research is two-fold. Firstly we believe that 
security poses the most significant risk to realising NEC because it is currently unable 
to accommodate the level of flexibility required between changing and collaborating 
communities of users. This problem starts at an abstract level with the modelling 
process because there is no means of including and reasoning about changing 
requirements at this level. As a result it becomes difficult to implement security 
solutions that adapt to accommodate operational need. If security hinders quite 
legitimate tasks because the system is inflexible, then it may become necessary for the 
user to find a workaround. This activity will not, of course, have been analysed to 
assess the level of risk that might be introduced as a result.
The second part of our motivation stems from the need to ease management overhead 
in our target community. The ability to model and measure the impact o f changing 
security requirements allows us to engineer more robust systems. The system can be 
designed with options and the means necessary to adopt those different options when 
the right conditions prevail. We must consider that our target audience frequently 
operates with limited resources and in a hostile environment. It is desirable to 
minimise the amount of effort they must expend on system planning. Our fit for 
purpose security solution arises from delivering appropriate security when needed and 
ideally with minimal intervention from the human user.
1.4 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the development of a methodology which 
enables us to realise fit for purpose security from high-level modelling through to 
implementation. The methodology is underpinned by the synthesis of security policy, 
architecture and mechanism and delivered by two new concepts the Non-Persistent 
Capability Concept (NPC2) and Non-Persistent Domain (NPD). Section 1.4.1 
introduces these concepts.
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1.4.1 The Non-Persistent Capability Concept and Non-Persistent Domain
The NPC2 and NPD are both used to capture, articulate and measure temporary 
changes to the security profile of the system. Our work with the NPC2 has evolved 
further and includes an implementation framework and practical demonstration of the 
concept in a prototype solution. Different chapters of the thesis discuss the individual 
uses of both constructs which, by way of introduction, are defined in the paragraphs 
below.
Modelling Security Requirements
In the military context security is synonymous with separation. When developing the 
security policy for a system it is reasonable to begin the modelling process with some 
expression of the separation and sharing requirements. An approach and notation 
developed specifically for the task of documenting such requirements in the defence 
community is the Domain Based Security Architecture DBSy® from QinetiQ [16],
[17]. Since our interest is focused on, but not limited to, the defence market an 
analysis of the DBSy approach is fundamental to the research. It provides an 
established and comprehensive environment in which to present our work on fit for 
purpose security models. Closer inspection of DBSy led us to believe that it was 
appropriate and efficient in environments of a relatively static nature and its primary 
function was to capture and articulate the maximum permitted connectivity of a 
system. Given that our interest lies in the development of fit for purpose security to 
enable changing requirements in a system, we hypothesised, correctly, that DBSy 
would exhibit limitations when applied to this type o f model.
In order to address what we considered to be a limitation and add to the 
expressiveness and potential usefulness of DBSy, the thesis proposes some simple 
additions to the DBSy notation which are embodied in the NPC2 and NPD constructs. 
In the DBSy models, the NPC2 shows where alternative separation and sharing 
options exist in the system. The notation allows the system architect to distinguish 
between the baseline, that is, ‘normal’ condition and exceptions to the baseline. The 
NPD was developed to capture the existence of a temporary community which could 
be, for example, an ad-hoc network occupied by some members of the existing
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system(s) and/or third-party agencies who are active members o f the community for a 
limited period and only under certain conditions. The NPD could provide the means 
of limiting information sharing where it is necessary to temporarily include an 
external community with a lower level of trust. Other members of the NPD may have 
alternative business connections set up with regular domains which are normally used 
to share information. Such examples are described in Chapters 3 and 7.
It is our view that models employing either the NPC2 or the NPD or both constructs 
provide a better representation of the security policy requirements. Moreover, their 
use alerts the system designer to areas where it will be necessary to architect 
flexibility into the security solution. If the user is provided with more comprehensive 
information regarding the changing architecture of the system and how this impacts 
risk, it is concluded that greater confidence in the integrity o f the system can be 
achieved under all of its states.
Risk Assessment
The security modelling process includes an analysis of risk inherent in the models. 
DBSy risk assessment is concerned with (but not limited to) analysing the permitted 
business connections between domains which are necessary to enable sharing, but 
could also be used to compromise the system [17]. Although DBSy identifies and 
includes a number of different system threats as part o f the risk analysis approach
[18], for the purposes of this research it is unnecessary for us to adopt all of them. Our 
risk assessment assumes that connectivity is also a measure of vulnerability. Given 
that the NPC2 and NPD constructs are deliberately designed to affect connectivity on 
a temporary and/or conditional basis, we are particularly concerned with assessing 
their impact on the risk profile of the system. It is therefore sufficient, at least in the 
first instance, to focus on the existence of the permitted business connection between 
domains and the role of the NPC2 and NPD constructs and omit individual threats 
associated with those connections as defined in the DBSy approach. It should be 
noted that as part of the risk assessment process the analyst would usually select 
security controls to mitigate identified risks and then reassess the system to calculate 
their effect. Since our study focuses on connectivity and does not include individual 
threats in the scope, it is inappropriate to follow this aspect of the risk assessment 
process and investigate the type of controls that may be applied.
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The NPC2 allows us to identify all of the sharing requirements that it is believed may 
be required during the lifetime of a deployment and conditions on those capabilities 
which may be exerted. The NPD provides further refinement where a sharing 
requirement may be between a regular domain and an ad-hoc community. Both 
constructs impact the separation and sharing profile; however they do so in different 
ways. The NPC2 is ultimately responsible for permitting or denying the sharing of 
information under different conditions and it therefore forces a choice to be made. 
Essentially it can reduce the number of potential paths because it acts as an exclusive 
OR between domains of interest rather than assuming that both are active. 
Furthermore, the NPC2 distinguishes between the baseline and exceptional policies 
making it possible to identify the number of compromise paths we could reasonably 
expect when the system is operating under normal conditions. Exceptions may never 
occur. However, in the event that they do, the impact on the separation and sharing 
profile of the system and subsequent risk can be calculated.
On its own the NPD does not place conditions on connectivity. It simply reflects the 
case where a temporary community will be set up, although of course it could be used 
in conjunction with the NPC2 if  the security policy limited participation in an ad-hoc 
network when other sharing capabilities were enabled. By recognising its existence, 
the impact on potential compromise paths in cases where the NPD is in use or is 
inactive may be calculated.
To assist with the risk assessment process, the DBSy compromise path models 
produced for our scenario are redrawn using graph theory notation [19, p. 11 ]. 
Although this very simple view of connectivity does not allow the capture of flexible 
(or non-persistent) connectivity it is convenient in providing a coherent transition 
between graphical representation and mathematical analysis of potential compromise 
paths using matrices [20, p.4]. As we show in Chapters 4 and 7, the NPC2 in 
particular displays some interesting characteristics when modelled as a matrix, 
particularly as we begin to calculate higher order connectivity arising from multiple 
‘hops’ between domains of interest.
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Implementation
The NPC2 is the more mature of the constructs and has been implemented and tested 
within a demonstration system. A conceptual architecture has been developed for the 
NPC2 which is presented in Chapter 5. This framework can be applied by the systems 
engineer to construct a working solution. The model describes the individual 
elements comprising the NPC2. This includes the functionality and services provided 
at each level and the interface with other layers in the architecture. As such it 
provides a necessary link between the theoretical discussion communicated in the first 
half of this thesis and the practical demonstration of the concepts in the second half. 
To conclude the study and support our claim that the NPC2 can be applied at all 
levels, a working prototype constructed in accordance with the NPC2 architecture, is 
documented in Chapter 6.
Security Patterns
Security in the discipline of Information Technology has attracted active research 
participation for decades. In [21, p.31 ] a security pattern is defined as:
“...a recurring security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well- 
proven generic solution fo r  it. The solution consists o f  a set o f  interacting roles that 
can be arranged into multiple concrete design structures, as well as a process to 
create one particular such structure... ”
In the context of this definition and following a brief review of some existing patterns 
described in [19] it is proposed that the NPC2 does exhibit properties of a security 
pattern. The NPC2 architecture described in Chapter 5 is a technology independent 
and modular framework which has been created to solve the problem of enabling 
flexible security in a very specific context; high assurance environments. In the 
limited duration of this research activity the NPC2 has not been subjected to the 
rigorous application normally demanded o f a concept before it is accepted as a 
pattern. The potential for describing the NPC2 as a security pattern was discovered 
late on in the research and as a result, there has been insufficient time to pursue the 
idea through to a logical conclusion. It is deemed to be of sufficient interest to note as 
part of our contribution and an area that should be actively pursued as future research.
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1.4.2 Publications
In addition to the development of the NPC2 and NPD as described in this thesis, our 
work has also contributed to the literature in this area. Some of the material in this 
thesis is included in the publications listed.
H. Janicke and L. Finch, “The Role of Dynamic Security Policy in Military Systems”, 
Proceedings o f European Conference on Information Warfare, Shrivenham, UK. 
July, 2007, pp.121-130. [22]
H. Janicke and L. Finch, “The Role of Dynamic Security Policy in Military Systems”, 
Journal o f Information Warfare, Vol. 6.3, UK. December, 2007, pp. 1-14. [23]
L. Finch and R. Vaughan, “Towards Fit for Purpose Security in Military Systems”, 
Proceedings o f European Conference on Information Warfare, Plymouth, UK, June 
2008, pp.71-80. [24]
I.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis documents the author’s primary theme, fit for purpose security, as a 
journey of two halves. The first part of the thesis applies the NPC2 and NPD 
constructs to the security modelling and risk assessment processes. In doing so, 
attention is focused on the theoretical implications of capturing and modelling fit for 
purpose security. The second part of the journey documents the practical work 
conducted to implement a working implementation of the NPC2. This covers the 
development of the NPC2 software architecture and concludes with a description of 
the practical example which was constructed to demonstrate one application of the 
NPC2.
The work documented in this thesis has been conducted without the membership and 
associated support of a research group that would normally be expected in post­
graduate studies. The author has therefore played a critical and central role in opening 
and developing the research argument. Throughout the thesis the personal pronoun 
‘we’ or possessive pronoun ‘our’ is used. However, it should be noted that the concept 
of the NPC2 and NPD and its application through the modelling, risk assessment and
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engineering processes is entirely that of the author. During the course of the research, 
the author formed relationships with other individuals to explore the concept of the 
NPC2 in a wider context. One example of this collaborative work is described in 
Chapter 3 where the author carried out some investigative work with DeMontfort 
University regarding the formalisation of output from the DBSy models. The author’s 
supervisor has also been instrumental in supporting further work with the connectivity 
matrices in Chapters 4 and 7. In addition to the work expressed in this thesis two 
joint-author conference papers, which develop the ideas, are currently in production. 
As described in Chapter 6 a small team of two people, the author and a software 
developer carried out the actual development of the NPC2 example. At this stage the 
author became project manager and solution architect. This involved producing the 
NPC2 architecture, designing the solution that would demonstrate the NPC2 and fulfil 
the requirements of the case study and solving the problems which naturally arose 
from developing an example in a resource constrained and demanding environment. 
Under the guidance of the author, the software developer produced or adapted the 
necessary software code to realise NPC2 functionality.
The remaining sections of the thesis are structured as follows. Security related 
research has been ongoing for over three decades therefore available literature related 
to the subject is plentiful. A selection of related work is presented in Chapter 2 which 
concludes with a statement of the problem to be addressed by this research. Chapter 3 
embarks on the primary theme of the work and begins with the informal modelling 
process using the DBSy graphical approach and notation. A small-scale illustrative 
example has been devised which allows us to apply DBSy and assess our proposed 
additions to the notation. The research is not limited to an informal modelling 
approach and in the last part of Chapter 3 output from the DBSy models is utilised in 
a formal modelling approach developed at De Montfort University. This study was 
conducted as a collaborative exercise by the author and Dr. Helge Janicke of De 
Montfort University and resulted in two joint publications listed in Section 1.2.2.
Chapter 4 looks at risk analysis and applies aspects from DBSy to our scenario. Our 
objective is to assess the impact on system vulnerability resulting from the 
introduction of flexibility via the NPC2 and NPD constructs. As part of this exercise 
we begin examining existing theory concerned with the rate of growth and
proliferation of connections as domains are added to the network. This discussion is 
also included in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 links the theoretical aspects of the work to the practical implementation 
phase and describes a high-level architecture for the NPC2. Chapter 6 contains the 
experimental results from applying this architecture to a working prototype of the 
NPC2. This work covers one way in which the NPC2 may be engineered; there are of 
course many others. The examples presented in this thesis are small-scale by design. 
This is necessary in order to keep the research manageable and within scope. 
Alternative applications for the NPC2 and NPD constructs are described in Chapter 7. 
This provides evidence that the concepts can be scaled both in terms of modelling and 
in the case of the NPC2, this includes implementation. Finally Chapter 8 reflects on 
the success of the research and presents our conclusions. Like most research 
endeavours it has not been possible to address all of the issues which have been 
revealed throughout the programme. We therefore present the areas which are 
outstanding but in our view, constitute valuable opportunities to continue evolving 
this important area of work and assist with further developing fit for purpose security 
for flexible but high assurance environments. This discussion concludes Chapter 8 
and the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The development of information systems in environments, where high levels of 
confidence are a prerequisite, is dominated by the requirement to construct provably 
secure systems. Research which investigates how this can be achieved has interested 
the academic and commercial communities for almost four decades and continues to 
stimulate discussion. This well established area of research has generated a 
correspondingly large amount of literature therefore it is necessary to be selective in 
our choice of work in this review. A number of reports are available which 
eloquently summarise security models in general, including [26], and policy 
specification in particular [27]. It is not our intention to repeat these works; instead we 
extract and critique aspects of particular interest to our research.
Our interest lies in enabling both flexibility and security in high assurance 
communities, and investigates how this may be engineered into a system through the 
synthesis of security policy, control mechanism and architecture. We also employ the 
principles of a separation architecture in that we define both the elements of the 
system that should (normally) be separated from one another and the ways in which 
sharing should (generally) occur. The emphasis is on the baseline or normal security 
requirements since through our research the system evolves to accommodate 
exceptions to the general pattern of behaviour. This provides flexibility which is 
necessary to support changes to the separation and sharing profile.
During the course of our literature survey it has become apparent that an important 
contradiction exists between flexibility and high assurance in computer systems. The 
former suggests the capacity to adapt which will result in emergent and potentially 
unexpected behaviours with the capacity to undermine the security of the system. 
High assurance of course is normally associated with tightly constrained and 
deterministic systems. However, as observed by Kuhlmann and Gehring, [6, p. 180] 
these designs tend to counteract any advantages to be gained through flexibility. This 
dichotomy is important for our research since it is necessary, in our view, to develop 
systems that can support the changing information and resource requirements of 
communities such as the military. At the same time a level of assurance must be
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preserved to demonstrate that flexibility is not achieved to the unacceptable detriment 
of security. As stated in Chapter 1, our research is inspired by the work of Kuhlmann 
and Gehring and whilst they focussed on the role of trusted computing platforms in 
digital rights management, there is an important parallel with our research. The 
authors proposed that this type of technology could offer a fit for purpose solution that 
would seem to provide a level of balance between flexibility (and openness) versus 
the need for a closed system. Furthermore the authors recognised that the balance 
between openness and flexibility would be dependent on the needs of the system 
owner and their communicating peers. However, from our perspective the more 
important observation was that this balance would be at a given point in time. We 
extend this idea to assert that security requirements of the user will change in response 
to time, event or level of trust: therefore fit for purpose security must take into 
account these stimuli.
Early research into security models and frameworks was significantly influenced by 
the military primarily because significant funding was invested by this community 
during the 1970s [28, p. 137]. The military have a clear need to preserve, perhaps 
above all else, the confidentiality o f information. However, the multi-level concepts 
developed to support this requirement are also applicable to enabling data integrity; a 
property of particular interest in commercial environments [29]. Although there are 
some differences in the classifications across nations, Governments apply a fairly 
standard protective marking scheme to information graded from Unclassified through 
to Top Secret and higher. These classifications provide the criteria on which to 
separate (and control access to) resources. When considering confidentiality, a 
subject may only read an object if his or her security clearance is at least equal to the 
protective marking of that object. This structure of security labelling and access based 
upon clearance defines multi-level security models. The challenge for computer 
scientists, particularly in the 1970s, was to define and enforce multi-level security into 
computer based systems. A study by Anderson [30] proposed the concept of a 
reference monitor, a component in the operating system designed to mediate access to 
resources but which was also sufficiently small and simple to undergo rigorous 
scrutiny and testing and provide some level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the 
component. Functionality in computing devices is constantly increasing with a 
corresponding growth in the complexity and size of the operating system. In short, it
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has become increasingly difficult to verify mainstream operating systems. During the 
1980s Rushby and Randall [31] observed that attempts to construct secure general- 
purpose operating systems had not been notably successful. They maintained this was 
due to the reliance on a security kernel as the primary mechanism for enforcing 
security and proposed an alternative approach which focussed on a distributed secure 
system rather than a secure operating system. Simply put, the responsibility for 
security was given to a number of small (trustworthy) components that were 
interconnected with larger “untrusted” host systems. One of the prime tasks for the 
trustworthy components was mediating communication between the untrusted hosts. 
The authors claimed this approach was “demonstrably more secure” and efficient.
In recent times the Multiple Independent Layers of Security (MILS) architecture has 
gained attention, particularly in the development of secure single purpose applications 
for security and safety critical environments such as the Avionics Industry. MILS, as 
its name suggests, is based upon a layered architecture and according to Alves-Foss et 
al, [32] it is possible, through separation, to construct a hierarchy of security services. 
Each level is responsible for its own security domain and uses the security services of 
the layer below to add new security functionality which can be exposed to the higher 
levels. The heart of the approach lies with a small separation kernel like the one 
proposed by Rushby in [33]. Functionality that would normally be found inside a 
traditional operating system is moved up into middleware layers away from the kernel 
so that it only has responsibility for maintaining separation between resources (in 
accordance with a pre-defined policy). This MILS approach has been used 
successfully in current Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS) products from 
LynuxWorks [34] and Green Hills Software [35]. Under this regime it is possible to 
achieve higher levels of assurance for the RTOS which is necessary for military 
applications or other environments with security or safety critical requirements. 
Products based on MILS do present certain limitations for our research however; the 
primary one being a static security policy. The target system utilising a separation 
kernel would not be able to adapt to changing circumstances without restarting the 
system with a different policy, which rather defeats the objective. Nonetheless, we 
consider the approach a very interesting development and propose that the role of 
dynamic policy within this context is worthy of future research.
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During the 1970s researchers were actively investigating how multi-level secure 
systems could be described and modelled for computing systems based on 
mathematical proof. Probably the most influential security policy model to emerge at 
this time was the Bell and LaPadula (BLP) confidentiality model [36]. The model is 
designed for the military environment and thus relies on an appropriate labelling 
scheme which reflects military interests. Labels describe the protective marking of an 
object, for example Secret, Restricted, Not Protectively Marked, and the security 
clearance of the subject who wishes to access it. In the BLP model two security 
principles are enforced which are defined as ‘no read up’ and ‘no write down’. In 
short the subject is not permitted to read information labelled at a higher protective 
marking than their own clearance nor are they able to write an object with a higher 
protective marking to a lower protective marking. Although Bell and LaPadula were 
able to prove the model mathematically it did exhibit certain limitations which were 
identified by other researchers. Biba [37] for example, proposed an alternative model 
to accommodate integrity rather than confidentiality. Clarke and Wilson [27] were 
interested in preserving integrity but rather than focus on the defence or military arena 
like Biba, they developed their model for the commercial environment. Brewer and 
Nash [38] were also concerned with confidentiality but unlike Bell and La Padula 
their model focuses on the commercial context.
An additional concern lies with the practical realisation of the aforementioned multi­
level security models. In a practical environment, the BLP model, without 
refinement, proved operationally difficult to implement and use. Furthermore, whilst 
static security policy has appeal because of the ability to prove security at given states 
it also gives us cause for concern. NEC requires interoperation and collaboration 
between changing communities of users who have different security characteristics, 
levels of trust and information needs. Whilst multi-level security models can 
successfully capture the various classifications of resources in such a situation, on the 
face of it, there is no provision to accommodate changes in the security profile that 
may be necessary once the system is in use. Bell and LaPadula introduced a 
refinement to their model in an attempt to address the usability problem resulting 
from such a strict definition of security rules and accommodate, to a limited extent, 
the concept of change. This refinement is the principle o f tranquillity which, as 
described in [39, p. 143] takes two forms. Strong tranquillity [39, p. 143] specifies that
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a security label never changes during system operation. Weak tranquillity [39, p. 143] 
is more interesting and relevant for our work with fit for purpose security. This form 
states that security labels do not change in such a way as to violate the defined 
security policy. In other words, the restriction is modified to allow what Bishop refers 
to as ‘harmless’ changes to security levels [39, p. 143]. In practice, a trusted entity or 
trusted subject is permitted to sanitise and declassify the object to a lower security 
level. In this way, the Bell and LaPadula rule of ‘no write down’ is upheld since 
through the process of sanitisation sensitive information, that would normally warrant 
the high security classification, is removed before writing down to a lower 
classification.
Although weak tranquillity is a more practical and realistic solution in real-world 
systems it does not fulfil our vision of fit for purpose security. For example, in the 
military environment it is necessary to consider operational context. Under certain 
circumstances it is quite probable that both resources and the opportunity to manage 
information will be quite limited, therefore applying the principle o f weak tranquillity 
in this situation may simply not be practical. The violation of the Tow’ classification 
principle where a subject has temporary capability to access ‘high’ classification 
resources may, in specific short term instances, be an acceptable fit for purpose 
alternative. Our research explores this idea in greater detail.
Throughout this thesis the view is adopted where under ‘normal’ circumstances a 
subject has restricted access or restricted capabilities in a system. However, under 
exceptional circumstances, the security policy allows the user elevated privileges for 
either a specific time period or until events in the system prompt another change in 
security policy. This approach differs from the weak tranquillity principle in that the 
classification of an object or subject is not modified. Instead the security policy is 
designed in such a way to allow temporary changes in the capability of the subject 
that would normally be associated with a more privileged user. This approach 
potentially limits the impact of the change quite significantly. As Bishop observes in 
[39, p.142], when an object is lowered in classification, Tow’ subjects (of which there 
could be many) suddenly have access to high level information (unless of course it is 
sanitised prior to declassification). In our approach, there is potentially greater control 
over who has elevated access since the change affects the subject. Moreover,
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escalation o f privilege is only instantiated under pre-defined and specific conditions. 
The system would normally be operating under restricted conditions. It is feasible that 
conditions requiring a change in capability may not present themselves. However, if 
they do, then our approach allows the system to accommodate change and thus 
survive for longer without intervention from an administrator. This approach 
complements the Law of Requisite Variety proposed by Ashby [5] and enables us to 
achieve a design objective in system robustness in addition to flexible security rules.
In order for security to be fit for purpose it clearly needs to meet the needs of the 
system owner and operators and satisfy the requirements of technology experts. A 
common language would help to avoid misunderstandings between these stakeholder 
communities. During the 1990s UK MoD sponsored research into developing an 
approach that could be used to capture and express security requirements in a manner 
comprehensible to both business and security specialists. The Domain Based Security 
Architecture (DBSy) approach from QinetiQ [16] originates from this work. As part 
of this approach a series of models are produced that reflect the sharing and separation 
requirements necessary to support the needs of the business and security. These 
models are the Information Security (InfoSec) business, infrastructure and 
architecture models respectively. The document set produced as part of the DBSy 
process is intended for use by the appropriate authorities to support the system 
evaluation process. Since our research includes the practical application of DBSy to a 
case study, a detailed description of the approach and models are provided in later 
sections of this thesis.
In [40] Hayat et al concluded that whilst DBSy did not explicitly support the 
modelling of mobile and ad-hoc communications, the benefits of doing so (which 
would require extensions to the DBSy technique) were of limited value. However, as 
a result o f our research we tend to disagree with this view. Increasingly the 
relationships between users of either one system or a system of systems are becoming 
more flexible and prone to change. Moreover, this is the more ‘static’ end of the 
mobility scale. The other extreme is the impromptu, ad-hoc community which may or 
may not be required during the lifetime of the communications but must be included 
as a discrete part of the model nonetheless. If we cannot capture requirements for 
flexible security and ad-hoc communities in the DBSy models and risk analysis
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process, the ability to provide appropriate security is impeded. It is suggested 
therefore, that appropriate notation and recognition of these special types of systems is 
a fundamental requirement. This thesis describes our proposed notation, the NPC2 
and NPD constructs which are both described in detail in Chapter 3.
Risk assessment or analysis is a large topic in its own right and the level of detail in 
its practice will vary across different types of organisation depending on their legal 
requirements, the value of the assets and the hostility of the environment. Clearly risk 
is a major concern for the defence industry since a breach of security could result in 
loss of life. For the purposes of this research it is particularly important to study the 
impact of flexibility on the security profile of the system. Fit for purpose security is 
the balance of flexibility with a level of assurance that the resulting risk is not 
increased or unacceptable. According to [41, p.8] in the field of Information Security 
risk can be defined as “ ... a function of the level of threat, vulnerability and value of 
the information asset ...” As part of the risk assessment process a metric would be 
attributed to each of these properties and used to calculate the overall weighting for 
the risk. The process can become very complex particularly in large and richly- 
interconnected systems. Software tools such as the Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) Risk Analysis and Management Method 
(CRAMM) cited in [41, p.233] have been developed to assist with risk analysis. 
CRAMM is still owned by the UK Government and is the “government preferred” 
method of risk analysis. According to Jones and Ashenden [41, p.234] Insight 
Consulting [42] is the sole licensee for CRAMM and the tool is used widely around 
the world. CRAMM provides a structured and rigorous methodology for risk 
assessment. As a result, the software is itself complex and requires a certain level of 
expertise which may dissuade individuals who only perform risk analysis on an 
occasional basis from using it.
The DBSy risk analysis approach analyses the InfoSec Architecture models to look at 
potential compromise paths arising from the permitted business connections between 
domains [18], [19]. The method also includes an assessment of threats and 
vulnerabilities arising from, for example, malicious or accidental compromises caused 
in the environment or the infrastructure as well as the method used for information 
sharing. Following a detailed analysis, which would also include an assessment of the
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likelihood o f compromise (based on the motivation and capability of the attacker), it 
is possible to determine the level of risk. For the purposes of our research it is 
unnecessary, at least to begin with, to perform a detailed analysis which considers the 
motivation of attackers as well as other factors. Of primary concern is the effect of the 
NPC2 or NPD on the separation and sharing profile which is represented at the most 
fundamental level through the permitted business connections. How does/do the 
NPC2 and/or NPD contribute to the level of risk in this context? Do they reduce it? 
To answer these questions it is necessary only to consider risk at the level of 
connectivity. If the NPC2 and NPD are successful in reducing the number of 
compromise paths then our hypothesis is that the affect will be increased when other 
factors are included in risk calculations.
The DBSy approach has no means of differentiating between different states of 
separation and sharing in a single model. Therefore all potential connections are 
included in the risk calculations whether they are active or not. The risk strategy is 
therefore based upon maximum permitted connectivity or the ‘worst case scenario’. 
In the opinion of the author, this is not a true reflection of the risk profile. A more 
faithful representation of actual risk occurs when the non-persistent connections are 
included in the model. Although it is necessary to perform risk calculations for each 
of the states of the NPC2, as described in Chapter 4, the task can be automated using 
appropriate (and potentially trustworthy) software. Not only does this approach 
reduce the amount of effort and potential for error, it also supports repeatability of the 
calculations by an independent assessor. The results obtained when the NPC2 and/or 
the NPD are included in the risk analysis are more complete. It is possible to identify 
the level o f risk introduced under certain conditions and take a more informed 
decision regarding the type and strength of security controls necessary when the 
conditions are invoked.
In [41, p.4] Jones and Ashenden observe that:
“ ...as IT  infrastructures become increasingly intertwined, we need ways o f  carrying 
out IT  security risk assessments that are lightweight and flexible yet allow us to 
understand interdependencies o f  risk in a complex and dynamic environment... ”
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Our work on risk assessment in Chapter 4 seeks to address these issues. Firstly, the 
effect of the NPC2 is included in calculations for both direct and higher order 
connectivity arising from indirect (multi-hop) communication between domains. Our 
models include external domains to represent other systems which may play a role in 
the case study and impact the security of the agile mission group under scrutiny. 
Interestingly, connectivity with these external domains may be subject to conditions 
which are captured with the NPC2. Secondly, it was mentioned in the previous 
paragraph that software could be used to automate the computation of potential 
compromise paths. Connectivity matrices are used in both Chapters 4 and 7 to 
capture the state of a connection. Using matrix multiplication it is possible to 
calculate higher order connectivity and investigate the relationships between domains. 
This functionality can be programmed using established tools or languages and for the 
purposes o f this research MATLAB [43] was selected. Not only is it possible to 
model larger and increasingly complex matrices using MATLAB the calculations can 
be repeated and validated by an independent assessor which would assist any formal 
evaluation of our approach or solution. The matrices can include Boolean variables 
and other values wrhich enable us to calculate and reason about the affect of the NPC2 
alongside probability and risk weightings within a single matrix. Matrices are 
commonly used in the assessment process to compare properties such as likelihood of 
attack, against another property such as impact. That is, they are not normally 
numeric but textual and descriptive. The Australia/New Zealand model [44] is a 
prime example of this approach. Connectivity matrices [21, p.4] are commonly used 
to express the mathematics and language of graph theory [45]. Graphs and matrices 
are used in our analysis to show the richness of connectivity and the accessibility of 
domains. Quite simply, large values in the matrix indicate a highly connected or 
accessible domain. In our view this can also be indicative of the potential 
vulnerability between different parts of an interconnected system because the same 
permitted connections that are used for legitimate business operations could be used 
as a means of launching an attack on the system. It is concluded that the approach we 
have adopted which uses MATLAB to calculate connectivity matrices is totally in 
harmony with Jones’ and Ashenden’s aspiration for a lightweight and flexible tool 
that can be used to assist the risk analysis process.
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The discussion concerning maximum permitted connectivity and actual connectivity 
continues as part of our investigation into the rate of growth in potential compromise 
paths when domains are added to the configuration. Of course the increase will be 
dependent on the number of permitted business connections between new and existing 
domains. We also contend that the temporal and conditional aspect of connectivity 
should be included in the growth calculations. It will be shown in Chapters 4 and 7 
that our conclusions concerning the rate of growth differ from the work of Metcalfe 
[46], Briscoe, Odylzko and Tilly [47]. Unlike Metcalfe we do not regard connectivity 
as a measure of value but a measure of vulnerability since a connection could be used 
as a means of compromising the system. A domain with many connections may 
therefore be more vulnerable than a sparsely connected domain. If the rate o f growth 
when domains are added to the network is as generous as all of these authors suggest, 
then we judge the situation does not bode well for risk. However, through the use of 
the NPC2 and indeed the NPD construct we believe that a less pessimistic view of 
potential compromise paths can be achieved and the rate of growth of connectivity 
and risk can be substantially reduced. As seen in Chapters 4 and 7, the use of the 
NPC2 and NPD yield interesting and in some cases counterintuitive results regarding 
the rate of growth when the matrices are multiplied to calculate higher order 
connectivity. The reduction in potential compromise paths becomes increasingly 
obvious as the number of hops between domains is increased. This lends support to 
the usefulness o f the NPC2 within a system, not just to represent changes in the 
separation and sharing profile that are required for normal operation, but also as a tool 
that can be used quite deliberately in the configuration to reduce the connectivity (and 
vulnerability) of a domain at a given point in time. This approach underpins our 
philosophy of fit for purpose security.
DBSy offers significant advantages to the user community because of its intuitive, 
graphical approach. It was not developed as a formal approach and provides only a 
high level view of the sharing requirements to support the business and separation 
requirements to support security. Our issue with DBSy lies in its static view of these 
connections where in reality, they will undoubtedly change. In related work [23, pp. 
125-128] we suggest how output from the DBSy models can be further refined using a 
formal security policy framework. For this purpose the Security Analysis Toolkit for 
Agents (SANTA) [48], [49] and [50] was applied to the case study described in
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Chapter 3. Not only does SANTA provide benefits in that a greater clarity of 
expression can be achieved through the linguistics of the tools, given that it has a 
formal underpinning in Interval Temporal Logic [51] it also affords a level of formal 
proof that cannot be achieved from the graphical models. Crucially for our work in fit 
for purpose security, SANTA allows us to capture and express dynamic security 
requirements. In [23] we provide examples of how the DBSy approach and SANTA 
framework can be combined and show how the policy can be validated using the 
Security Policy Analysis Tool (SPAT) [52].
Our vision of fit for purpose security encompasses security policy, mechanism and 
architecture. Therefore the study of policy frameworks, capable of capturing dynamic 
properties, is only one aspect of the work. In order to realise a demonstrable example 
it is necessary to look at how properties from the security policy models have been 
realised into useable and workable components that can be employed to build secure, 
but flexible systems.
The foundation of a system is the operating system. This is fundamental to the 
security of a system since it has responsibility for mediating between applications and 
the underlying system resources and enforcing the security policy of the system. 
Without such a secure foundation any attempt to create security through applications 
alone will be like a ‘fortress built upon sand’ [53]. Loscocco et al [54] continued the 
discussion on secure operating systems. They concluded that there was an 
assumption in software development that applications could be created to enforce 
security without the support of the underlying operating system. This approach, the 
authors noted, could result in system-wide vulnerabilities. A good mainstream 
solution was required and this is where the security enhanced version of Linux 
(SELinux) makes a promising and positive contribution. We do not intend to provide 
a detailed account of SELinux or its origins in this literature review. Instead we 
would recommend that interested readers consult the National Security Agency [55] 
website where there are a number of papers describing the evolution of SELinux. In 
this review we provide a very brief introduction to the technology which is necessary 
to appreciate how we intend to utilise and extend existing work to illustrate our own 
research goals in fit for purpose security.
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SELinux implements a flexible mandatory access control mechanism called Type 
Enforcement [56]. Under this regime, each subject and object on the system is 
assigned a type identifier. In order to gain access to an object, the subject’s type must 
be authorised for the object’s type irrespective of the user identity of the subject. 
SELinux provides a high level of granularity since a type is assigned to individual 
objects on the system. Furthermore the system administrator has complete control 
over the labelling of resources and development of security policy rules to suit their 
own organisational and security requirements. Although this level of flexibility is 
potentially more appealing to the wider community there are of course some 
disadvantages. In this case, one of the downsides for SELinux, particularly in the 
early days, was and still is the difficulty in developing security policies. However, as 
Mayer et al point out in [57, p.240]:
”... SELinux policy is ‘rich ' and complex; necessarily so because SELinux provides 
fine-grained access control fo r  the rich and complex Linux kernel and its interactions 
with the multitude o f  user space applications... ”
In other words, SELinux does not, in itself, add complexity. As we have found during 
the course of our research however, this knowledge is of little comfort to the novice 
policy developer. What is more helpful is the vast amount of interest and activity 
from the SELinux community in developing strict [57, p.242] and targeted [57, p.261] 
example policies that will suit the security requirements of many standard systems 
and which are available in the mainstream SELinux distributions. Furthermore there 
is ongoing work in developing a more modular approach to policies in the Reference 
Policy project [58] and policy development frameworks to assist with writing policy 
[59]. In our work, we are interested in how this seemingly flexible approach, 
incorporating the strength of mandatory access control with the highly configurable 
benefits of type enforcement, can be exploited to support fit for purpose security 
where it is necessary to enforce conditional policy based on (pre-defmed) conditions.
The SELinux policy language was extended in 2004 to include conditional policy 
language extensions [60]. This provides the capacity to define conditional rules 
where the definition of the rule is dependent on the value of a pre-defined Boolean 
variable. For example, a subject may only be permitted to run a particular process if
the associated Boolean variable is set to True. Under normal circumstances, and let 
us assume that the default setting for the Boolean is false, the subject would not have 
the required privileges. However, if its value is true, the policy contains the necessary 
rules to allow the process to be run. It is possible for a ‘user’ occupying a suitable role 
to change the value o f Booleans in a running system. Therefore the policy can be 
written such that behaviour changes ‘on the fly’ that is, without restarting the system. 
This has the obvious advantage that disruption to the system operator is minimised, 
which in a system critical environment, such as the military, would probably be 
essential. O f course such an environment would also demand that whatever is used to 
change the value of the Boolean can be trusted. This is even more critical where we 
want to minimise human intervention and thus have a background process changing 
the value when a condition is met.
The use of SELinux to support adaptive conditions has been explored by others in 
recent literature. In [61] Gregory and Loscocco developed a prototype system to 
demonstrate support for Risk Adaptable Access Controls (RAdAC). The overall 
objective of this work is similar to our own, since they are seeking to secure a change 
in the security profile of the system using SELinux policy. However, the most 
striking difference between our work and theirs is that our policy change is carried out 
automatically through the use of a Boolean setting and conditional policy statements. 
Gregory and Loscocco’s work uses a graphical user interface (GUI) from which a 
system administrator is able to select a new policy to load, based on their perception 
of risk. The authors observe that real applications supporting RAdAC may require a 
more automated means of identifying the need to change security policy. They 
suggest this could be done by replacing the manual “risk knob” with external sensors 
in the environment to detect when a new policy should be loaded. Our work provides 
a demonstration that this extension is possible. The security policy automatically 
makes changes to a user’s capability based upon the detection of a pre-defined 
condition in the environment. The NPC2 architecture defines an environmental 
monitor component which could be a simple software process (as used in the 
demonstration system described in Chapters 5 and 6) or a combination of external 
sensors (hardware) and software. Such implementation specific details are completely 
dependent on the requirements of the target system since the NPC2 does not dictate 
the type of technology used.
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The Dynamic Policy Enforcement Agent (DPEA) described by Pollet, Butler and 
Hale [62] is probably the closest rival to our work to emerge in recent literature. 
According to the authors, the DPEA tool provides a new mechanism using the 
SELinux security policy to deflect attacks. To achieve this goal, the tool monitors the 
environment for internal and external threats and uses SELinux Booleans coupled 
with conditional policy statements to modify the security level of the system. Our 
work is similar in that we incorporate the same constituent components: 
environmental monitoring, some form of policy trigger mechanism (which can be 
realised through Boolean variables) and conditional statements. In our research these 
components when combined form a demonstrable implementation o f our NPC2 which 
forms the basis of this thesis. However, the NPC2 differs from DPEA in that we are 
interested in enabling capability at the time it is required and in response to specific 
events. Interestingly the NPC2 could also be used to defend the system (by enabling a 
different or potentially more limited set of capabilities) but its ultimate objective is in 
supporting fit for purpose security to the system owner or user. We utilise the security 
design goal of SELinux, that is, ‘deny all’ by default and through standard security 
policy a baseline set of capabilities are permitted that will enable the user to operate 
under ‘normal’ conditions. The NPC2 is designed to cope with exceptions to the 
baseline and allow the system to ‘adapt’ to changing conditions when those conditions 
prevail. This is achieved through the conditional policy statements. Furthermore, our 
NPC2 is a concept that can be applied at many levels. In this thesis we show how it is 
used at the system modelling stage to represent conditional and temporary behaviour 
in the target system and as a means to assess potential compromise paths during the 
risk assessment process. In Chapter 5 the NPC2 architecture is specifically described. 
Our prototype system using SELinux is only one example of how the NPC2 
architecture can be constructed. Since the NPC2 architecture itself makes no 
assumptions about technology, system developers have control over the components 
they use to construct each element of the NPC2. Conversely, the DPEA example 
appears to be bound to a very specific technology platform. Finally our work with the 
NPC2, whilst offering a flexible solution, is without doubt more biased towards the 
deterministic end of the flexibility scale. Given our target environment, this is 
considered appropriate. However the NPC2 architecture is not a limitation since it can 
be implemented in other ways which would support a less deterministic approach.
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2.1 Statement of Research Problem
Following our review of relevant literature in the complex and vast area of 
information security, it is our belief that research in developing a more flexible and 
dynamic approach to security through policy, architecture and mechanism is still an 
emerging area with unsolved issues and the potential for further investigation. Our 
research is grounded in the context of the following question:
I f  current security policy models do not adequately express or capture the security 
requirements o f  high assurance, ad-hoc and collaborative interactions, what options 
are available fo r  engineering solutions appropriate to the Network Enabled 
Capability military initiative?
In addressing this question, our research has followed a systematic appraisal of 
security policy, architecture and mechanism since it was discovered early on that a 
solution would require a synthesis of the three. Our initial investigations into this 
question led us to believe that a feasible answer lay in developing fit for purpose 
security solutions that could be applied to the NEC environment. The remainder of 
this thesis describes how we approached and achieved this goal and thus successfully 
addressed the research question.
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Chapter 3: Modelling Changing Security Requirements
The security policy itself is central to developing an appropriate security solution. The 
development process begins with a high level expression of requirements. At the 
outset these may be simple and relatively conceptual natural language statements 
which can be subsequently captured and made more specific within a modelling 
framework. Through a gradual process of refinement, an increasing level of detail 
and possibly formalism will be applied to the statements until rules that can be 
implemented as ‘policy’ in the target system, are defined. It is at this stage that the 
policy becomes suitable for the security enforcement mechanisms within the target 
environment using the security sub-system and language of the host platform. The 
policy is now able to, in the words of Daminaou et al, “... govern the choices of 
behaviour in a system ...” [27].
Fit for purpose security demands a policy that is able to respond to changing 
conditions in the environment and effect appropriate behaviour in the enforcement 
mechanisms within the system. However, a crucial part of balancing the desired 
levels o f flexibility against assurance is exposing the impact and ultimate risk that 
introducing flexibility will undoubtedly bring so that mitigating action can be taken. 
The risk assessment process can be assisted, or hindered, depending on the quality of 
information resulting from the policy modelling process. It is therefore crucial to 
capture and express security requirements as accurately as possible.
For the purposes of this research, the main body of the investigation is focussed on the 
use of graphical models to express flexible security requirements. Our work embraces 
the philosophy of DBSy and judges that the security requirements of an organisation 
can be captured in models which identify separation and sharing needs. However, in 
accordance with our vision for fit for purpose security, the DBSy technique is applied 
to a case study which exhibits changing, temporary and conditional requirements. 
This will be a typical scenario for the NEC military operation of the future. Since 
DBSy was developed originally for the defence community, our study provides an 
ideal opportunity to assess DBSy against a very relevant type of case and identify any 
limitations with the approach.
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During the course of the research it was revealed that separation and sharing 
requirements could be captured in more than one way using DBSy. This led us to 
conclude that there was probably no right or wrong approach; the onus is on the 
system designer to select the approach which most accurately reflects the 
requirements of the system. This is an important point because critics of our work 
could suggest other ways in which the case study could be modelled using existing 
DBSy notation which would of course affect the structure o f the model and may 
impact other factors such as the risk assessment. Given that our concerns with DBSy 
lie in its ability to capture changing requirements, it is considered necessary to study 
as many permutations of the models as possible in order to ascertain if  change can be 
reflected by a different method. However, as the work in this section confirms, 
regardless of alternative solutions, there are limitations with the current modelling 
approach with respect to capturing change. The solutions we put forward to augment 
DBSy have been carefully considered; indeed, as the study progressed we discovered 
ways in which our own proposed additions could be enhanced to address the 
challenges of presenting temporary conditions in the models.
During the course of this work it was discovered that an important assumption was 
being made about the user(s) affected by the temporary change in capability. The 
scenario only affects one user at any one time but the domain structure suggests that 
all members (which may be one or many) are impacted. The case arises where 
capability between members of a domain is temporarily unequal which in turn, affects 
the dynamics and relationships inside of the domain. Although it is possible for the 
members to operate in different domains and model this case using existing notation, 
it is believed that such an approach does not accurately reflect the requirements. If 
the inequality is both temporary and conditional the additional domain may never be 
required and therefore may never need the security mechanisms employed to support 
it. To overcome this inconsistency, another concept and addition to the notation was 
required which could either work with or independently of our NPC2. The result was 
the Non-Persistent Domain (NPD). The purpose of the NPD is to represent a 
temporary community created spontaneously (and perhaps conditionally) for a 
specific purpose. Not only does this concept fit with our philosophy of capturing 
changing security requirements it could also be used to capture and express the 
presence o f ad-hoc communities and include them in the InfoSec models. To the best
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of our knowledge this has not been done with DBSy. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
challenge of extending the security boundaries of a system to include such temporary 
connections is a natural consequence of the Information Age and is increasing in 
prevalence and importance. It is therefore deemed essential to discuss this 
development in our work as part of the modelling section.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of DBSy and then presents the Information 
Security (InfoSec) models which are the output of this modelling process. After the 
results are analysed, the InfoSec models are updated to include the NPC2 and a 
summary is provided describing how these additions augment the existing 
methodology. We conclude the chapter by summarising some o f the collaborative 
work that has been conducted with De Montfort University using their formal policy 
modelling and analysis tools.
3.1 Example Scenario
In order to validate our approach, a small but illustrative scenario, typical of a future 
military requirement has been devised. One of the most striking characteristics is that 
a mixture o f resources from different security domains are used to form a new agile 
grouping suited to the task in hand. In the lifetime o f this task it is expected that the 
boundaries of the system and the separation and sharing requirements will change to 
reflect operational need. A high-level statement of requirements is given below:-
Military Need: On an expeditionary operation, the deployed order o f  battle (ORBAT) 
comprises groups o f  military assets that exist within pre-defined security domains. 
NEC envisages that commanders may create any desired subset as an agile group for  
a limited period, to undertake a specific task. The elements o f  the agile group will 
need to intercommunicate and will also need to communicate with their functional 
parent organisations. On completion o f  the task, either the agile group will dissolve 
or its composition will be adjusted fo r  another task. The commander’s ability to task 
organise an agile group should not be constrained by security considerations, in 
terms o f  what can be task-organised, the free passage o f information between agile 
group elements or the time taken to establish the group.
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3.2 Summary of Requirements
For the purposes of this research a formal requirements analysis has not been 
conducted on the scenario. The above description given of the ‘Military Need’ 
provides sufficient information to allow us to elicit and summarise explicit and 
implicit requirements from the statements of intent. Some of those listed below are 
used in the development of the models because they provide information regarding 
separation and sharing needs. The results will show that not all information 
pertaining to the requirements can be captured and must be therefore be provided in 
supporting documentation or by some other means. Indeed, the DBSy models are 
generally accompanied by a rich document set, including tables and possibly network 
diagrams that assist with communicating the security requirements of the system 
under development.
Explicit requirements:
El. It must be possible to create new agile resource groupings from a subset of 
resources originating from different security domains
E2. Within the new agile group, intercommunication between resources is required
E3. Communication back to the functional parent organisation is required
E4. On completion of the task, assets must be sanitised so data, for example, is 
appropriate for the security classification of either the functional parent to which 
the asset is returned or a new group if re-organisation takes place
E5. The Commander requires liberty to organise assets without being constrained by 
security
Page 37
Implicit requirements:
11. Assets from different security classifications and security clearance must coexist 
in the agile group
12. The needs of the agile group’s commander must not compromise the security of 
the organisations surrounding the new grouping. Therefore it is implicit that the 
commander understands the external security environment and the constraints it 
may place on his or her decision making
13. The formation of different resource configurations will be time-critical, that is, 
there will be a time frame outside of which the resources will be of limited or no 
use (and may even compromise security). Flexibility with the underlying policy 
and infrastructure must be realised within a specified time period.
3.3 Modelling Security Requirements with DBSy
This section begins with a brief description of the DBSy approach and notation. For 
brevity this section is limited to an overview. Further information and worked 
examples can be found in publications such as [16], [17]. Appendix A contains an 
extract from the DBSy ‘quick reference guide’, reproduced by permission of QinetiQ.
DBSy captures and documents the sharing and separation requirements of an 
organisation in a series of Information Security (InfoSec) models. The process begins 
by defining the InfoSec Business model which serves to identify:
• The resources to separate
• From whom separation is necessary
• The information/resources to share in order to meet business needs
• With whom sharing is permitted to meet business needs
• The method by which sharing is achieved
Resources are grouped together into domains which are analogous to departments in 
an organisation. A domain has no geographical dependency, that is, it could represent
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a department whose members are dispersed physically across the globe. Domain 
members are at liberty to share information within the domain without constraint. 
However, the fact that members are grouped together is indicative that the domain 
requires protection from other domains identified in the system and some constraints 
are placed on the ability to share. Where sharing is permitted between domains a line 
is drawn connecting them together and annotated to show the method of sharing.
The InfoSec Infrastructure model builds upon the business model to show where 
‘strong’ separation is required between domains through an impenetrable boundary. 
Where sharing is permitted, it is controlled through a single, managed point of access. 
As its name suggests, the Infrastructure model is more closely aligned with the 
underlying network and controls that would be enforced to implement the separation 
and sharing requirements that form the security policy.
Finally the InfoSec Architecture model is the composite of both models. This allows 
stakeholders to combine both separation and sharing requirements onto a single 
model. The model assists with understanding risks posed to the business which arise 
from the permission and capability to share data or indeed from preventing it. At this 
stage of the process the models are completely technology independent. It is only 
when the risk assessment is performed that system architects calculate the type and 
placement of controls necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
3.3.1 Modelling the Scenario using DBSy
The scenario, introduced in Section 3.2, has been modelled in Figure 1 using DBSy. 
Not all of the requirements listed in Section 3.2 can be shown in the models because 
some would be satisfied by procedural rather than technological means.
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Figure 1: Case Study modelled as InfoSec Architecture Model
Figure 1 shows the InfoSec Architecture model. To aid comprehension of the model, 
the symbols provided in Appendix A may be used in conjunction with the narrative 
that follows.
Domains are shown by solid ellipses. Permitted business connections link domains 
together and are annotated with a construct to indicate the method o f sharing. For the 
purposes o f our research it is necessary only to indicate that sharing is required, not 
necessarily the means of achieving it although Figure 1 assumes ‘messaging’ as 
shown by the envelope construct. Environments are essentially ‘where people work’ 
and are indicated by broken ellipses. These relate to geographical locations. The 
portal or broad arrow connecting the Environment with the Domain represents the 
means of access. This would provide details used for implementation such as two- 
factor authentication, operating system, access control policy and so on. Figure 1 
shows Environment and Portal constructs for the agile mission group (Agile Task A) 
and Domain B (the HQ). This part of the system is our focus of interest and the 
elements over which control has been assumed. Therefore we have not identified 
Environments and Portals for the other domains in the model.
Emboldened rectangles are named ‘Islands’ and belong to the InfoSec Architecture 
notation. These are used to show where strong separation, assumed to be
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impenetrable, would be required. It can be seen that the Agile Task A Domain 
containing Domains AX and AY would be hosted on its own island of infrastructure. 
Sharing between the domains is controlled at a single point, represented by a 
Causeway or emboldened square which also contains the notation for the method of 
sharing.
In Figure 1, the Domain ‘Agile Task A ’ has been refined into two sub-domains AX 
and AY. This allows us to reveal more detail about the composition of the domain 
and is necessary because there are restrictions placed on the sub-domains which could 
not be adequately captured in a higher level view. In our scenario, Domains AX and 
AY experience different external connections albeit under particular conditions. It 
was therefore necessary to refine the Domain ‘Agile Task A ’ in order to capture this 
level of detail.
Figure 1 shows the model of the complete case study including the functional parent 
components of the organisation. Furthermore, an element o f prediction has been 
included in the models by introducing an external domain to represent collaborative 
partners. The case study states that NEC envisages that commanders may create any 
desired subset as an agile group for a limited period. Given that there is an increasing 
requirement to share information within national contingents and between coalition 
partners, it is reasonable to include an external domain to the model to indicate with 
whom collaboration may become necessary depending on how the operation unfolds. 
It should be noted that this requirement demonstrates a potential flexible and 
conditional need in that it may happen. It is by no means certain. The work in this 
chapter will reveal that it is possible to capture a conditional requirement in the 
graphical models and in Chapter 4 the potential impact on risk can be assessed.
Our scenario has an additional consideration, not captured explicitly in the scenario 
text, but which gives rise to the need for flexible and ‘adaptive’ behaviour and 
therefore serves to illustrate the raison d ’etre of this research. The condition affects 
the agile group and we judge it to be a reasonable and realistic requirement for a 
military hierarchy. Under normal circumstances Domain AX is permitted to share 
information with Domain AY. It is not normally permitted to share with Domain B 
unless Domain AY is unavailable. This requirement is fundamental to our research
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since it exposes the need to capture changing capabilities within the graphical models. 
This type of behaviour would undoubtedly occur as a task develops because, as 
indicated in [63] it is expected that a plan never survives first contact and information 
needs would change to support modifications to the plan. Moreover it is probable that 
the configuration of a system would change with respect to ad-hoc interactions 
between different domains. Small communities of users with shared interests would 
be set-up and dismantled for the purposes o f temporary information exchange.
The InfoSec Business model maps to the requirements listed in Table 1 as follows:
Requirement Achieved in Business Model Comments
El No Not possible in model
E2 Yes Agile group members AX and AY 
permitted to share
E3 Yes e.g. Domain AX permitted to 
communicate with AX Parent 
domain
E4 No Not possible in model
E5 Achieved in part 1. Model contains element of 
future prediction with inclusion of 
external collaborative domain.
2. Connection shown between 
domains AX and B. This 
relationship will be clarified since 
the connection is only permitted 
under particular conditions.
D1 Achieved in part DBSy notation allows us to refine 
a domain into constituent parts. In 
this case AX and AY have 
different levels o f capability
D2 No Not possible in model
D3 No Not possible in model
Table 1: Requirements Mapping
The results in Table 1 show that the DBSy models are suited to capturing certain 
requirements; specifically those cases where there are clear and unchanging 
separation and sharing requirements between different communities of users. Other 
requirements they can only capture in part or not at all. Our work looks in detail at 
some of the requirements that are partially satisfied. It is surmised that this is where
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the research will provide the greatest contribution and progression towards the goal of 
fit for purpose security.
The investigation continues by refining the scenario to concentrate on a sub-set o f the 
system, the Agile Task group which exhibits the changing security properties. The 
resulting InfoSec Architecture Model is shown in Figure 2.
A gile  G ro u p  AYAgile Group AX HQ
AX
Agile T a s k - A ^ fsland B
Island A
Figure 2: Focus of Interest - Agile Task Group
As shown in Figure 2, DBSy captures maximum permitted connectivity, that is, all of 
the permitted connections that would be required within the system at any time are 
represented in the models. One very important observation of both Figures 1 and 2 is 
that permitted connections between Domains AX and AY and AX and B are both 
shown. It is deduced from the requirements that this observation is not strictly true. 
In this case, the ability to share is a conditional capability and will therefore only 
occur in specific circumstances. In a dynamic environment maximum permitted 
connectivity is context specific. It would be expected to change as a situation or 
operation unfolds to reflect changing (permitted) resource requirements. For 
example, our policy may state that information up to secret can be shared within the 
community. However, if  a collaborative partner is encountered and communication 
established, this may change. How can this situation be captured in existing 
approaches, that is, do we model the maximum state of connectivity where secret 
information is being passed? If this approach is adopted, how do we manage and 
model the situation where a collaborative partner is encountered and a different level 
of information sharing is permitted? Furthermore, it is known from the scenario that 
sharing is only permitted between Domains AX and B when particular conditions are
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present in the network. The models in Figures 1 and 2 only capture the maximum 
state, which is in fact, inaccurate. How can we reconcile the two sets o f capabilities 
with one another? These questions are addressed as part of this section.
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the security landscape and the 
appropriate security enforcement controls in the system it is necessary to express what 
we term ‘non-persistent’ business connections. These temporary and possibly 
conditional connections between domains essentially give the system its flexibility 
since they represent the requirement to share (resources) between domains but 
temporarily and on a conditional basis. Quite simply, they alter the separation and 
sharing profile o f the system under different circumstances. With access to this level 
of information, the system architect is able to select appropriate security controls, 
when required, to enable a capability. The models should provide sufficient detail to 
aid understanding of the impact that enabling flexible behaviour will bring. This view 
is entirely complementary to and supportive o f our notion of fit for purpose security.
Where a system is likely to be deployed in different scenarios, it is expected that the 
system would be modelled for each individual case rather than attempt to capture all 
of the information on a single model. The changes of state, represented as non- 
persistent connections within this case study, could be considered as individual 
scenarios. Therefore individual models have been produced in Figures 3 and 4 to 
capture the two states o f the system. We term this level one refinement. Under this 
regime, not only is it possible to capture the true connections at different states in the 
policy, we can also identify limitations with the models more easily and demonstrate 
where our proposed additions augment the modelling process.
In accordance with our case study, Figure 3 shows the business model where 
connectivity is permitted between Domains AX and AY but not between Domains 
AX and B. This state is categorised as the baseline policy since it represents the 
normal set of conditions that this system is expected to support.
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Agile Group AY ;I Agile Group AX HQ
AX AY
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Figure 3: InfoSec Architecture model; Domains AX and AY sharing
Although Figure 3 is an accurate reflection o f the ‘normal’ policy state it does not 
reveal exceptions to the rule. It would therefore be necessary to refer back to a more 
detailed diagram in order to fully appreciate the complete picture of connectivity.
Figure 4 shows the exceptional state of the policy where Domain AX is permitted to 
communicate with Domain B but not AY. Since this model is a refined version of 
Figure 2, none of the related connections are shown; specifically the relationship 
between Domains AX and AY is not provided.
Agile G roup AYAgile G roup AX HQ
AX AY
Island B
Island A
Figure 4: InfoSec Architecture Model; Domains AX and B sharing
3.3.2 Limitations with DBSy
The main limitation revealed through the modelling process so far is that the DBSy 
models have no cognisance of temporal and conditional changes to the separation and
Page 45
sharing profile. The security solution is always based upon maximum permitted 
connectivity irrespective of the fact that sharing may never be required between some 
of the domains if the motivating condition does not arise. Currently, different 
‘scenarios’ are modelled independently o f one another therefore each time a condition 
alters the state o f the security profile, it would be necessary to generate a new model. 
We conclude that if conditional and temporary connectivity can be represented on a 
single model, the fidelity of the models is enriched. The information presented to 
system designers and stakeholders is a more complete and accurate representation of 
the actual security requirements.
3.3.3 Application of the Non-Persistent Capability Concept
Our research proposes a simple but influential addition to DBSy that will identify 
where a temporary and conditional business connection between two domains is 
permitted. The construct put forward in this thesis represents the NPC2. Its purpose 
is to alter the separation and sharing profile of the system by manipulating the 
presence o f the business connection. Note that the connection indicates permission to 
share which of course, requires a number of complementary activities to occur before 
this can take place. In [23, p. 125] we describe how the activity is decomposed into a 
series o f stakeholders, interactions and attributes that allow us to express ‘permitted to 
share’ in terms o f policy rules. However, at the level of abstraction required for this 
discussion it is sufficient to simply capture the existence of the behaviour through the 
NPC2 construct.
Our additions to the DBSy notation include two constructs which operate together. 
The first is a conditional connector, which takes the form of a switch and is shown in 
Figure 5. This depicts the conditional paths through the construct when the input 
point and an output point are connected by a line.
or
Figure 5: Conditional Connector
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The second is a temporary business connector, represented by a broken line 
(connecting one point on the conditional connector with a Domain). The use of a 
broken line is deliberate as it allows us to distinguish between the standard permitted 
business connector, which would form our ‘normal’ or ‘baseline’ policy and 
temporary exceptions to this case. The temporary business connector is shown in 
Figure 6. Note that it can be used independently of the conditional connector and in 
Chapter 4 such a case is described.
or
Figure 6: Temporary Business Connector
Combined, these two objects comprise the NPC2. Our proposed modifications to the 
notation are extremely simple in design but far-reaching in impact. Our decision to 
maintain simplicity with the proposed additions was deliberate and entirely in 
harmony with the design principles o f DBSy. The NPC2 was put to QinetiQ and the 
reaction to the notation itself was mixed although the principle behind its purpose met 
with a positive response. Acceptance o f the ideas into the DBSy notation has not been 
pursued further but will probably be followed up once the thesis is complete.
Figure 7 presents the modified InfoSec Architecture model using the NPC2.
Agile Group AYAgile G roup AX HQ
AYAX
Island B
Island A
Figure 7: NPC2 in DBSy InfoSec Architecture model
Page 47
Figure 7 shows that Domain AX is permitted to share with both Domains AY and B, 
but not simultaneously. The current (active) path is shown by the position o f the 
switch. Importantly, the temporary business connector provides information about.the 
policy in that it shows the exception to the ‘normal’ connectivity. Figure 7 informs us 
that the standard condition is to permit sharing between Domains AX and AY because 
it uses the standard DBSy business connector. The exception to the policy is the 
temporary business connector allowing communication between AX and B albeit 
under specific conditions.
The NPC2 is clearly useful in clarifying the nature o f a relationship between two 
domains where their separation and sharing profile is not constant. In Chapter 7 
additional examples derived from the case study are modelled to show other instances 
where the NPC2 can be used to differentiate between baseline and exceptional or 
changing security requirements. Nonetheless, despite the positive advantages of 
introducing the NPC2 to the models it is still believed that, in some cases, a level of 
detail is missing from the models.
Use of the domain construct implies that any or all members may share information 
with the connected Domain using the permitted business connection. This is not 
necessarily the case. Our scenario provides an example where the military 
organisation would follow an established hierarchy of capabilities. Under this regime, 
only one member (the second in command or 2IC) would be permitted elevated 
capability i f  and when the requirement arose. Although it is anticipated that DBSy 
would require separation o f these users into separate domains to reflect their different 
‘needs’, it is suggested this approach is not always suitable. In our scenario for 
example, the requirement for the 2IC to ‘move’ between domains would only occur 
under certain conditions. It is therefore a temporary and exceptional requirement 
which should, in our view, be documented as such. This approach more accurately 
states the separation and sharing profile o f the system and benefits the correct 
assessment of risk. Our alternative solution is the NPD, which complements the 
NPC2, and is described in the next section.
3.3.4 Introducing Non-Persistent Domains
The NPC2 captures the existence of temporary changes to the separation and sharing 
profile o f a system that may arise as a result o f different events in the environment. 
We conjecture this also includes the formation (and destruction) of ad-hoc 
communities where members will form a temporary association for the purposes of 
information sharing and disband when appropriate.
As described in the previous section a potential complication arises from the implied 
assumption that in forming a non-persistent connection between Domains AX and B 
the models effectively state that any member o f Domain AX is permitted to 
communicate with Domain B. In reality, this would not necessarily be the case. In an 
agile mission group the 2IC would take on the additional responsibility to maintain 
communication, not the entire membership o f the community. In the absence o f the 
2IC an established hierarchy would be followed where the next most senior would 
become leader and so on until membership was exhausted! In a DBSy model an 
individual can be a member of one or more domains and may work in more than one 
domain at any one time. This access is shown and ultimately controlled by the 
environment since it is probable that the domain would only be accessible from a 
particular configuration or possibly geographical location. As part o f  our research this 
approach was considered but rejected for the following reason.
It is feasible that a member of Domain AX could also be a member o f Domain AY 
and simply transfer to the alternate domain when conditions in the environment 
required this behaviour. However, the ability to work in Domain AY may be 
impractical since it could afford the user inappropriate capabilities for the task in 
hand. Domain AY could, for example, hold permitted business connections with other 
domains that should not normally be accessible to or exercised by a ‘temporary’ 
member originating from Domain AX. Recall that our aim in fit for purpose security 
is to support appropriate security at the time it is required. We therefore seek to 
enhance the user’s capability for a limited set of tasks that enables them to do a 
specific task at a specific time. This approach allows them to either remain in their 
own domain or through the use o f our NPD, transfer into a new ‘temporary’ domain 
constructed specifically for the purpose. In this section we illustrate how this can be
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achieved. For brevity notation representing the Environment and Portal constructs 
has been omitted from the diagrams.
In Figure 8 Domain AX has a permitted business connection with Domain B as 
indicated by the position on the conditional connector. Not all members o f Domain 
AX have this capability therefore it is necessary to differentiate between regular 
members o f Domain AX and the member with elevated capability.
AY ) 
Agile T a s k -A ^
AX
Island B
Island A
Figure 8: Logical connectivity when NPC2 is employed
Figure 9 illustrates what actually happens when the conditional connector permits the 
business connection between Domains AX and B.
AXAX
Island B
Island A
Figure 9: Actual connectivity when NPC2 is employed
The elevated capability associated with the 2IC to permit the business connection with 
Domain B effectively sets this individual into their own domain (AXi) since they 
have software acting on their behalf to allow sharing with Domain B. Other members 
of Domain AX either do not have this capability or if  it is available, it is neither active 
nor accessible to them. Although the refinements shown in Figure 9 are a better 
reflection o f the case study it is still not completely accurate because the temporal 
characteristics o f the scenario have not been identified. Domain AXi may effectively 
never exist if  the condition that triggers the need for it does not transpire.
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Closer examination o f this case leads us to conclude that an additional construct, 
which represents a temporary domain, may be the answer. Since the NPD is a 
temporary community we selected an elaboration of the existing domain construct and 
devised the ephemeral ‘cloud’. At this time neither the concept nor the notation for 
the NPD has been put to QinetiQ as possible additions to DBSy. Figure 10 revises 
the InfoSec Architecture model to include the NPD.
AX AY
Island  B
AX
A gile AX
Island A
AX A d-H oc
Figure 10: Introducing the NPD
Figure 10 is interpreted as follows. Domain AX is normally permitted to share 
information with Domain AY as shown by the position of the NPC2. It is not 
normally permitted to share information with the temporary Domain AXi and does 
not have a direct business connection with Domain B. Domain AXi is a non-persistent 
or temporary domain which, in this case, only exists if  the NPC2 is switched to allow 
a permitted business connection between Domains AX and B. When formed, AXi is 
permitted to share information with both Domains AX and B. As shown in Figure 10, 
it is part o f the Agile Group Domain and Island and is therefore subject to the same 
security constraints.
Note that Figure 10 also shows the DBSy Environment and Portal constructs. 
Domain AX may be accessed from the ‘Agile AX environment’ whilst AXj, when it 
exists, may only be accessed from the AX Ad-Hoc environment. The naming o f the 
domains and environments is quite deliberate and attempts to indicate the relationship, 
in this case, between Domain AX and the non-persistent Domain AXi.
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It is possible to extend the concept o f the NPD by looking at other types of domain 
occupant. For example, Domain AXi has only been constructed to permit sharing 
with Domain B. However, it can also be used to explain the case where a domain is 
(potentially) permitted to share with a collaborative partner. An ad-hoc domain using 
the NPD construct could be employed for this purpose as shown in the InfoSec 
Business Model in Figure 11.
AY
Collabl
Collaborative
P a rtn e r
Figure 11: NPD representing an Ad-Hoc Community
In Table 1, requirement E5 stated the Commander’s need to (re)organise assets 
without constraints from security. For the purposes of illustration, the requirement 
was interpreted in such a way that a (potential) permitted business connection with a 
collaborative partner should be shown in the model. This provides an example o f a 
future requirement which is not definite at the time of planning, but allows us to 
predict what could happen if  the agile mission group did need to organise in such a 
way as to share information with a third-party community. Whereas the original 
DBSy model could only partially capture the requirement, it is believed that the NPD 
used in Figure 11 fully captures it. It shows that Domain AY may form a temporary 
permitted business connection with an ad-hoc community which is also occupied by 
the collaborative partner. This configuration may have additional constraints placed 
upon it (not shown in this Figure). Since the NPD represents an ad-hoc network, it is 
quite possible that other members apart from the collaborative domain which has been 
anticipated may be present. For that reason the NPC2 may also be used to show that
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when the NPD is established, Domain AY may not communicate with Domain B. 
This InfoSec Business model for this scenario is shown in Figure 12.
IS!
Collabl
Collaborative
Partner
Figure 12: Combined use of NPC2 and NPD
Figure 12 shows quite clearly that the baseline policy permits Domain AY to share 
with Domain B using messaging as indicated by the NPC2. When switched between 
Domain AY and the NPD, the business connection with Domain B would no longer 
be permitted or available as shown in Figure 13.
Collabl
Collaborative
Partner
Figure 13: NPC2 permitting business connection with NPD
This section on informal modelling can be summarised as follows. Capturing and 
expressing temporal and conditional separation and sharing requirements in a high 
level graphical modelling environment is difficult, particularly when working within 
the boundaries o f the existing toolset and avoiding radical changes to either the
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approach or notation. Our proposed additions to the DBSy methodology and notation 
are promising. The NPC2 allows us to capture the existence o f a non-persistent 
permitted business connection between two domains. However, we note that its use 
suggests that an entire domain adopts any change in permitted connections when it is 
likely that this capability may be limited. The fit for purpose security approach seeks 
to minimise the number of changes to the security profile and elevate capability for a 
limited period thus affecting the minimal number of users possible. This approach is 
unlike others, such as the principle of weak tranquillity, where the protective marking 
of an object is lowered (after sanitisation) with the potential that a greater number of 
subjects will subsequently acquire access.
There are o f course different ways in which the requirements could be modelled. 
However, without a change in the notation, it is not possible to capture the temporal 
or conditional properties o f a connection. Through the introduction o f another 
construct, the NPD, ad-hoc groups o f subjects can be identified. As shown in Figure 
10 by using the combination of the NPC2 and the NPD construct it is possible to 
identify a temporary change in the separation and sharing requirements, including the 
existence o f a temporary community. Of course the level of detail is limited. The use 
o f the NPC2 shows a relationship between the change in separation and sharing and 
the use o f the temporary domain however, it does not inform us if  the domain is 
formed as a result o f the change or if  it pre-exists. From the use o f the environment 
construct we learn that access to the temporary domain is achieved through the AX 
ad-hoc environment therefore if  a subject requires access to both, each environment 
would need to be supported.
It is acknowledged that the additional constructs introduce some complexity into the 
model and there are potential inconsistencies that need to be addressed. For example, 
the connection between AXi and B has been shown as temporary in Figure 10, that is, 
a dependency exists on the conditional connector and the associated permitted 
business connector. If the conditional connector permits sharing between AX and AY 
then AXi effectively does not exist because there is no requirement for it. However, 
we could also utilise the NPD construct to represent an ad-hoc network. In this case 
its existence may not be dependent on the availability or not of Domain AY. 
Furthermore, the creation of an ad-hoc network may be in addition to or in place o f an
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existing domain. Non-persistent constructs and ad-hoc networking is an area of 
research in its own right. It is considered important to model a simple case study to 
begin discussion, and this is addressed in Chapter 7. Even so, we do not claim to have 
exhausted discussion of this topic in this thesis, and it is clear that further research 
could be done.
3.4 Formal Policy Models
So far this chapter has described the role of the NPC2 and NPD within the context of 
an informal modelling approach. Given that our work with fit for purpose security 
combines both flexibility and a level of assurance it is deemed necessary to consider 
an informal methodology such as DBSy in conjunction with a formal modelling 
approach based on mathematical proof. This approach supports a more rigorous level 
of analysis and verification to confirm the extent to which the proposed system and 
policy design conforms to the security requirements. This is clearly only one level of 
verification; once the design is translated into a working system it is necessary to 
conduct a thorough set of functionality and penetration tests to confirm the security 
and functional behaviour of the system under both ‘normal’ and ‘exceptional’ 
operating conditions.
This section introduces the collaborative work that was conducted with the Software 
Technology Research Laboratory (STRL) at De Montfort University. The STRL has 
been actively engaged in security research particularly in the area o f software Agents 
and SANTA is one technology to emerge from ongoing research [50]. The 
collaboration provided an opportunity to use the DBSy InfoSec Architecture models 
from our case study as input to the SANTA formal policy modelling process and 
analyse the success of combining the two. This work had several aspirations. Not 
only were we interested to discover whether the dynamic requirements described in 
the case study could be modelled using SANTA, we were also curious to find out how 
well the output from an informal approach could be used as input to a formal 
approach that defines and requires very precise constructs. The study for this thesis 
benefited from verifying the changing and conditional separation and sharing 
requirements expressed in DBSy through a formal modelling approach and the STRL 
benefited from exercising SANTA with a case study from a different domain.
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Furthermore, it was possible to create a simulation of the security policy using SPAT 
which is a part of the toolkit developed at the STRL. The simulation provided 
verification and feedback through a graphical interface confirming that the policy 
rules were behaving as defined and expected as the conditions changed. For the 
purposes o f this thesis, detailed elaboration of the collaborative task is not 
appropriate. Instead we summarise some o f the salient content and results from 
detailed papers as published in [23] and [24].
3.4.1 Policy Modelling
The case study used in [22] was essentially the same as that described in Section 
3.3.1. The paper referred to the limitations o f DBSy regarding the capture of dynamic 
security requirements within the existing notation. Our work with the NPC2 was in its 
infancy at that time. Therefore, the role of a non-persistent capability concept such as 
the NPC2 was only mentioned but not presented in the models.
The SANTA security policy framework comprises three main components. Firstly, 
the policy model allows for the expression o f security requirements such as:
• Authorisation: Defines access to resources such as the communication 
infrastructure
• Delegation: Defines which stakeholders can pass on their privileges to others
• Obligation: Defines conditions under which activities must be performed
The model has a formal underpinning in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [51] which is 
suitable for expressing and reasoning about temporal dependencies between policies 
and the dynamic change o f these requirements in a compositional manner. By this it is 
meant that different parts o f a policy may be specified individually and then 
composed to provide the complete system policy.
The formal foundation and the expressiveness of the policy model with respect to 
dynamic change and temporal dependencies of security requirements was used to 
show how high-level DBSy specifications can be represented by policies. Classes of 
requirements that cannot be adequately represented using DBSy were identified and 
modelled. The approach described in the paper exploits the advantages of both
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methodologies: the intuitive and high-level modelling capabilities o f DBSy, and the 
expressiveness and formality o f SANTA. This complementary approach should 
appeal to a wider policy development community and ultimately increase the 
opportunities for developing fit for purpose security.
For the purposes o f the paper, we extracted a number of policy requirements from the 
DBSy model that enabled us to illustrate our interest. The study was successful. The 
requirements were modelled using SANTA and the resulting policy was validated 
with SPAT. Not unexpectedly, the process did reveal difficulties when correlating the 
two very different modelling approaches. For example, before security requirements 
can be refined all stakeholders and their potential interactions must be identified. In 
this case study stakeholders were o f course the members of the different domains, 
thus a domain represents a community able to interact. The stakeholders can be 
identified from the DBSy model with relative ease. Establishing the potential 
interactions is more difficult, as the model can only express the existence (or non­
existence through omission) of a business connection. That said other information 
can easily be identified including the mode o f sharing, which was messaging in this 
case study. Moreover it can be inferred from a two-way business connection that 
stakeholders are permitted to both ‘send’ and ‘receive’ information across the 
permitted connection. The domains themselves are usually (but not always) labelled 
with the maximum protective marking of the material that can be contained in the 
domain. We therefore know the range of sensitivities that may be transmitted. What 
the models do not reveal however, is any constraints or conditions that may be placed 
on the interaction. A policy language, such as SANTA, provides greater 
expressiveness when defining the constraints on a business connection. The condition 
under which the communication is permitted may be more complex than domain 
membership. Policies can also explicitly state conditions for a denial of an interaction, 
which cannot be expressed in the higher-level DBSy diagram. To resolve conflicts, 
that is, where both a permission and a denial can be derived from the policy, the 
policy contains decision rules that enable conflict resolution.
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3.4.2 Conclusions from Collaborative Study
The joint work with De Montfort University was a useful exercise because it 
demonstrated how the graphical and visually intuitive DBSy models could be 
translated into a more expressive policy language such as SANTA. The formalisation 
process allowed for the identification and correction of ambiguities in the high-level 
policy that would not have been detectable otherwise. Given the policy representation 
of the DBSy model, it was possible to revisit the original requirements and capture 
more sophisticated properties associated with individual business connections that are 
o f course fundamental in producing the final policy enforcement rules.
The collaborative study demonstrated that flexibility can be achieved through policy 
and furthermore the use o f a formal language provides a level o f proof and confidence 
that is required in a military system. As a result, it is concluded that the approach 
constitutes an initial step in developing systems that can achieve the military 
requirements of flexibility and high assurance.
3.4.3 Concluding Observations
One o f the reasons for collaborating with De Montfort University for this study was 
that SANTA is still relatively new. At the time o f writing, it was not at a suitable state 
in its development to allow a novice user to take the software and model a case study 
without additional support. A watching brief is being maintained to see how the work 
continues to develop because as the results o f the joint paper clearly show, there is an 
opportunity to use the framework to provide a formal underpinning and refinement of 
informal models. A promising direction for future work could include combining a 
formal approach such as SANTA with an informal and graphical approach such as 
DBSy into a single package. Our collaborative work leads us to conclude that this 
development could have appeal because it builds upon the intuitive and graphical 
characteristics o f DBSy by offering a level o f rigour that may only be achieved 
through modelling frameworks underpinned by a formal, mathematical approach. This 
could be a fruitful topic for future research.
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Chapter 4: Risk Assessment and Changing Security Requirements
In Chapter 3 the security requirements of the case study were presented in the context 
of a separation and sharing profile and articulated through the DBSy InfoSec models. 
This chapter explores the risk analysis process and broadly applies principles from 
DBSy to our models both with and without the NPC2 and NPD notations. This 
enables us to validate our approach and assess the impact of including non-persistent 
and conditional connectivity in the models.
Permitted business connections between domains, which are necessary to enable 
sharing, also provide the means for compromising security if not appropriately 
protected. They can therefore also be viewed as potential compromise paths. As stated 
in Section 1.4.1, DBSy identifies a number o f possible different threats to the system 
which would normally be included as part o f the risk assessment process. However, in 
order to assess the impact of the NPC2 and NPD in the models, it is sufficient to limit 
our investigation to the fact that a connection and therefore a potential compromise 
path exists, rather than the multiplicity of methods by which it could be compromised. 
Assuming that the NPC2 and NPD constructs serve to reduce the number of potential 
compromise paths, it is conjectured that increasing the complexity of the model by 
considering other factors will amplify these beneficial effects. The DBSy risk analysis 
process looks at the affect of one or more domains, which form the potential Attack 
Group (AG), on another, which is the Focus of Interest (FOI). Essentially the FOI is 
where security controls will be applied to address the methods of compromise which 
have been identified. It therefore represents the domain over which the system 
stakeholders can exert some control. The risk analysis process considers both inbound 
and outbound paths between the AG and FOI. An inbound path introduces a 
compromise to the FOI. A computer virus is one example. The outbound path may 
constitute a breach o f confidentiality such as inappropriate release of information 
from the FOI. Where the FOI and AG have been defined in our study only inbound 
connections are included in the calculations. This is sufficient to examine and 
demonstrate our work. Outbound connectivity would simply double the number of 
potential compromise paths since the inbound connection could also be used as a 
means of compromising information from the FOI. This thesis also explores the case
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where any connection in the model may be considered as a potential compromise 
path. Whilst the identification of the FOI and AG allow us to define and limit the 
scope for analysis, we believe it is also of interest to examine the proliferation of 
connections and potential compromise paths in a system to identify any useful 
patterns that could be used to assist in assessing risk.
Our work also considers higher order connectivity where indirect compromise paths 
occur in the models as a result of permitted business connections between domains. In 
order to keep the investigation to a manageable level, we calculate indirect 
connectivity to a level o f  two hops between domains. As shown in this chapter and 
again in Chapter 7, useful results about the number and position of connections can be 
identified with this level of analysis. This can be used to inform us about the potential 
accessibility and therefore vulnerability of a domain. To assist with calculating higher 
order connectivity this research has adopted the formal technique o f matrix algebra to 
analyse connectivity between domains. The matrices lend themselves to computer 
programming which has the benefit of speed and accuracy in the calculations even 
when the system is scaled in terms o f size and complexity. It is possible to extend our 
calculations to 3 hops or more, but this is not necessary to illustrate our work.
In this thesis the research adopts a different view of compromise paths from DBSy 
which is more in line with our vision of fit for purpose security. DBSy works on the 
notion o f maximum permitted connectivity where there is no differentiation in terms 
of the compromise path between a potential connection and an actual connection. By 
contrast, our work recognises changes in the separation and sharing profile and using 
the NPC2 and/or NPD it identifies where a temporary and possibly conditional 
exception to the baseline profile may exist. This approach allows us to calculate 
permitted business connections when either the default policy is active or any o f the 
exceptions are active. It is our belief that this presents a more accurate representation 
of the actual compromise paths and potential risk to the system at that time.
This chapter begins by modelling risks associated with the agile mission group and 
considers how temporary and conditional connections such as those modelled with the 
NPC2 and NPD can be included in the risk calculations. This is followed by some 
preliminary investigations into calculating the growth of potential compromise paths
Page 60
as domains are added to the network. Here we are specifically interested in the work 
of Metcalfe [45] although there are some important differences between Metcalfe’s 
work and our own. Equation (1) is the expression for Metcalfe’s law [45] for a fully 
connected network.
N  = n ( n - \ ) I 2
In (1) prefers to the number of nodes in the network and TV the total number of 
unidirectional connections. The expression ignores bi-directional connections (hence 
the division by 2) and the case where a domain is connected to itself (hencen-1). 
Unlike Metcalfe our work does not assume that the network is fully connected all o f 
the time. Furthermore, because a connection could be used to compromise the domain 
at either end we do consider bi-directional connectivity. Therefore our version of 
Metcalfe’s law i s N  = n ( n - 1). The NPC2 and NPD vary the level of connectivity in 
accordance with a security policy and we hypothesise, will impact the rate of growth 
as domains are added to the network. Another important difference lies in our view of 
connectivity which regards all connections as potential compromise paths. The value 
of a connection is viewed more in terms of its benefit to the unauthorised user than 
value to the rightful owner. This is an important point. If some domains are more 
connected than others then it follows that they may also have more value to the 
prospective hacker for use as a platform from which to launch an attack. The richly 
connected domain may itself hold low classification data but provide an ideal vehicle 
to access a more sparsely connected but sensitive domain. The security analyst 
requires an expedient and accurate method of revealing information about 
connectivity and growth before it is possible to use this information to design the 
security of the system under all o f its conditions. It is our intention to show how this 
problem can be approached using the NPC2 and NPD in slightly larger configurations 
which indicate how connectivity is affected by the addition o f domains to the 
network.
4.1 Informal Validation using DBSy
Risk assessment is a complex process involving a number of different techniques that 
will enable stakeholders to understand and mitigate identified risks to the system. An
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InfoSec Architecture model-based risk analysis is one aspect of the overall assessment 
process. It involves analysing the infrastructure and business connectivity to identify 
where vulnerabilities may arise in the system through the identification of potential 
threat actors and agents [18], [19]. The analyst must consider unintentional or 
accidental compromise in addition to deliberate action with a malicious intent since 
appropriate security controls must be capable o f mitigating both types of activity.
In this research the risk analysis process is based on the InfoSec Architecture model 
for the Agile Mission group in Figure 2, which for convenience is repeated in Figure 
14. This model identifies all permitted business connections, that is, no attempt has 
been made to differentiate between temporary and conditional or permanent business 
connections.
Agile Group AYAgile Group AX HQ
AX 4L1
A gile T a sk -A ^ island BIsland A
Figure 14: Agile Mission Group showing maximum permitted connectivity
The first stage of the compromise path analysis involves redrawing the InfoSec 
Architecture model where the domains and underlying infrastructure are separated as 
shown in Figure 15. For ease o f analysis the FOI and AG are both identified. In this 
example Domain B, the FOI, should be protected from potential compromise by 
Domains AX and/or AY, which form the AG. The boxes at the top of the diagram 
represent the domains and those at the bottom, the infrastructure. Lines are drawn 
representing inbound compromise paths from the AG to the FOI. As previously 
stated, potential compromise paths that arise as a result of the infrastructure are not 
included in our initial calculations. They are included in the first model for 
completeness but omitted from future diagrams.
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Figure 15: Compromise path model for case study
A couple o f points arise from Figure 15 which merit discussion. For example, 
Domains AX and AY appear as separate entities because quite simply, they are both 
members o f the same attack group. In this context they are not considered a threat to 
one another despite the fact they are connected because the analysis is considering the 
impact of the whole AG on the FOI. The guidelines outlined in [64] describe the 
process for simplifying the models which should, in theory allow Domains AX and 
AY to be combined. However, in our scenario simplification is not practical because 
each of the two domains in the AG potentially have a relationship with the FOI. If the 
model is simplified, this level of detail is lost and the resulting model is not an 
accurate representation of the case study. It is conjectured that in addition to drawing 
Domains AX and AY it would also be useful to include the connection between the 
two domains. Although it has no impact on the number of direct or single step 
compromise paths, it does form an indirect compromise path between Domain AX 
and B which would become apparent when higher order connectivity is calculated.
Of course, Figure 15 does not and can not capture the conditional nature of the 
connection between Domains AX and B. Critically for our research, the permitted 
business connection between AX and B would not exist under normal or baseline 
conditions. As a result, the only means of compromise between AX and B would 
arise from indirect connectivity. The above example in Figure 15 shows that two 
inbound compromise paths exist via the permitted business connections involving 
Domains AX, AY and B and is therefore erroneous. We conclude that it is necessary 
to capture the nature of the link between Domains AX, AY and B so that conditional 
behaviour of connection and potential compromise path can be calculated 
accordingly. Furthermore Figure 15 does not reveal the relationship between Domains
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AX and AY. Domain AY has a permitted business connection with Domain B. 
However, under the stated security policy, this has no impact on Domain AX’s 
permitted connection with Domain B. The only time this particular connection is 
allowed and established is when the connection between Domains AX and AY is 
unavailable. This path is crucial in fact, because it is the feature that ‘opens’ the 
potential compromise path between AX and B.
To summarise, the inability to annotate and calculate temporary permitted connections 
yields misleading results. Only maximum permitted connectivity can be shown. This 
identifies all possible compromise paths regardless o f the fact that some of the paths 
may not be active in different states and indeed may not exist at all unless the 
condition prevails which triggers a change in the security profile a temporary 
permitted business connection may never be required. The standard approach 
calculates the effect as if  it were in use. It is concluded that the process would be 
more useful if the nature of the connections is captured, because it would then show 
the maximum number o f connections under various states. The system designer can 
then mitigate those risks accordingly and deliver appropriate security when it is 
required: in essence, realise ‘fit for purpose’ security. O f course we believe this can 
be achieved by including the NPC2 and NPD constructs in the risk analysis process.
4.2 Risk Assessment and the Non-Persistent Capability Concept
In the next series of diagrams the NPC2 construct is included in the compromise path 
models and calculations. As with the previous example, this process begins by 
defining the AG and FOI for the InfoSec Architecture model depicting the Agile 
Mission group. Inbound connections between the AG and FOI groups are calculated 
in the models.
In the first arrangement captured in Figure 16, the NPC2 is enforcing the baseline or 
default separation and sharing profile where connectivity is permitted between 
Domains AX and AY (as shown by the solid line and position of the conditional 
connector). There is no direct path between Domains AX and B. To avoid confusion, 
potential compromise paths are shown with an arrow head. Straightforward
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connections are plain lines and included for completeness because they will be used 
when calculating indirect connectivity.
AX
A ttack G roup
Figure 16: Compromise path model using NPC2 between Domains AX and AY
As shown in Figure 16, when the NPC2 construct is used to switch between Domains 
AX and AY, only one inbound, direct or single step compromise path exists between 
the AG and FOI.
Figure 17 shows the same configuration, but in this example the NPC2 construct 
switches connectivity between Domains AX and B.
Attack G roup
Interest
Figure 17: Compromise path model using NPC2 between Domains AX and B
It can be seen from Figure 17 that this configuration yields 2 potential inbound 
compromise paths between the AG and FOI. The relationship between Domains AY 
and B has no effect on the relationship between Domains AX and B or AX and AY as 
controlled by the NPC2 therefore the connections are considered independently.
We have an interest in calculating the rate o f growth for potential compromise paths 
as domains are added to the configuration and believe that the NPC2 can be used to 
influence both the rate of growth and proliferation of connections. The investigation 
begins by adding a single domain, Domain C to represent a collaborative partner in 
the existing model. Recall from the original InfoSec Architecture model in Figure 1,
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Section 3.3.1, that the collaborative partner, represented by an external domain, is 
normally permitted to communicate with Domain B. It is therefore included as a 
member of the AG and the results, captured in Figure 18 are obtained. The number of 
potential compromise paths increases by 1. The default separation and sharing policy 
is in force where the NPC2 is switched to permit connectivity between domains AX 
and AY (as shown by the solid line). This relationship has no effect on any domains 
that are added to the model because additional domains are not, in this instance, 
controlled by the NPC2.
r
F ocus of 
In terest
A ttack G roup
Figure 18: Compromise path model with additional Domain
Finally, Figure 19 shows the case where the NPC2 is switched to permit connectivity 
between Domains AX and B. Again, we see that the number of direct, single step 
compromise paths between the AG and FOI increases by 1, when Domain C, is added 
to the model.
__________  __________
AX AY
-----------------
L
Attack G roup
tit:
Focus of
Interest
Figure 19: Compromise path model with Domain C
The next series of models deviate quite deliberately from DBSy and consider each 
domain in the role of potential AG and FOI. The DBSy approach defines and bounds 
the scope of the analysis which enables stakeholders to focus on the part o f the system 
over which they have control. By removing these boundaries and examining the total
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number of compromise paths arising from any permitted connection it is assumed that 
each domain presents a threat to its immediate and connected neighbour. Clearly this 
will impact the number of direct compromise paths but we believe that this approach 
will later prove useful in revealing indirect compromise paths which represent a subtle 
but very real threat to the system. An analysis of total connectivity will provide 
additional information which will enhance our understanding of the impact of the 
NPC2 in reducing the number of potential compromise paths. Calculations for Figure 
20 are based on maximum permitted connectivity. This result can be compared with 
the models in Figures 21 and 22 where the NPC2 is used. In each case, the paths can 
be totalled quickly and easily by counting the number o f arrow heads for each 
diagram.
Domain BDomain AYDomain AX
Figure 20: Compromise paths assuming maximum permitted connectivity
Figure 20 shows a total of 6 potential compromise paths when maximum permitted 
connectivity between domains is assumed.
Figure 21 presents the case where the NPC2 is switched to permit communication 
between Domains AX and B as shown by the position of the conditional connector. 
As expected, the number of direct compromise paths is 4.
Domain BDomain AYDomain AX
Figure 21: Compromise path model assuming conditional security policy
Figure 22 shows the three-domain arrangement where the baseline separation and 
sharing policy is in place permitting the connection between Domains AX and AY as 
depicted by the position of the conditional connector. In this configuration there are a 
total o f 4 direct compromise paths between Domains AX, AY and AY, B
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respectively. Note that the temporary connection that would exist between Domains 
AX and B is identified by the broken line if  the NPC2 were switched in this direction 
but is not included in the calculations since it is inactive.
Domain BDomain AYDomain AX
Figure 22: Compromise paths assuming baseline security policy
Figures 23, 24 and 25 all show a configuration o f 4 domains where in this case 
Domain C is permitted full connectivity with existing domains. In Figure 23, 
maximum permitted connectivity is assumed in the model which provides some 
results for comparison with a model utilising the NPC2. A total o f 12 compromise 
paths exist.
Domain BDomain AY
Domain 0
Domain AX
Figure 23: Four domain configuration; maximum permitted connectivity
In Figure 24 the NPC2 restricts connectivity permitting Domain AX the ability to 
share with Domain B and, in Figure 25 Domain AX is permitted to share information 
with Domain AY.
Domain B
Domain C
Domain AYDomain AX
Figure 24: Compromise path model, four domains; NPC2 switches AX and B
Page 68
Domain AX Domain AY Domain B
Domain C
Figure 25: Compromise path model, four domains; NPC2 switches AX and AY
In each scenario there are a total of 10 direct compromise paths.
Figures 26, 27 and 28 are all 4-domain configurations. However, in this series of 
models Domain C is only permitted partially connectivity with the rest o f the system. 
Figure 26 is the comparison model and incorporates maximum permitted 
connectivity.
Domain AX Domain AY Domain B
Domain C
Figure 26: Four domains, partially connected; maximum permitted connectivity
In Figure 27 the NPC2 permits connectivity between Domains AX and B. The result 
is 6  potential compromise paths.
D o m a in  B
D o m a in  C
D o m a in  AYD o m a in  A X
Figure 27: Partial connectivity with fourth domain; NPC2 switches AX and B
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Finally in Figure 28 the NPC2 is switched to allow connectivity between Domains 
AX and AY. Again, there are 6 direct compromise paths.
D o m a in  A X <•— f a Z ) D om ain  AY ----------► D o m a in  B
K y ------------
D om ain  C /
Figure 28: Partial connectivity with fourth domain; NPC2 switches AX and AY
The results from this initial set of models are summarised in Figure 29 which 
tabulates the potential number of compromise paths in a bar chart.
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Figure 29: Compromise paths summarised
In Figure 29, the first data set (on the left-hand-side) corresponds to Figures 20, 21 
and 22. The second dataset (in the middle) refers to Figures 23, 24 and 25. Finally the 
third dataset (on the right-hand-side) corresponds to Figures 26, 27 and 28. From 
Figure 29 it is very clear that for the cases described the NPC2 reduces the number of 
compromise paths when we consider direct connections. However, this small-scale 
study also reinforces the importance of looking at how domains are connected to one 
another since this will impact the effectiveness and influence of the NPC2. This is
□  No N PC 2
■  N P C 2 AXJB
□  N PC 2 AXAY
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particularly significant when we consider adding domains to the configuration and 
calculating the corresponding rate of growth in potential compromise paths.
In our case study, Domain C normally shares data with Domain B only. Therefore we 
would not expect the rate of growth to be high; an expectation supported by the 
evidence collected in this section. Full connectivity shows a substantial increase in the 
number of potential direct paths and we would expect the difference to be higher 
when indirect connectivity is considered. As shown in Figure 29 the NPC2 will, in 
some cases, reduce the number of potential direct, inbound compromise paths 
although it effectiveness is not pronounced in this simple model described. The result 
is not unexpected since the NPC2 provides an ‘exclusive OR’ between two domains. 
The effect o f the NPC2 when domains are added to the model is dependent on the 
relationship between the NPC2 and those additional domains. If, for example, 
Domain C had also been controlled by the NPC2 acting either in the role o f a multi­
way connector or an additional construct the results would probably have been 
different. The use of a multi-way NPC2 is not explored in this thesis. However, it 
could be an interesting development in our research and should be investigated as 
future work. Multiple 2-way NPC2 constructs are studied in Chapter 7.
4.3 Risk Assessment and the Non-Persistent Domain
In this section we calculate the effect on potential compromise paths when the NPC2 
and NPD constructs are used together. Recall, that the NPD is designed to capture the 
temporary formation o f a domain. It is only formed under specific conditions 
otherwise a regular domain would be used. It is therefore suited to ad-hoc networks. 
For convenience Figure 10, the revised version of the mission group including our 
suggested notation for the NPD, is repeated in Figure 30.
Page 71
AX AY
Is lan d  B
AX,
Agile AX
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AX Ad-Hoc
Figure 30: Scenario including NPD
The InfoSec Architecture model is redrawn to show inbound, direct compromise paths 
between the AG containing Domains AX, AXj and AY and the FOI containing 
Domain B. Maximum permitted connectivity is assumed. The potential compromise 
path arising from the connection between Domains AXi and B is included.
Attack Group
B
Focus of Interest
Figure 31: Compromise path model assuming maximum permitted connectivity
Figure 31 shows a total of 2 direct compromise paths between the AG and FOI. The 
model makes no account of potential paths opened through indirect connections 
which we know, in this case, exist between Domains AX to AY and when it is active, 
from Domain AX to AXi. We conjecture that when indirect paths are included the 
number will increase significantly. Another factor affecting this model is the inclusion 
of the path between AXi and Domain B, which again only exists if this temporary 
domain is active. The model is adjusted to show the NPC2 controlling connectivity 
between domains AX, AXi and AY and the paths redrawn accordingly. This 
configuration is captured in Figure 32.
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AX
Focus of InterestAttack Group
Figure 32: Compromise path model controlled by NPC2
Figure 32 indicates that only 1 direct inbound compromise path exists between 
Domains AY and B. When the NPC2 is switched to allow connectivity between AX 
and AXi the total number of direct compromise paths will be 2. This is the same as 
the maximum permitted connectivity model in Figure 30 since the path between 
Domains AXi and B will be activated.
The NPD has an additional benefit to our case study and that is managing risk internal 
to the domain itself, which has not been specifically addressed so far. This internal 
risk arises because the case study assumes that domain members do not have equal 
capabilities all o f the time. This assumption is fundamental to our research because it 
considers temporal and event driven changes to separation and sharing capabilities. 
DBSy assumes that all members of a domain are able to share without restriction. It is 
only external connections that may be subjected to control. Internal risk to the 
domain would therefore not normally be an issue. In our approach the scenario has 
been complicated because a single member of Domain AX has the temporary 
elevation o f capabilities allowing them to share with Domain B. Given that this 
feature is conditional, the subsequent change to the separation and sharing profile 
may, in reality, never occur and this member will simply be a regular occupant of 
Domain AX. The change to potential compromise paths has been considered for the 
case where the NPC2 permits connectivity between Domains AX and B. However, 
neither the affect of this change on the remainder of AX, nor the affect if  the NPC2 is 
switched back to the default separation and sharing policy, has been studied. The 
NPD could be used to identify this exceptional user since under this regime, they 
would move from a regular domain into a temporary structure. Figure 30 shows that 
Domain AX and the NPD AXi each have their own Environment and Portal for 
domain access, the two entities are therefore quite separate.
Page 73
If Domain AY were to become available again, the default separation and sharing 
policy permitting Domain AX to share with Domain AY but not Domain B would be 
enforced. The temporary elevation in capability would be revoked from our NPD 
member and Domain AXi would effectively cease to exist. Revocation o f capability 
is of course a fundamental issue in this respect. The implementation of our solution 
must ensure that the removal of authorisation is clean. It is expected that this would be 
tested through auditing resource access both before and after the change in policy. 
This could be viewed in the audit or log files. Depending on the features of the 
security infrastructure it may also be possible to view access control lists against the 
resource in question. If information has been exchanged between users there must be 
a means o f securing it from the user once their privileges have been revoked in order 
to prevent unauthorised, intentional or accidental disclosure or modification to the 
data. This is not a trivial task since the user could have already saved information to a 
location where they have privileges. Of course, the human in the loop presents a 
potential risk in any security solution. They may simply remember information and 
not record it anywhere in which case no technical measure will be of use. The threat 
presented by the user will however be taken into consideration during the threat and 
risk analysis process with knowledge of the level trust which may be vested in them.
So far the existence of a compromise path arising from internal risk has not been 
identified in either the models or incorporated into the calculations. This raises an 
important question; at what stage should it be included in this process? The issue will 
only occur if domain members have (temporarily) different capabilities from one 
another. When the NPC2 is either switched back to the default separation and sharing 
policy or indeed moves on to a completely new and as yet unknown configuration it 
may not exist at all. Is it therefore appropriate to include it at all? On closer 
inspection, it is concluded that this issue is not the prerogative of the NPC2. Since 
users may be members o f more than one domain, by switching between them, there is 
always the opportunity for introducing compromise. This is one reason o f course why 
DBSy shows separation between the domains and the means of access. We therefore 
conclude that judicious use o f the NPD overcomes some of the concern o f introducing 
internal risk to a domain since the user is temporarily moved into a new domain. A 
new method of access is provided thus separating them from the domain o f origin. 
We therefore introduce no greater risk through the non-persistent constructs than the
Page 74
accepted method of allowing a user to work in more than one domain. In fact it could 
be argued that less of a risk is introduced with this approach since the user does not 
have the capability of the temporary domain unless the conditions trigger the change 
in security policy which specifically allows it.
4.3.1 Variation to model using Temporary Business Connector only
Our case study shows a dependency between Domains AX, AY and B whereby 
simultaneous connectivity is not permitted between AX and the other domains. The 
conditional connector is used as an ‘exclusive OR’ to switch between domains in 
accordance with the separation and sharing policy. For our notion of fit for purpose 
security, changes to the policy are required because of a condition in the environment 
and may not affect the relationship between existing domains at all. Consider the case 
where the default security policy permits Domain AX to share with Domain AY. 
Under certain circumstances the permission is extended to Domain B, but this is only 
on a temporary basis and has no dependency on Domain AX’s relationship with 
Domain AY. Figure 33 shows the InfoSec Architecture model for this arrangement.
AX AV
Island B
Island  A
Figure 33: Conditional connectivity omitting dependencies between domains
Recall from Chapter 3 that the NPC2 is actually comprised o f the conditional 
connector represented as a ‘switch’ and temporary business connector combined. The 
temporary business connector may be used on its own where connectivity between 
domains is not mutually exclusive. This is exactly the case shown in Figure 33 where 
we omit the conditional connector from the model because the exception to the 
normal separation and sharing profile is not dependent on the relationship between 
Domains AX and AY. In terms of risk analysis this variant would need to be 
considered as normal and exceptional states where the exceptional state could also be
considered as maximum permitted connectivity. Figures 34 and 35 model inbound 
compromise paths for the case where the agile mission group containing Domains AX 
and AY is the potential AG and Domain B is the FOI.
Attack Group
M essaging
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Figure 34: Compromise path model baseline security policy, AG and FOI defined
Attack Group F o cus of■
In terest
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Figure 35: Compromise path model exception to policy, AG and FOI defined
As with our earlier models, the connection between Domains AX and AY is not 
included although, for the reasons described previously, it is proposed that some 
reference should be made to this relationship since it does form a potential indirect 
compromise path. In Figure 34 there is only 1 inbound direct compromise path 
because the connection between Domains AX and B is not permitted at this time. 
Figure 35 yields the same results as our first in example back in Figure 15, because it 
makes no concession for the temporary nature of the connection between Domains 
AX and B. A total of 2 potential direct compromise paths exist for this model
Finally, for the case where all domains are viewed in the capacity of both AG and FOI 
the results in Figures 36 and 37 are obtained.
AYAX
Figure 36: Compromise path model conditional security policy
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AYAX
Figure 37: Compromise path model baseline security policy
Figure 36 shows a total of 6 potential direct compromise paths because maximum 
permitted connectivity is assumed; whereas Figure 37 has a total o f 4 because in this 
case the business connection between Domains AX and B is inactive. Interestingly 
these results are exactly the same as using the NPC2 and placing some condition on 
permitted connectivity through Domain dependencies although of course the 
configuration and conditions for this variation is different.
The results support our assertion that differentiating between the default and 
exceptional permitted connections provides a more accurate view of the number of 
potential compromise paths. We conclude that this information will ultimately affect 
the way in which the security engineer mitigates risk through system controls.
So far, the work in this chapter has focused on direct compromise paths and, crucially, 
connectivity introduces indirect or covert paths, which must also be analysed and 
addressed. In the next section all of these initial results are used to form the basis of 
an investigation which looks specifically at higher order connectivity. This allows us 
to understand the potential impact of the NPC2 and NPD constructs in greater depth.
4.4 Calculating Indirect Compromise Paths
Indirect compromise paths are a natural consequence from permitted business 
connections between domains and neither their presence nor impact may be 
immediately obvious. It is therefore important to have an efficient method of 
identifying indirect compromise paths so that their risk can be understood and 
mitigated. It has already been shown that the number of direct compromise paths 
grows as domains are added to the network, although the rate o f growth is dependent 
on the richness of connections. However, this will also impact the number o f indirect 
connections between domains. It is our opinion that the affect o f indirect connectivity 
can be substantially reduced through judicious use of the NPC2 or NPD to reflect the 
temporary and conditional nature of connections and domains where applicable. To
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assist with the analysis, some ideas from network theory are applied to the various 
domain configurations.
According to Chartrand, a network can be defined as “ ... a graph or directed graph 
(digraph) together with a function which maps the edge set into the set of real 
numbers . . .” [20, p. 19]. In this chapter it is sufficient to employ either a graph or 
directed graph to complement the DBSy models.
A part of network theory is concerned with connectivity and the identification of 
potential paths through any type of network. In the disciplines o f computing and 
communications applications of the approach could include, amongst others, the 
calculation of routing efficiency using shortest path algorithms, designing redundant 
paths for quality o f service and the determination of node accessibility. As stated 
previously our work uses the notion of connectivity and accessibility as a measure of 
vulnerability between domains. Using graphs to calculate node accessibility is 
therefore o f particular interest. Although connectivity is normally considered at the 
individual node level, for the purposes of this investigation it is sufficient to continue 
working at a higher level. The Domain is seen as a collection of nodes with a common 
security profile and function and can therefore be regarded as a single entity.
Graphs provide a convenient method of representing the DBSy InfoSec Architecture 
models. Using graph notation vertices or nodes are drawn as small circles and used to 
represent the DBSy domains. This thesis uses the term node(s) in preference to vertex 
or vertices. An edge is shown as a line joining two nodes and indicates the DBSy 
permitted business connections. Domain accessibility is calculated by the degree of 
the node. In graph theory, a degree is the number of edges of a graph incident upon 
the node [20, p.27] or for our purposes, the number of permitted business connections 
for a domain.
Matrices can be used to represent a graph. Connectivity or potential compromise paths 
can therefore be captured within the matrix. This can be used subsequently to 
calculate higher-order connectivity between nodes using matrix multiplication. 
Matrices provide a convenient method to present the connectivity status and means of 
assessing the impact of multi-hop or indirect connections.
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In graph theory, the path length is defined as the number of nodes that are traversed 
between the starting and final node in a path. Therefore, a direct or single path 
connection between two nodes is the equivalent of a path length of 1 because there are 
no intervening nodes. Indirect or multi-hop connections indicate a path length greater 
than 1. In the example below, Figure 38 shows the DBSy model of our agile mission 
group redrawn as a graph. The individual connections between AX with AY and AX 
with B both have a path length of 1. The path between AX and B (via Domain AY) 
gives a path length of 2.
A X  AY B
Figure 38: Basic scenario represented as Graph
In this research the matrix is defined as follows. For a set of domains Z), 
/=1,2,........./Z the ij-th entry in the N x N  connection matrix C is
1 if  D( is connected to Dj
C,, = I 0 if  Dt is not connected to Dj
0 if  i = j
The graph shown in Figure 38 can be represented by the connectivity matrix C, in (2) 
for domains Di =[AX, AY, B].
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 0
. . . ( 2)
This model shows maximum permitted connectivity, that is, all of the edges between 
nodes are included irrespective of their state. In (3) connectivity for the case Cf is
Page 79
shown where the path length or hop-count is 2. It can be seen that the number of 
potential paths increases to 12; double that of C{.
C? =
2 1 1 
1 2 1 
1 1 2
...(3 )
Total connectivity up to and including second order, CUot is calculated in (4) and 
gives a total of 18 potential compromise paths.
c  =  c +c2=I tot ^ 1  ^  1
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2
. ..(4 )
(4) shows quite clearly that in this configuration, each domain is equally accessible.
The next case in Figure 39 considers the addition of Domain C to the model. Like the 
first example in Figure 26, Domain C is partially connected and may only share with 
Domain B. The Domains in Figure 39 are D2 = [AX, AY, B, C].
AYAX
C
Figure 39: Graph showing partial connectivity including Domain C
This configuration is for maximum permitted connectivity and does not distinguish 
between a permanent and temporary connection involving Domains AX, AY and B. 
The connectivity matrix C2 is shown in (5).
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c,
0 1 1 0  
1 0  1 0  
1 1 0  1 
0 0 1 0
...(5)
C2 confirms our original findings that when there is no differentiation between non- 
persistent and permanent connections, the number of potential compromise paths is 8 . 
Domain B is the most accessible or connected node.
(6 ) shows connectivity for the caseC22 where the path length is equal to 2 .
a  =
2 1 1 1  
1 2  1 1  
1 1 3  0 
1 1 0  1
. . . ( 6)
In (6 ) it can be seen that the number of potential compromise paths has risen from 8  to 
18. The potential richness of connectivity between the nodes is much greater once 
indirect links are considered. Note, for example, that according to (5) Domain B does 
not have connectivity to itself. Once indirect connections for a 2-hop configuration are 
calculated, there are three potential routes via AX, AY and C respectively.
Total connectivity for this configuration is given in (7) and yields 25 potential paths.
c =c +c2 tot 2 ^ 2
2 2 2 1 
2 2 2 1 
2 2 3 1 
1 1 1 0
...(7 )
(7) shows that Domain AY is the most accessible or vulnerable domain in this case. If 
the path length was increased to 3 hops, that is, the case C\ , we postulate that the 
number of connections would again increase.
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The final example in this set of models, is the four domain fully connected network. 
This is shown as a graph in Figure 40 for domains D3 = [AX, AY, B, C]. The resulting 
connectivity matrix C3 is given in (8 ).
AY
AX
C
Figure 40: Four domain, fully connected configuration represented as Graph
a
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
. . . ( 8)
C3 yields a total o f 12 direct potential compromise paths. Indirect connectivity is 
shown in (9) for the connectivity matrix C3 .
C =
3 2 2 2
2 3 2 2
2 2 3 2
2 2 2 3
...(9 )
When the path length is equal to 2, the number of potential compromise paths 
increases from 12 in (8 ) to 36 in (9). The total number of potential compromise paths 
is calculated in (9) giving 48 connections.
c =c +c3 tot 3 ^  3
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3
. . . ( 1 0 )
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The rate of growth for direct and indirect compromise paths, where maximum 
permitted connectivity is assumed, is summarised in the graph in Figure 41.
El D irect c o n n e c t io n s  
■  Indirect C o n n e c tio n s  
□  T ota l c o n n e c t io n s
Figure 41: Comparison of direct and indirect connectivity
Figure 41 shows a sharp increase in the number of connections between direct and 
indirect connections even though the calculations have only considered a path length 
of 2. The analysis could continue to look at higher order connections using the same 
process of matrix multiplication. It is expected that the increase and richness of 
connections would become even more pronounced.
A fundamental part of this study involves analysing and articulating the impact of the 
NPC2 construct within the scope of the connectivity matrix and assessing whether it 
reduces the potential number of compromise paths when used. In Section 3 the 
equivalent connectivity diagrams were shown but used the NPC2 construct to switch 
between different domains. When the model is shown as a graph there is no means of 
identifying the temporary or conditional nature of a connection. The connection can 
only be included in the graph or omitted. To avoid confusion, the compromise path 
model and connectivity state is shown alongside the relevant graph. In all cases all 
connections are considered as potential compromise paths, therefore neither an AG 
nor FOI are specified.
r t f"  . CM
T h r e e  D o m a in s  F ou r D o m a in s , F our D o m a in s , 
Partly Fully
C o n n e c te d  C o n n e c te d
Domain Configuration
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The first model shown in Figure 42 is the three domain configuration where the 
security policy is in its baseline state. The conditional connector permits connectivity 
between Domains AX and AY.
Domain AYDomain AX Domain B
Figure 42: NPC2 switching Domains AX and AY
This is redrawn as a graph in Figure 43, but no edge is shown between AX and B 
because this path is not currently active.
• ------• ----- •
AX AY B
Figure 43: Configuration in Figure 42 redrawn as a Graph
In Section 4.2 the number of potential compromise paths for this model was 
calculated as 4. The connectivity matrix C4 in (11) confirms the original findings.
0 1 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 0
. . . ( 11)
Indirect connectivity for a path length of 2 is shown for the case C42 in (12) where 
there are a total o f 6 potential compromise paths.
r L =
4
1 0 1 
0 2 0 
1 0 1
. . . ( 12)
Total connectivity for this model is given in (13) which yields 10 potential 
compromise paths.
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c =c +c =4 tot 4  ^  4
1 1 1 
1 2 1 
1 1 1
...(13)
Figure 44 shows the exceptional case where NPC2 permits a business connection 
between Domains AX and B only. Connectivity for the equivalent graph shown in 
Figure 45 is given in (14) where there are a total of 4 potential compromise paths.
AX AY  ► B
Figure 44: Compromise path model; NPC2 permits sharing between AX and B
Figure 45: Graph for model in Figure 44
C ,=
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
1 1 0
(14)
Indirect connectivity for the case C52 is given in (15) totalling 6  potential paths.
C =5
1 1 0 
1 1 0 
0 0 2
(15)
The total for this configuration is calculated using (16) and shows a total of 10 
potential compromise paths.
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c =c +cSlot 5 ^  5
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 2
(16)
This result is the same as (13). In both models the NPC2 has reduced the number of 
paths when compared to a model where maximum permitted connectivity is 
calculated.
In the next series of diagrams the case where an additional Domain has been added to 
the configuration is presented. The domains are D5 = [AX, AY, B, C]. It is known 
from (4) that Domain C is not controlled by the NPC2 therefore little change is 
observed in the number of direct potential compromise paths when this domain is 
included. However, when higher order connectivity is calculated it is expected that its 
presence will have a greater impact. In Figures 46 and 47 the NPC2 permits 
connectivity between Domains AX and AY, which prohibits simultaneous 
connectivity between Domains AX and B.
Domain AX Domain AY •4-----------► Domain B
Domain C /
Figure 46: Four domain configuration utilising NPC2
AY
AX
C
Figure 47: Four domain configuration in Figure 46 redrawn as Graph
The connectivity matrix for direct and indirect potential compromise paths are shown 
in (17) for C5 and (18) for C\ respectively.
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c< =
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
...(17)
Cl =
1 0 1 0
0 2 0 1
1 0 2 0
0 1 0 1
(18)
c =c +c5 tot -  ^ 5  ^
1 1 1 0  
1 2  1 1  
1 1 2  1
...(19 )
0 1 1 1
Connectivity forC5 shown in (17), gives a total of 6 potential compromise paths. This 
increases to 10 for C\ when the path length is increased to 2, as shown in (18). The 
matrices reveal that Domains AY and B are the most connected and therefore, 
seemingly, the most vulnerable. The contents of C5 and C\ are summed in (19) to
obtain the total connectivity for this configuration. This yields 16 potential 
compromise paths.
(20) shows the connectivity matrix C6 for the configuration in Figures 48 and 49.
Here the NPC2 permits connectivity between AX and B which denies connectivity 
between AX and AY.
Domain B
Domain C
Domain AYDomain AX
Figure 48: Four domain partial connectivity using NPC2
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AYAX
C
Figure 49: Figure 48 represented as Graph
0 0 1 0  
0 0 1 0  
1 1 0  1 
0 0 1 0
. . . ( 20)
In (20) C6 shows of total of 6 potential compromise paths where Domain B has the 
greatest connectivity. This increases to 12 for the caseC^ as shown in (21).
Cl
1 1 0  1 
1 1 0  1 
0 0 3 0 
1 1 0  1
. . . ( 21)
Total connectivity is given in (22) yielding 18 potential compromise paths.
C,6 /0/ C t+ c l  =
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 3  1 
1 1 1 1
. . . ( 22)
Figure 50 summarises the results o f this section in a bar chart. It refers to the total 
number of potential compromise paths for each configuration, that is, the summation 
of direct and indirect connections for each case.
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30 n
25
20
□  No NPC2
■  NPC2 AX1AY
□  NPC2 AX1B
Three D om ains Four D om ains, Partly
C on n ected
Figure 50: Sum m ary o f indirect connectivity with and without the NPC2
In Figure 50 the first data set on the left-hand side refers to (4), (13) and (16). The 
second data set on the right-hand side refers to (7), (19) and (22).
Figure 50 shows quite clearly that in each case the NPC2 construct has a significant 
impact in reducing the number o f potential compromise paths. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesised that its usefulness will become more marked as higher orders o f 
connectivity are considered and/or the numbers o f  domain increase. The degree o f 
impact is affected by the placement o f the NPC2 and o f course the level o f permitted 
connectivity between additional domains in the model.
To complete this section indirect connectivity and the NPD are considered. Recall 
from Section 4.3 that when direct connectivity was calculated use o f the NPD 
presented little difference in the potential number o f  compromise paths irrespective o f  
when the NPC2 was used. However, we postulate that this position will change as 
higher order connectivity is calculated. The figures and matrices that follow contain 
the results o f  our study. Like the preceding models there is no differentiation between 
inbound and outbound connections involving the AG and FOI; any level o f 
connectivity is seen as a potential compromise path.
In order to determine the effect o f introducing the NPD, our initial risk calculations 
are based on maximum permitted connectivity. Figure 51 captures this configuration
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for domains D7 = [AX, AY, AXi, B]. Note that the temporary or conditional 
connections are defined using a broken line to indicate an exception to the baseline 
policy. The connectivity matrix C7 is given in (23) and shows 8  potential direct 
compromise paths.
AX AY AX
Figure 51: Compromise paths and the NPD, maximum permitted connectivity
c 7 =
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
(23)
In (24) this number increases to 16 for C 2.
C 2 = 7
2 0 0 2
0 2 2 0
0 2 2 0
2 0 0 2
...(24)
Total connectivity is calculated in (25) and shows 24 potential compromise paths.
C = C  + C 2 =° 7 tot 7 ^  7
2 1 1 2  
1 2  2 1 
1 2  2 1 
2 1 1 2
...(25)
The configurations are recalculated using the NPC2 and NPD constructs to determine 
the actual number of potential compromise paths for the case where the security 
policy does not allow participation with the NPD. C8 is the connectivity matrix for the
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default policy where Domain AX is permitted to communicate with Domain AY. A 
total of 4 direct potential compromise paths are shown in (26), which is a 50% 
reduction in the number of paths when (26) is compared with (23).
C. =
0 1 0  0 
1 0  0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0  0
...(2 6 )
For the case C\ , (27) shows an increase o f only 2 connections, from 4 to 6. This 
gives an overall total of 10 potential compromise paths when (28) is computed.
Cl =
1 0 0 1
0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
(27)
C - C  + C ‘8 /0 /  8 ^  8
1 1 0 1
1 2 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
..(28)
In the case where Domain AX is not permitted to share with Domain AY the NPD 
AXi is established. The connectivity matrix C9is shown in (29).
C9 =
0 0 1 0  
0 0 0 1 
1 0  0 1 
0 1 1 0
...(2 9 )
(29) shows a total of 6 direct compromise paths. Although this is clearly less than the 
worst case scenario depicted in (23) where maximum permitted connectivity was 
assumed, it is also greater than (26) where the security policy is in its default state. 
This is not unexpected since an additional domain is being created and connected,
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albeit temporarily, to accommodate the 2IC in this case study and maintain 
connectivity with Domain B.
(30) is the result o f calculating Cq and gives 10 potential compromise paths.
C =9
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 2 0
1 0 0 2
...(3 0 )
Total connectivity for this configuration is calculated in (31) and gives 16 potential 
compromise paths
c =  c +  c =9 lot 9 ^  9
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 2
(31)
The total number o f potential compromise paths as computed in (25), (28) and (31) 
are summarised in a bar chart in Figure 52.
i :
I m M
M axim um  P erm itted  N P D  A ctive; T em p N PD  inactive: AX to  
C onnectiv ity  D om ain  crea ted  AY only
D o m a in  C o n f ig u r a t io n
Figure 52: Summary of compromise paths for configurations using the NPD
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Figure 52 shows that the use of the NPC2 and NPD constructs may result in a 
significant reduction in the potential number of compromise paths when compared 
with calculating maximum permitted connectivity. We have always maintained that 
the result is not unexpected because the NPC2 and NPD enable us to accommodate 
change whilst recognising that the condition requiring that change may not occur. It 
is therefore, in our opinion, a more realistic representation of the actual number of 
compromise paths for states we are able to anticipate.
4.5 Combining Connectivity States within a Single Matrix
In Chapter 3 the difficulty of capturing temporary, changing or conditional 
connections in the graphical models was observed. Our solution, which lies in the 
NPC2 and NPD notation, allowed us to combine multiple states onto a single InfoSec 
model. This benefit has not, until now, been realised in the connectivity matrices.
Our analysis currently uses two separate matrices to represent each state o f the NPC2 
using a numeric ‘1’ or ‘0’ to symbolise the connection states ‘connected’ or ‘not 
connected’ respectively. This information is slightly misleading in that it cannot 
capture the potential for connectivity. Using a ‘0 ’ could suggest that a path is never 
connected which in our example, is not the case. It is possible to imply potential 
connectivity in a single matrix if  we diverge from the use of a ‘1’ or ‘0 ’ and apply 
other symbology. Given that the NPC2 has been used as a Boolean tru e  or fa l s e ,  it 
follows that Boolean algebra could also be incorporated into the matrices to capture 
the state of the connection. Although this option has not yet been fully explored, 
preliminary findings, as described in this section, look promising.
The InfoSec Architecture model in Figure 53 is a repeat of Figure 7 and shows that 
the NPC2 permits sharing between Domains AX and AY.
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Agile Group AY •Agile Group AX HQ
AY ) 
Agile T a s k A ^
AX
Island B
Island A
Figure 53: Basic InfoSec Architecture model
From previous calculations it is known that the connectivity matrices C4 and C5 are
obtained from this model when the NPC2 permits sharing between Domains AX and 
AY or AX and B respectively. The configuration in Figure 53 is reused to 
demonstrate that the two conditional connection states can be combined into a single 
matrix using a combination of real numbers and a Boolean representation o f the 
NPC2. The accuracy o f the results can be confirmed against C4 and C5. Although
our approach is unusual it should enable us to clearly differentiate between potential 
and conditional (active or inactive) and regular business connections.
Combining Boolean and regular values requires two different types of addition when 
summing the contents o f the matrix. Numerical addition is used for regular numbers. 
Boolean conjunction or disjunction is applied to the Boolean values to obtain a 
regular number that can be included in the numerical addition. In all of the matrices 
involving Boolean values and regular numbers the following conditions are observed. 
The conditional connection can take the Boolean value of b or b as follows:
• b represents the conditional (active) path between two domains as controlled
by the NPC2. For the purposes of calculating connectivity, b = 1.
• b represents the conditional (inactive) path between two domains as
controlled by the NPC2. For the purposes of calculating connectivity, 6 = 0 .
When b = 1, b = 0 and vice versa.
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The Boolean values are used with the regular numbers ‘1’ or ‘0’ where:
• 1 represents an active (permitted) connection
• 0 means that no connection is permitted
The matrix C10 shown in (32) is obtained when the Boolean values and ordinal
numbers describe the connectivity state in Figure 53 for domains Dio -  [AX, AY, B]. 
In this example Domain AX has a conditional (active) business connection with 
Domain AY and a conditional (inactive) connection with Domain B.
r  = ' “'10
0 b b 
b 0 1 
b 1 0
..(32)
Total connectivity is achieved by summing the contents of the matrix. Equation (33) 
shows the sequence of calculations for obtaining the total number o f potential 
compromise paths for this configuration.
total = 2b + 2 + 2b 
total = 2(1) + 2 + 2(0) 
total = 2 + 2 = 4
...(33)
The first line in (33) shows the total number of regular and conditional compromise 
paths. The second line simplifies the calculation by substituting the values of 
b = 1 and b = 0 into the equation. The third line performs the addition o f 4 potential 
compromise paths. This total corroborates the results obtained in C4 .
It is known that the conditional connection may only be b or b . Furthermore, when 
b = 1, b = 0  and vice versa. Total connectivity for the alternate configuration, that is, 
when Domain AX is permitted to communicate with Domain B, may be calculated by 
one of two methods. A separate matrix can be constructed where the existing Boolean 
value is replaced with its complement or a single matrix can be reworked by 
substituting the alternative values for b and b .
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We illustrate the second method in (34) where b = 0 and b - 1.
total = 2b + 2 + 2b 
total = 2(0) + 2 + 2(1) 
total = 2 + 2 = 4
...(34)
Our initial conclusion is that the use of a symbol as opposed to a numeric is more 
representative of the actual state of connectivity. By using b to represent an active 
(conditional) connection with the NPC2 we know that the path is permitted. Where 
b is used the connection may be permitted but is not currently permitted. The ‘0’ and 
‘I* are literal states and therefore provide no information regarding the temporary or 
changing nature of the connection. Whilst it is usually necessary to calculate the 
potential number of compromise paths individually for each connection, there is a 
short cut. In the expression total = 2b + 2 + 2b , it is possible to group b and 
b together and use the Boolean identity b + b = 1 to obtain 
total = 2(b + b) + 2 = 2 + 2 = 4 whatever the value o f  b andb , in agreement with (34) 
and (35). This underlines the value of persisting with the algebraic representation 
rather than pursuing two separate evaluations.
The earlier models using ‘1’ or ‘O’ enable us to calculate indirect connectivity using 
matrix multiplication. This is still possible in the combined matrix and means that the 
level of complexity and detail o f information held within the matrices can be 
enhanced whilst retaining a uniform methodology to calculating higher order 
connectivity. The connectivity shown in Matrix C,20 in (35) is obtained when C10 is 
multiplied by itself and represents a path length of 2 between domains.
In (35) and all other matrices where both Boolean variables are used and higher order 
connectivity is calculated, the substitutions b2 = b , b 2 =b  are made. This allows
0 + b 2 + b 2 b b
Cj o = b b 2 +1 bb
b bb b 2 + 1
...(35)
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simplification of the matrices and addition of their contents. For ease of understanding 
all stages o f the simplification process have been shown for our first example in 
matrix Cjq in (36) and (37). Subsequent examples will not show all of the stages but 
the final version of the matrix after simplification.
The matrix in (36) shows connectivity after is simplified by substituting for 62 and
6 2 .
C l = ' “'10
0 +b +b  b b 
b b + 1 bb 
b bb  6 +1
(36)
In (37) the content of C 20 has been further simplified by substituting 6 + 6 = la n d  
66 =  0 .
C = ' “'10
l b  b 
6 b + 1 0
b 0 6 +1
...(37 )
Total connectivity of the matrix is calculated in (38) where 6 potential compromise 
paths are achieved when 6 = 1 and 6 = 0 .  This result corroborates C\  . As with (33) all 
stages o f the addition process have been included.
total = 26 + 26 + (6 +1) + (6 +1) +1
, -  ... (38)total = 36 + 36 +3 = 6
This is a simple example with only two states. In Figure 54 a variation o f the model 
is used which includes an additional NPC2 between Domains B and D. The business 
model has been simplified to remove the method of sharing from the connections. 
There is no relationship between the NPC2 constructs, that is, connectivity between 
Domains A and B is not dependent on the state of connectivity between Domains B 
and D. Each NPC2 must be identified and calculated independently in the matrix.
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Figure 54: Use of multiple NPC2 constructs
In the connectivity matrix Cn, the NPC2„ is represented as bn where the conditional 
connection is active and bn when inactive. Cn in (39) shows the configuration where 
the domains are represented as Du = [A, B, C, D].
0 A 0 A
A 0 A A
0 A 0 0
A b2 0 0
The total is calculated in (40) giving 4 potential compromise paths for the case bx = 1,
b2 = 1, bx = 0 and b2 -  0. Note that each instance of bn and bn can have the value of
1 or 0. There are three other cases to consider although the total number of paths 
would be the same in each instance.
Total = 2b, + 2b, + 2b2 + 2b2 = 4 • • • (40)
Here, we have used the Boolean identities bx +bx = 1 and b2 +b2 = 1.
What is interesting about this approach is the flexibility it offers to model numerous 
different configurations within a single matrix. For example, in Figure 54 there is no 
relationship between the two NPC2 constructs therefore it would be necessary to 
calculate the matrix 4 times in order to capture the 4 combinations of NPC2 state. 
This can easily be achieved through the single model simply by substituting the
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appropriate value of 2?ninto the NPC2 of choice. A different security policy may
specify that NPC2s must operate together, that is, their individual behaviours are 
effectively linked together. If the conditional connector is activated on one, another 
within the same chain is also activated. It is possible to capture this event within the 
matrices because the NPC2 can share the same identifier. Figure 55 illustrates this 
scenario where when activated, both NPC2 constructs in the model will switch to 
permit the alternate business connection in the model. The effect on the matrix Cn  is 
shown in (41).
NPC2
Figure 55: Multiple NPC2 constructs operating as a chain
0 0 bx
_ bi 0 bx bx
12 0 ^ 0 0  
bx bx 0 0
As shown in (42), the total number of potential compromise paths is 4 when 
bx -  I and bx -  0.
Total = 4b, + 4b, = 4  •••(42)
In this configuration, if the position of the NPC2 were to be switched, the values of bx 
and bx would be transposed that is, bx = 0 and bx = 1, which would not alter the total 
number of compromise paths. Both cases are covered by a single equation, (42).
The results in (40) and (42) show that total connectivity is the same for the two 
configurations despite the fact that the NPC2 is being used differently. This is 
somewhat counterintuitive; our initial expectation was that when the NPC2s are
...(41)
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linked together total connectivity would be less than when the NPC2s operate 
independently. Figures 54 and 55 do represent a simple case. Therefore in order to 
explore this phenomenon more closely another example is given in Figure 56.
NPC2
Figure 56: Multiple NPC2 constructs working independently and as a chain
Figure 56 has 3 NPC2 constructs. Two of them, labelled as NPC2i, operate together 
whilst NPC22 operates independently. The domains in Figure 56 are represented as 
Do = [A, B, C, D, E, F]. Connectivity for the cases b{ = 1, b2 = 1 ,bY = 0 and b2 = 0 is 
given in the matrix Cn (43). As with the earlier examples, if  the position of any NPC2 
is switched the values of bn and bn would be transposed.
C 13 —
0 bx 0 bx b 2 b 2
h 0 bx bx 0 0
0 bl 0 0 0 0
5 h
0 0 0 0
t>2 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 0 0 0
...(4 3 )
Total connectivity for this configuration is calculated in (44) where it can be seen that 
a total of 6 potential compromise paths exist.
Total = 46, + 46, + 262 + 262 = 6 " '  ^
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To conclude this example, each of the NPC2s in Figure 56 are considered as 
independent entities. This case is shown in Figure 57.
NPC2
Figure 57: Multiple NPC2s operating independently
The domains in Figure 57 are represented as D m = [A, B, C, D, E, F]. Connectivity is 
shown in C14 (45).
0 b l 0 by h h
b t 0 b 2 b 2 0 0
0 b 2 0 0 0 0
by b 2 0 0 0 0
b , 0 0 0 0 0
b l 0 0 0 0 0
Total connectivity is calculated in (46) and yields 6 potential compromise paths.
Total = 2b, + 2b, + 2 b2 + 2 b2 + 2b3 +2 b3 =6 • • • (46)
Total connectivity in (46) is the same as (44) even though the NPC2s in Figure 56 are 
acting independently. This more complex configuration gives the same result as the 
simple examples in Figures 54 and 55, that is, there is no difference in the total 
number o f compromise paths irrespective of whether the NPC2s operate 
independently or as a chain. The results obtained in (40) and (42) and (44) and (46) 
lead us to the following observation:
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In a network exhibiting symmetrical connectivity, the total number o f  connections 
will be twice the number o f  NPC2 constructs used to control connectivity irrespective 
o f whether the NPC2s act independently or in a coordinated fashion.
This observation is clarified as follows. The Boolean variables bx ,bx ,b2,b2 . . .etc occur 
in pairs; that is, for every occurrence of b in the matrix there is a complement b . The 
NPC2 offers 2 potential paths, symbolised by b and b . In examples such as (46) they 
always occur as a sum b + b , and this is, by definition, unity: b + b =1. In a 
symmetric matrix each NPC2 offers 2 bi-directional connections therefore to obtain 
total connectivity, the number of connections are doubled. Our observation is useful 
since in appropriate configurations it can be used as a shortcut to total the connections 
and thus the number of potential compromise paths. Furthermore, it provides a means 
of verifying the addition of the matrices. Understanding the relationship between 
NPC2 connectors enables us to verify the matrices. Since all o f the Boolean values 
should have a complement, mistakes can be readily identified through a visual check 
of the matrix. This theorem has not been tested against an asymmetric case and we do 
have doubts concerning its applicability in this circumstance. Such a study would be 
of interest but is beyond the scope of this thesis. In summary, the use o f a formal 
technique, such as the matrices, is necessary to reveal subtle and counterintuitive 
results. It would not have been obvious from a simple visual check of the models, 
that the number of compromise paths would have been the same irrespective of 
whether multiple NPC2s operate independently or as a group.
4.6 Discussion of Preliminary Results
The preliminary results regarding indirect connectivity and network growth can be 
discussed in the context of other work. Metcalfe’s law [45] as stated in (1) applied to a 
6 node network yields a total of 15 connections. If an additional node were added this 
number would increase to 21; a substantial increase in connectivity. Our models 
assume bi-directional connectivity. Therefore these values would actually be 30 or 42 
potential connections respectively. Given that our work equates connectivity with 
potential compromise path if  Metcalfe’s calculations are correct, additional
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connectivity would probably result in an unacceptable increase in risk. However, 
Metcalfe makes the assumption that nodes are fully connected therefore when an 
additional node is added it is automatically able to connect to all existing members 
(apart from itself). The models in Sections 4.2 and 4.5 showed the difference in 
potential compromise paths when a new domain was both fully and partially 
connected to existing domains. The result was quite pronounced and can be further 
influenced through the use of the NPC2 and NPD constructs.
Our initial findings indicate that the rate of growth does not conform to Metcalfe’s 
model neither is it as pessimistic as the view o f maximum permitted connectivity. 
Taking Figure 21 as an example we apply Metcalfe’s formula to the model. Since 
there are three domains this would take the form 3 (3 -1 )/2  and would yield 3 
connections. Our results for Figure 21 showed a total of 4 potential compromise 
paths. This is clearly a larger value when compared with Metcalfe’s value of 3 but is 
explained by the fact that unlike Metcalfe, each connection is considered 
independently and the result contains no division by 2. Our result is still less than 
maximum permitted connectivity (6 connections) as shown in Figure 20, which does 
not recognise the role of the NPC2. These preliminary results indicate that the NPC2 
and NPD constructs have a positive impact on reducing the number o f potential 
compromise paths. Moreover, their use can be effective in controlling the rate of 
growth and proliferation of connections as domains are added to a network. This 
subject has by no means been exhaustively researched in this thesis. We conclude that 
further work is required in order to wholly appreciate the implications o f including 
non-persistent and conditional constructs in the risk assessment process.
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Chapter 5: Implementation of Fit for Purpose Security
This chapter is the first of two which together represent a paradigm shift in our work. 
They describe the transition from a conceptual view of the NPC2 in high-level models 
to practical implementation of the principles in a small-scale example.
Chapter 5 presents the evolution of the NPC2 from a piece of abstract modelling 
notation used in Chapters 3 and 4 to an architectural model and design blueprint. The 
model identifies how the NPC2 will operate in and interact with its target 
environment and the components necessary to achieve the required behaviour. Since 
our overall objective is to utilise the NPC2 in high assurance environments, we were 
bound to observe certain design objectives which will enhance its acceptability into 
our target market. In following this route we became aware of the potential for 
designing a proprietary framework which could result in a ‘closed’ solution 
completely at odds with our philosophy of fit for purpose security. The level of 
openness in the NPC2 model can be visualised as an up-side-down pyramid such as 
that shown later in Figure 59, where the modules at the top are generic and platform- 
independent. As the architecture progresses towards the security policy components 
so it becomes more focused and constrained by the target platform. This is a concept 
we return to in section 5.1.
In Chapter 6 we describe the practical element of our work where the NPC2 design 
has been taken and engineered into a working example. This prototype solution is 
one way in which the NPC2 can be constructed; there are o f course many others 
which could utilise different technologies. A major strength with our approach is the 
openness o f the NPC2 structure which means that systems engineer may utilise their 
preference of technology provided the overall design principles are adhered to.
5.1 Visualising the Non-Persistent Capability Concept
In the high level modelling process the NPC2 effectively provides an indication that a 
level of flexibility is required through an exception to the normal or baseline 
separation and sharing requirements. Until the risk analysis stage where security
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controls are considered, we are not concerned with how flexibility will be engineered 
into the system. As described in Chapter 1, fit for purpose security is underpinned by 
the synthesis of security policy, architecture and mechanism. As a result, a substantial 
part of our background research focussed on looking at the separation architectures 
and technologies that were available and would ultimately influence the design o f any 
fit for purpose solution we would propose. In principle the NPC2 sits above and 
manipulates the underlying system to elicit changing behaviour in accordance with a 
security policy. The NPC2 therefore needs to be as generic as possible so it can be 
applied across a variety o f different platforms and technologies with minimal 
reconfiguration. Realistically, we appreciate that at some point in the design it will be 
necessary to bind the NPC2 more closely with the underlying technology and lose 
some of its open structure. The NPC2 acts as a ‘glue’ between the external 
environment comprising other host systems and the system platform on which it is 
itself hosted. The host platform is expected to support some form o f separation 
between objects although the strength and capability of this mechanism would of 
course vary depending on the solution employed. The NPC2 does not mandate any 
particular type o f target technology although it will require a certain degree of 
customisation in order to interface with individual security sub-systems. In summary, 
we have applied some o f our early research on separation architectures to the design 
principles and development of the NPC2 architecture. These include:
• modularity of components
• clearly defined and bounded functionality
• technology independence
During the course of this chapter it will become clear how each of these principles has 
been utilised in the framework and where difficulties have been encountered. We 
discovered that moving from statements o f intent, which constitute the design, 
through to a practical implementation is a complex task, particularly when we are 
seeking to introduce an element o f dynamism into the system. As shown in this 
section, the NPC2 is not simply about a security policy that can be defined, refined 
and processed into system level rules. In order to adapt to changes in the environment 
in an appropriate way, the policy must interact with other components that observe
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and monitor conditions, determine when a threshold has been met or exceeded and 
subsequently invoke a change in the security policy. Each of these processes could be 
carried out by a ‘human in the loop’. Given that ‘system robustness’, in accordance 
with Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety [5], and fit for purpose security are both 
design goals for the NPC2, our solution is designed to operate autonomously. The 
policy is therefore wrapped within a suite of supporting capabilities, including:
• Environment monitoring / detection
• Event management including policy trigger mechanisms
• Validation
In accordance with our design objectives, the monitoring, management and policy 
requirements which embody the NPC2 have been refined into a series of modules. 
The result is a package of individual but integrated components, which when 
combined provide a practical means of realising the NPC2. Figure 58 presents a 
conceptual view of the NPC2 architecture.
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Figure 58: High level taxonomy of NPC2 architecture
Each of the elements in Figure 58 are described in later sections of this chapter. 
However, the following points are noteworthy at this stage since they will
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significantly affect the design and implementation and are fundamental to our 
approach.
Given that the NPC2 interacts with and controls a host platform, there will be some 
overlap between functionality at the lower layers of the architecture and the host 
security sub-systems. We expect the policy trigger mechanism (which is considered a 
part of the event management module) to be more closely coupled and therefore 
potentially less generic than other components of the NPC2. A conceptual view is 
shown in Figure 59.
Environment Monitor 
and
Event Manager
Policy Trigger 
Mechanism
, Target /  
\  Security /  
\  Po licy /
Host Environment 
Manipulated by 
NPC2
Figure 59: Conceptual view of NPC2
Both Figures 58 and 59 identify the relationship between the NPC2 and the host 
environment which it influences by controlling changes to the target security policy. 
This environment of course is external to the NPC2 itself and is therefore technology 
specific to the host platform.
Figure 58 also identifies the direction of information flow between components and it 
is immediately clear that the environmental monitoring component is both inward and 
outward facing. That is, it collects data (externally) from the environment and feeds it 
to an internal store. This is noteworthy because the fit for purpose security principle 
is dependent, at least in part, on the trustworthiness of its components. Quite clearly, 
the external environment presents a risk to the system. Therefore the veracity o f the 
data collected must be confirmed as far as possible. Furthermore, a security 
mechanism must be applied to the internal communication process to protect data
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being passed between components. The same principles will apply to other 
communication flows identified in Figure 58.
We have identified where components of the NPC2 could potentially reside in the 
target system. That is, they could be installed locally on the device where the security 
policy will be updated, or distributed within the system. Of course the placement of 
components will be driven by the implementation scenario since it will influence the 
development and functionality of software modules. The demonstration environment 
used for our example in Chapter 6 monitors the absence of a device, and in order to 
detect its presence or absence our monitoring event is bound to the network. For 
simplicity the Environment Monitor module is activated on the device that will 
assume command. Equally, this capability could have been distributed within the 
network and collected information from other community members. It would have 
introduced other complexities and issues for the security of the system, although there 
would have been other benefits. For example, distribution of the capability removes 
the problem of a single point of failure which we encounter if monitoring is contained 
within a single device. Furthermore, our device may simply be out o f range of the 
Commander device and therefore erroneously report its absence. If other devices are 
also responsible for collecting the information then it would be apparent that the 2IC 
was at fault and not the Commander device. These are issues we are aware of. The 
design of the NPC2 therefore takes account of both local and remote data collection. 
The choice of approach can only be decided in the light of other information related to 
the individual scenario.
Validation is a feature o f all components and of course the entire NPC2 will require 
verification that it functions as designed. Given our interest in high assurance 
environments the ability to validate is a critical part of the architecture. The modular 
approach of the NPC2 assists with this process since each component is small and 
very self-contained. The interfaces between an individual module and its neighbours 
are well defined and bounded. Of course the complexity of each module will increase 
as additional functionality is included to perform more complex event processing or 
collection of multiple events. The benefits of enhancing a module must always be 
weighed against the impact on validation.
Page 108
The NPC2 does not stand as an independent entity within the system. It is required to 
interface with the existing environment and indeed, some aspects of it will actually 
straddle the boundaries between the NPC2 and external environment. As described 
previously, one example is the security policy. This clearly exists in the external 
environment but is manipulated by the NPC2 to achieve flexible behaviour. Although 
we alluded to the presence of the external environment in Figure 58, the architecture 
framework itself did not provide any contextual information to describe how the 
NPC2 fits within an overall configuration. This detail is captured in Figure 60.
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Figure 60: NPC2 in context
Figure 60 distinguishes between elements that will be developed to form the NPC2 
only and components that will be modified or adapted from the standard (target 
system) to provide or enhance NPC2 capability. Further information on each module 
is provided in the sub-sections which follow.
5.1.1 The External Environment
Figure 60 shows the NPC2 positioned within the external environment. This 
represents the elements used to drive policy change, because they are either events of
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interest or elements that will be affected by a change in policy rules. The external 
environment is not prescriptive; that is, we could register an interest, through the 
Environment Monitor component for an event or change in time. The events 
themselves may be interpreted in many different ways. For example if 
communication appears from a specific source we may perceive the event as an 
increase in risk or a reduction in trust and thus wish to change our separation and 
sharing profile accordingly. Figure 60 indicates that environmental data can be 
gathered from external sensors directly and fed straight into our Environment Monitor 
component or it could be an indirect feed collected from a log file that is subsequently 
monitored by the Environment Monitor.
Access control rules, which are defined in the security policy, reflect the overarching 
separation and sharing concerns of the system stakeholders. In our case study for 
example, the policy permits the 2IC to read situational awareness data when the 
Commander is no longer available. This action effectively allows the 2IC to ‘share’ 
this information where he or she was ‘separated’ from it before. These access rules are 
enforced in the external environment and manipulated by NPC2 functionality. The 
high level models provide no information regarding the resource(s) that will be 
protected in the external environment. For the purpose of our research it should be 
noted that the ‘external environment’ is synonymous with the ‘test environment’ 
where the NPC2 as a working capability is scrutinised. A detailed description o f the 
test environment is provided in Chapter 6.
5.1.2 Monitoring the Environment
It is envisaged that a system will be deployed with a baseline set of separation and 
sharing conditions that fulfil the anticipated requirements of the scenario. These are 
captured in the high level modelling process where in the DBSy InfoSec Architecture 
model, presented in earlier chapters, solid lines or permitted business connections join 
domains together to indicate that sharing is permissible. In order to allow the system 
to adapt to change it is necessary to have some means of detecting ‘events of interest’ 
in the environment that will ultimately drive through a change in security policy. In 
the NPC2 architecture this component is the Environment Monitor which we expect 
to be implemented through software or in some situations a combination of hardware
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and software depending on the installation and application. The Environment 
Monitor consists o f two elements, the event monitor itself and a repository, which are 
shown in Figure 61.
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Figure 61: Conceptual view of Environment Monitor Module
As shown in Figure 61 the Environment Monitor module essentially provides a data 
collection service where data related to the ‘event o f interest’ is collected and fed into 
a temporary repository for further processing. The monitoring service could be 
implemented as a combination o f hardware and software or software only depending 
on the type o f event being monitored. For example, one solution may include the use 
o f hardware sensors with onboard software designed to detect the presence o f moving 
metal objects such as vehicles. The event o f interest could be detection o f the object 
in an area identified as ‘no access’ which would subsequently generate and send a 
message elsewhere in the system. Interestingly the NPC2 Environment Monitor in 
this example could be the actual sensor and software itself or it could be an 
independent software process monitoring the generated message through the 
temporary repository or receiving the detection message. In Figure 61 it is shown that 
the data collection process may be ‘push’ or ‘puli’. In other words, the Environment 
Monitor may pull data about the event o f interest from the detection process. It could 
also subscribe to the same process and be informed about the event o f interest when it 
occurs. The method employed and actual composition o f the monitor would depend 
entirely on the requirements of the target system.
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In Figure 60 multiple lines were identified connecting the Environment Monitor to the 
Event Manager. This indicates that the Environment Monitor may be interested in 
and therefore passing on information about one or possibly many events from the 
external environment. Multiple configurations are envisaged. It could be configured 
to detect multiple instances o f the same event or perhaps single instances of different 
events. This would enable scalability in the NPC2.
5.1.3 Event M anager
Figure 62 is conceptual view of the Event Manager architecture. This can be 
implemented as a software component and is comprised of two components; the 
threshold which when met or exceeded generates an event or alert of some 
description, and the Event Manager itself which is responsible for taking appropriate 
action on receipt o f the alert communication. This action could be monitoring and 
maintaining the status o f the environment variable that has been set.
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Figure 62: Conceptual view of Event Manager Module
Essentially we want to cause a change in capability which involves loading a modified 
set of rules into the system either as a complete policy or module. The Event 
Manager will include a software component that is responsible for triggering a change 
in the security policy. The physical operation of the trigger mechanism will be 
dependent on the capability o f the target environment. For example, the 
demonstration system created and described in Chapter 6 is based upon SELinux. It 
is therefore possible to have a minimal implementation for the trigger mechanism and
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harness the conditional policy extensions through manipulation of a Boolean variable; 
both of which are features o f SELinux. Another security infrastructure which is less 
flexible than SELinux would require a different approach.
The Event Manager can be as simple or complex as the situation demands. For 
example, if  only one input is coming from the Environment Monitor then the Event 
Manager needs only to manage and process one interrupt. However, if  it is receiving 
multiple pieces o f data then some level o f additional processing is necessary. This 
may involve:
• fusing the environment data to generate one trigger (many to one)
• fusing the environment data to generate multiple triggers (many to many)
• managing events where there may be one or more events and/or triggers but 
the relationship between them is one to one
• some combination of the above
Figure 60 also captured this possibility by showing multiple lines between the Event 
Manager and Security Policy.
5.1.4 Security Policy
The security policy is a difficult module to describe. It clearly has a significant role to 
play in the NPC2, but fundamentally belongs to the external target platform and is 
therefore required to interface with the NPC2. For the purposes o f this chapter it is 
necessary to present the properties that are required from the security policy whilst 
avoiding details that would be specific to the security sub-system o f a target device. 
The properties described will almost inevitably dictate the type o f policy which can be 
applied on the target system. It is necessary, for example, for the security policy to 
support dynamic behaviour. This behaviour is characterised by the loading and 
unloading of rules that will enable or revoke access with minimal disruption to the 
end user. At this point our vision o f fit for purpose security becomes very contentious 
with systems operating at the higher end of the evaluation assurance levels and 
enforcing mandatory access control. Typically the security policy loaded at system 
start will not change once the system is operational. If  a change is required the system
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must be restarted. Quite clearly this does not fit with our vision particularly where the 
affected system is operating in an autonomous environment. Nonetheless, our whole 
argument is based around the need for a more radical view of security and we believe 
there is sufficient motivation to consider dynamic security policy but under controlled 
circumstances. The level of dynamic capability supported in the security policy will 
without doubt influence the development o f other modules in the NPC2. For 
example, our research revealed that SELinux supported conditional policy extensions 
triggered by a change in the Boolean variable. As shown in Chapter 6, this made the 
development of the Event Manager, which encompasses the trigger mechanism, very 
easy. If this capability had not been available, engineering o f the same mechanism 
would have been more complex because it would have had to perform some of the 
tasks undertaken by the conditional policy rules themselves.
It is suggested that the NPC2 solution has some form o f policy feedback mechanism 
which is invoked after a change to the policy is loaded. We foresee a requirement that 
once a modified policy has been activated it may be necessary to inform the affected 
‘user’ o f the change. In situations such as our own the tempo of operations is such 
that it is essential for the user to begin applying the new policy immediately. It would 
be inappropriate to wait until the next time the user makes an access request. This 
approach differs from the traditional view of the policy decision and enforcement 
process provided by the reference monitor [30]. Normally a user requests a capability 
which is checked and permitted (or denied) by the reference monitor. The whole 
process is thus user driven. It should be noted, that under this regime the user will be 
unaware o f a policy change until their access is refused and they probably will not 
know why it has failed. Worse still, if  a user has never had access before but the 
policy changes to allow a capability, they will be ignorant of that fact unless a 
feedback mechanism is in place. In a more dynamic approach we expect a level of 
‘planned intelligence’ where some decision can be taken regarding updating affected 
parties that the policy has been changed.
5.2 Validation
As stated previously, validation is a significant element in the design o f the NPC2 and 
therefore appears at all levels o f the architecture. Validating the design and 
implementation o f the NPC2 modules can be achieved in a variety o f ways and
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depending on the requirements o f the stakeholders, some aspects will be more 
important or useful than others. The purpose of this section is to describe some of the 
features both in the NPC2 design and the way in which we anticipate it will be 
constructed that will contribute towards validation. The section does not discuss 
specific technologies that provide any of the features described since it is our intention 
to maintain independence in this respect.
It is recognised that where an organisation ultimately seeks a level o f assurance for a 
product it will be necessary to follow a more structured design and development 
process right from the start. However, for the purposes o f this research it was not 
appropriate to conform to such requirements because the work is a proof of concept 
rather than a finished product. Nonetheless, we are mindful o f this possibility in the 
future. Although it is clearly an area for future work, which we contend would come 
under the umbrella of development as opposed to research, as part o f our discussion 
on validation in both this section and within Chapter 6 we present some of the 
features of the NPC2 design which should assist with an evaluation. Our aspiration is 
to keep the core NPC2 components as small and simple as possible with targeted 
functionality. This philosophy is in harmony with established guidelines and 
architectures for secure systems. For example, in [28, p. 140] Anderson notes how the 
study by James Anderson [28]:
“...led the US government to conclude that a secure system should do one or two 
things well; and these protection properties should be enforced by mechanisms that 
were simple enough to verify and that would change only rarely... ”
We examine the design o f the NPC2 in the context o f this description in Section 5.2.1. 
The NPC2 is modular and we have attempted to clearly define and bound the 
functionality provided by each of the layers. In theory it should be possible to 
implement the NPC2 with small modular applications working together to provide the 
overall capability; applications which should be more amenable to testing to verify for 
accuracy, integrity and functionality.
Validation is not restricted to the development o f each NPC2 module but in the 
communication and information exchange between modules and o f course the
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underlying operating system that supports it. In Figure 58 we show secure messaging 
as a requirement between each o f the modules. Again, the interpretation and 
implementation o f such a feature would be governed by the needs of the stakeholder 
and the capabilities of the technology used for implementation. We look at the NPC2 
in the light o f  other architectures in Section 5.2.2.
Logging and auditing perform a significant role in the validation process which is 
discussed in Section 5.2.3. It is necessary to have some record of events that can be 
easily analysed and potentially used as a feedback loop to assist with system 
refinement. We would therefore expect logging and auditing to be an essential part of 
the initial development to confirm that the system behaves as expected and validate 
both the design o f individual components and the overall capability.
Finally, it should be noted that since the NPC2 is technology independent, the final 
solution including the target platform hosting the NPC2, could be constructed using 
security certified components. Although this does not guarantee a level of 
certification, because the resulting system would need to be re-certified, it would 
clearly assist in the evaluation and certification process.
5.2.1 Design Principles
The NPC2 architecture is modular by design and presents a number o f advantages. 
The software components within each module perform very specific tasks which 
should enable the developer to contain the size and complexity of each. A modular 
design also assists with application testing and the validation o f software code. For 
the purposes of evaluation it is necessary for the independent assessor to examine 
individual lines o f code to verify the integrity o f the software. Modem operating 
systems and applications are victims o f their own functionality. The enhancements to 
functionality result in an increase in the amount and complexity o f code required to 
deliver the capabilities. Unavoidably the software will become more expensive and 
difficult to evaluate. We have an opportunity to design the total NPC2 capability 
around small composable modules. Therefore, in theory it should be easier to confirm 
the behaviour of each module independently and as part of the whole structure.
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A modular design also allows us to secure each application independently and contain 
its access to resources. Since the NPC2 modules are well defined and specific, greater 
control can be exerted over the access required for the individual applications to 
perform their task. This design allows us to adopt the principle o f  least privilege [65]. 
In the event that the application is flawed, there is some potential to contain damage it 
may cause to other processes running on the system. O f course, this level o f control 
will be dependent on the underlying functionality o f the host security system. If it 
does not provide the level of granularity required to secure individual applications, 
then it is not possible to exercise strict control over the NPC2 modules. As part o f the 
fit for purpose vision, it would therefore be necessary to select a host operating 
system that offered flexible security for the NPC2 components themselves in addition 
to supporting the capabilities required to support dynamic changes to the security 
policy rules.
The modular design is of course advantageous when performing functionality tests 
since each can be tested independently o f another. Furthermore, it is possible to 
perform incremental testing where modules are gradually slotted together and tested 
until the entire system is constructed.
5.2.2 Security of Messages
Validation and the security o f messages relates to ensuring the veracity and integrity 
of the message communicated between different components of the NPC2 and in 
some cases the NPC2 and the external environment. O f course this will be dependent 
on the level of communication. That is, we are potentially dealing with messaging 
between devices using the communications network and messages passed between 
processes on the same system. In either case we need to be sure that the message can 
be trusted since it will ultimately be used to drive through a change in the security 
profile of the system. There are o f course different techniques for validating the 
authenticity and integrity of a message which involve the use of encryption and digital 
signatures. At this point it should be remembered that the NPC2 may be used in 
autonomous systems with limited resources therefore the overhead o f applying 
cryptographic techniques must be carefully reviewed. The MILS architecture [35] 
outlines the use o f end-to-end encryption for inter-process communication and since
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the architecture has successfully been implemented in small embedded systems such 
as those used in the avionics industry, [36] we know it is achievable in a constrained 
environment. The ability to provide validation through the security o f messages 
communicated to and within the NPC2 will clearly be dependent on the capabilities of 
the implementation platform. In Chapter 6 we discuss how this aspect was 
approached for the demonstration system.
5.2.3 Logging and Auditing
The NPC2 components generate application logs where their activity will be recorded 
in the form of an audit log. The logs can be analysed to provide some confirmation 
that the component is behaving as expected. It is anticipated that the technology 
adopted for the security sub-system will also provide some form o f audit log where 
access attempts are recorded. The NPC2 modules will be protected by a security 
policy and their own access attempts will be subject to auditing. Again, this will 
enable the system analyst to confirm that the component is not attempting to access a 
resource for which it is unauthorised. If it does, the attempt can at least be validated 
to determine whether it is legitimate or not and appropriate action taken.
5.3 Summary
This chapter describes the transition from the NPC2 as a modelling capability to the 
NPC2 as an implementation architecture. The purpose was not to prescribe a set of 
technologies that should be adopted, but outline the functionality and interactions 
between the suites of components deemed to be necessary to achieve a flexible 
security capability.
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Chapter 6: Practical Demonstration
This chapter presents the practical phase o f the NPC2 implementation and the 
development of our prototype solution from the architecture described in Chapter 5. 
As with most engineering projects the actual implementation differed from the 
theoretical model. However this is a valuable part o f the process since it is necessary 
to establish the extent to which the theoretical concepts map to reality. O f course an 
account o f  the ‘lessons learned’ from this experience is useful in future 
implementations both for our own purposes o f that o f other developers. In the sub­
sections that follow, we describe how each component o f the NPC2 was engineered 
for the demonstration system. This solution is, o f course, only one example of how 
the NPC2 might be applied in practical terms and has been developed specifically for 
our requirements. The example described is intended to be a proof o f concept and 
would therefore require more rigorous engineering to evolve it from prototype to 
product. At this stage the development process would be aligned with the 
requirements of a formal evaluation model if  a level of assurance was necessary for 
the NPC2.
6.1 Development Considerations and Constraints
The transition from the design and modelling phase to practical implementation 
revealed a number o f issues. These were external to the NPC2 but nonetheless 
influenced the way in which the work evolved and the solution was engineered. This 
section describes each and discusses how the issue was addressed in the development. 
This is introduced via a reprise o f the original case study since its content raised some 
unique challenges to be overcome.
6.1.1 The Scenario
The demonstration scenario is based upon an agile group and its interaction with other 
parties, who by virtue o f their affiliation and function, have different levels of trust 
associated with them. This situation has been captured in the DBSy InfoSec 
Architecture models presented in 3.3.1 o f this thesis.
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In our scenario, Domains AX, AY and B are all members o f an agile mission group 
Domain AX is permitted to share information with Domain AY using messaging and 
Domain AY shares information with Domain B. Members of Domain AX are not 
normally permitted to share information with Domain B. However, under exceptional 
and particular conditions which, in this case occurs when Domain AY is unavailable, 
sharing between Domains AX and B is permitted. At this time there is no 
connectivity between Domains AX and AY. The absence o f Domain AY must be 
detected so that the security policy can be modified to allow the system to adapt 
accordingly. As described in Chapter 3, our work includes the NPC2 to capture 
temporary and conditional connectivity within the DBSy InfoSec models.
In the models, the NPC2 is directly connected to the domain where it will be 
implemented; although at this level of detail there is no indication regarding either the 
platform or technology that will be used to realise the NPC2. That said, the NPC2 
quite clearly controls the ability to pass or share information between two domains 
and this level of control could manifest itself in a number o f  ways. For example, we 
could adopt the typical functionality o f a gateway device where members o f the same 
community or network are permitted to communicate with relative freedom. Traffic 
crossing the gateway is subject to restrictions. The desired levels o f separation are 
achieved by blocking communications packets at the network boundary based upon 
factors such as the source or destination address o f the packet, protocol type or 
possibly the port address. This is a classic gateway approach but does present some 
risk since a significant part of the separation strategy is placed in a boundary device 
that might fail. It is usual to design ‘defence in depth’ where a firewall or gateway is 
combined with other security controls. Details such as these are identified and 
assessed as part o f the risk analysis process.
Another approach is to define the separation boundary at a lower level. For example, 
members o f a domain could be permitted or denied the capability that enables them to 
share information with a different domain. Whilst this affords greater granularity of 
control, that is, it is possible to specify who has elevated privileges, we also risk rule 
explosion and greater complexity if  there are too many exceptions to the ‘normal’ 
security policy. However, this second approach is in the spirit o f  our original concept 
for the NPC2. We recall the literature review in Chapter 2, where the divergence
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between our thinking and the principle of weak tranquillity was observed. An 
advantage with our fit for purpose solution was found in its ability to tightly control 
an elevation of privilege and open a system for a limited period, to a limited number 
of subjects for limited capabilities. It is therefore necessary to design our 
implementation to uphold this philosophy. A separation solution using the NPC2 
exercises control over when a user may acquire enhanced privileges in the system and 
thus modifies access to the flow o f information accordingly. The NPC2 enables the 
principle o f  least privilege [65] to be designed into a device that must also provide a 
level o f flexibility.
6.1.2 Engineering Resources and Skill Sets
As stated previously, the NPC2 is comprised o f different components including 
hardware (possibly), software and security policy. It was apparent from an early stage 
that a blend of skills would be required in the practical experimentation phase to 
support the development process. Broadly speaking, these skills cover software 
development or programming expertise and specific knowledge of the selected 
security policy language or environment used in the implementation. It was 
unrealistic to assume that one person would necessarily possess all o f  the skills 
required to the necessary level o f expertise. Furthermore, given the timescales o f the 
project it was impractical for one person to acquire any additional skills. Therefore 
we took the approach that collaboration and specialisation in the defined areas 
presented a satisfactory solution to the issue. The experimentation was therefore 
undertaken by the author and a software developer, a colleague, who was also familiar 
with the target platform and critically, the philosophy behind the NPC2.
Our collaborative approach brought with it additional considerations. The most 
significant for this research was a modification to the first example o f the NPC2 
where it was necessary to demonstrate its capability in a more visible and therefore 
acceptable format to the stakeholder providing the development resource. O f course, 
security policy operates in the background and is therefore neither visual nor obvious 
to the casual observer. An effective way o f demonstrating a working security policy 
is to show the effect by denying a capability followed by the difference in behaviour 
when the same capability is permitted. The ‘effect’ o f course needs to be visual to
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make a satisfactory impact. In our situation it was necessary to adapt the interpretation 
of our original case study to make use o f display output. The modifications allowed 
us to maintain the fidelity o f the original principles, that is, separation between lower 
and higher domains unless exceptional conditions arise, whilst producing a very 
visible example to show the NPC2 in operation. The revised scenario is as follows:
1. Situational awareness data, in the form o f Global Positioning System (GPS) co­
ordinates, time and user identity is distributed to all users o f the network and 
written to a message queue.
2. Device 1 (the Commander) is permitted to read the message queue. The 
situational awareness data is read, interpreted and displayed on a hand-held 
output device to show the geographical location o f the user on a map. This 
updates as the device changes position.
3. Device 2 (the Second in Command or 2IC) is not normally permitted to read the 
message queue. The messages are therefore discarded1. The display on the 
output device is inactive because no situational awareness data is available.
4. Security policy exception - in the event that Device 1 is unavailable , the 
security policy changes to permit Device 2 to read the message queue. 
Situational awareness data is read, interpreted and displayed on the output 
device and updates as the device changes position. The output display for 
Device 1 becomes inactive since it is no longer participating in the network.
Figure 63 illustrates stages 1-4 from the list.
1 This is a recognised vulnerability in the design. If the security policy is undermined, the device will 
be able to read messages. However, the ad-hoc network is a broadcast network therefore all devices 
will receive the situational awareness messages.
2 The term ‘unavailable’ may be interpreted in many ways. It is necessary to differentiate between the 
human operator (who may be incapacitated when the device is functioning) and the device itself which 
may simply malfunction. For this demonstration it is assumed that the device itself will become 
unavailable.
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Figure 63: Flexible Security Demo when Device 1 is active
Figure 64 illustrates the system state from stage 4.
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Figure 64: Flexible Security Demo when Device 1 is inactive
Although this new interpretation of the security requirements lends itself to a more 
visual demonstration, it does highlight an important tension between the theoretical 
models and the practical constraints of the target environment. We observe that
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behaviours or characteristics arising from the implementation environment mean that 
the actual solution does not map exactly to the original requirement although the end 
result is the same. To clarify: all o f the devices participating in our case study operate 
in a broadcast network, which is perfectly reasonable and usual for an ad-hoc 
environment. All of the messaging traffic is therefore received by all devices. In its 
purest sense, it could be argued that separation has not been achieved since Device 2, 
the 2IC, is also included in the network and will therefore be ‘receiving’ broadcast 
traffic along with its neighbours. However, Device 2 is not permitted to read the 
message queue therefore it has no knowledge about the type or content o f  the actual 
message. Strictly speaking sharing has been denied for the 2IC in this situation, but 
obviously at a higher layer in the communication hierarchy. Ultimately the debate 
comes down to how strictly the system designer wishes to interpret (and enforce) 
‘sharing’ and ‘separation’. Since our work is concerned with balancing flexibility 
with traditionally highly segregated solutions, separation must occur at a higher level 
than the physical layer in order to support expedient reconfiguration. The 
implementation o f ‘logical’ separation over ‘physical’ separation presents a 
significant engineering challenge. This is particularly the case in environments such 
as the military where the separation between resources is o f paramount importance to 
prevent contamination or compromise o f sensitive information. In our solution, the 
properties o f the physical environment necessitate the use o f separation techniques at 
a higher level. This constraint is actually an opportunity to manipulate the underlying 
infrastructure, through security policy, and support our flexible solution. We only 
dwell on this point in order to underline the importance o f being aware of 
characteristics in the implementation environment that will undoubtedly influence the 
engineering solution.
6.1.2.1 Environmental Constraints
In the previous section we described how the properties of the broadcast network 
affected the level at which separation will be engineered for our practical 
demonstration. Furthermore, the target system operates with limited bandwidth, 
power, storage and processing resources with the result that our solution must have a 
minimal footprint and tightly control the amount o f additional overhead that is placed 
on the system. Integration o f the NPC2 must therefore be innovative and incorporate
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ways in which existing data and resources can be used to provide input to components 
such as the NPC2 Environment Monitor and Event Manager. The target system 
operates on a secure version o f Linux (SELinux) and our solution leverages the 
security features of this operating system to define and construct the security policy 
components of the NPC2.
The system is designed to operate in a mobile, ad-hoc community but also has the 
capacity to communicate over fixed links. Our solution is focussed on the ad-hoc 
network where community members join and leave fairly regularly and for varying 
durations. Since our case study is concerned with using the absence of the 
‘Commander’ (Device 1) to drive a policy change we must consider the impact of 
using a potentially highly mobile community o f users and set our acceptance 
threshold for the event ‘user absent’ accordingly. If  this is set too low then we risk 
changing the security policy unnecessarily.
In an ad-hoc network routing protocols including the Ad-hoc On Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) protocol [66] are used to discover the existence of other group 
members in the network and support message routing. All community members can 
‘see’ their immediate neighbour, that is, a device ‘one hop’ away. If  the address o f a 
remote member is known, a route request can be issued to locate another user. These 
characteristics offer both challenges and opportunities for our solution. It cannot be 
guaranteed that the device held by the basic user, who will assume the status o f the 
agile group leader, will also be its nearest network neighbour; that is, one hop away. 
The device will only be aware o f the existence o f the leader if  a network route has 
previously been established between the two devices. It will then, as a matter of 
course, receive route error messages when the agile leader device can no longer be 
reached. As part o f the normal communications procedure it is expected that all 
devices would establish an initial communication with the leader device and therefore 
a network route would be set-up. This is probably an operation that should be 
automated to ensure that the required routes are in place. As part o f the network 
configuration the basic user devices must have some means of resolving the network 
address of the agile group leader to identify the actual device and user. This is 
required to assist with observing and reporting the absence or presence o f the leader 
and enabling the 2IC to assume elevated capabilities when necessary. For the first
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demonstration we have elected to pre-configure some of this information so that, for 
example, the 2IC device has prior knowledge o f the Internet Protocol (IP) address for 
the Commander device and can detect its presence in the network using routing 
information generated by AODV. In addition a pre-defined list containing the IP 
addresses o f  community members is read by the Environment Monitor to determine 
the identity of the device which will assume the capabilities of the Commander when 
the security policy is updated. Whilst it is recognised that this approach is contrary to 
the normal functioning o f ad-hoc communities, it is also appreciated that expending 
effort solving complexities generated by the external environment would have 
jeopardised and detracted from development o f the NPC2 itself. The military 
community does operate in a hierarchical manner therefore using a pre-defined list to 
determine the ‘next in command’ is representative o f normal working practices.
6.1.2.2 Policy Management
In our ad-hoc network configuration there is no central point for administration or 
management and this clearly impacts how much local management will be necessary 
in the deployed solution. One o f our objectives is to minimise the amount of 
intervention that is required by the human ‘user’ or administrator. It will therefore be 
necessary to have the components necessary to enable a change in behaviour installed 
or accessible locally but protected by suitable security mechanisms and only invoked 
when policy change is triggered. In support o f our research objectives and philosophy 
this approach is acceptable. It is also completely in harmony with Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety [5] since we are striving to deploy a system with the capacity for 
different options and thus increase its lifespan before external intervention is required.
6.2 Implementation Components
The NPC2 is designed to interact with and add a flexible dimension to existing 
systems. It is therefore necessary to provide some context for the NPC2 and identify 
areas where the modules defined in the high level architecture overlap with the host 
system. Much of our discussion has focused on the NPC2 manipulating the 
underlying security protection mechanisms however we have not, as yet, described the 
resource that is actually being protected. Figure 65 illustrates the demonstration
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environment for the NPC2. Here it can be seen that the system uses a message queue 
(MQueue) which will be protected by the security policy.
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Figure 65: NPC2 Demonstration Environm ent
Protection of MQueue is achieved by controlling the access o f two processes SA1 and 
SA2 which have write and read access respectively. Not only do MQueue, SA1 and 
SA2 exist in the external environment they are also regarded as part o f the test 
environment. Without them, the functionality o f the NPC2 cannot be verified. The 
development of MQueue and related components in the external environment is 
acknowledged throughout this chapter. However, a detailed description of the 
implementation is reserved until Section 6.2.5, which is devoted to the test 
environment.
Recall that Figure 60 illustrated a combination of broken and solid arrows between 
the Environment Monitor, Event Manager and Policy Manager components. This 
notation has been used to suggest that one or more data streams may be used as 
input/output to each process. For example, the Event Manager may receive a number 
of data observations from the Environment Monitor that it fuses and processes into 
one policy trigger. This could result in a single policy rule change or many, 
depending on the requirement. Our demonstration is concerned with a single event
and does therefore not require complex processing by any of the NPC2 components. 
However, the management o f multiple events is fundamental to scalability in the 
NPC2 approach and should therefore be captured in the more detailed models. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 7.
In Figure 65 the shaded components were either developed or modified for the NPC2 
demonstrator using a combination of applications developed in the C programming 
language, Linux scripts, a standard text file and SELinux security policy modules. 
The components are installed on all devices in the network. Figure 66 maps these 
components to the NPC2 architecture.
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Figure 66: NPC2 Physical Components
In Figure 66 the shadow boxes represent each module identified in the NPC2 
architecture. Behind each there is a box naming the software component developed 
for the demonstration system. This is with the exception of the external environment 
components SA1 and SA2. These are implemented as applications also developed in 
the C programming language and named SHIMMER and SHIMMEE respectively. 
These applications are described in Section 6.2.5. The development o f the other NPC2 
components is described in the sub-sections which follow.
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6.2.1 Environment Monitor
As described in Chapter 5, the Environment Monitor (EM) is responsible for 
observing events of interest, collecting this data and feeding it into an analysis 
process. In our prototype NPC2 the EM is a software-only solution satisfied by two 
components: SEADOVE and EMMA.
SEADOVE
This is an enhanced version o f the ADOV routing protocol designed for use in Ad-hoc 
networks. As stated in Section 6.1.2, for the purposes o f our demonstration we are 
interested in events related to the Commander (device) and specifically when it is no 
longer available. In order to reduce the amount o f overhead introduced by the NPC2 
it was decided to utilise the routing and connection information provided by AODV 
and stored in routing tables as part o f its normal operation. Having modified the 
standard protocol we referred to it as SEADOVE and to avoid confusion use this 
name throughout the chapter. The majority o f the data processed by SEADOVE is 
related to network routing. It therefore includes AODV messages such as Route 
Request (RRQ), Route Reply (RRE), Route Error (RERR) and so on. These messages 
and their format are described in [66]. For the purposes o f the NPC2 two functions 
were added to SEADOVE to perform housekeeping and call-back activities. The 
housekeeping function maintained a list o f network subscribers by their IP address. 
This allowed the absence o f the ‘subscriber o f interest’ or the loss o f this IP address 
from the subscription list to be detected. The call-back function in SEADOVE simply 
informed EMMA when the event o f interest, that is the loss o f the IP address 
associated with the Commander device, occurred.
SEADOVE is implemented as a Linux kernel module and EMMA a user-space 
application. A means o f communication between the two processes is required. This 
is provided through the use o f a Netlink socket created specifically for the purpose. 
Only the EMMA and SEADOVE processes use the socket which, given the 
requirement for secure messaging in the NPC2 architecture, is an important point. An 
attacker would need to be aware o f the existence o f the socket and once they had this 
information it would be possible to intercept messages passed between the two 
processes. Whilst it is unlikely that this would occur on the machine, it is nonetheless
Page 129
possible. No claims can be made regarding the security of this regime and for a more 
robust solution a different approach would need to be found.
At system start-up a conversation occurs between SEADOVE and EMMA the 
purpose of which is to register an interest about a user of interest. To achieve this, 
EMMA parses a text file listing the IP addresses o f network members and passes the 
details of those it is interested in to SEADOVE. The housekeeping function within 
SEADOVE maintains this list. As part o f the subscription process, EMMA instructs 
SEADOVE to send a message when it detects an event of interest related to those 
members. SEADOVE observes and gathers routing information. Software code 
located within SEADOVE determines whether it is ‘of interest’ or not. The call-back 
function which is a software hook inserted into the AODV route management table, 
instructs SEADOVE to inform another device about an IP address o f interest, in this 
case the IP Address associated with EMMA.
EMMA
EMMA performs a dual role in this implementation. Not only does this software 
component interface with SEADOVE to provide environment monitoring, it also runs 
code related to the Event Manager function. As described above, EMMA subscribes 
to SEADOVE in order to be informed about events of interest. In this case the event 
of interest is the absence of the Commander device as detected in the route 
management tables maintained by AODV. When EMMA receives the message from 
SEADOVE informing it that the event has occurred, the process consults an external 
text file to determine who will assume command. This file is essentially the hierarchy 
of members in the operation and contains the IP Address information o f current 
network members. EMMA parses the list to determine who is ‘next in command’. 
This effectively determines the device on which the security policy will be updated to 
allow the message queue read process to read and share situational awareness 
messages from the network. Having established the next in command and assuming 
the ‘next in command’ is the host device, EMMA runs a standard Linux script file 
which effectively changes the role from EM to Event Manager (EvM) and un­
subscribes from the SEADOVE process.
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6.2.2 Event Manager
The Event Manager (EvM) is a software solution satisfied by two components: 
specifically EMMA and a standard Linux script file.
In the capacity o f EvM, EMMA calls the external standard script file. Given that the 
NPC2 demonstrator is hosted on SELinux for our example, it was necessary to 
interface with the conditional policy extensions which are a feature of the SELinux 
security framework. Conditional rules work with Boolean variables. The system 
administrator defines a Boolean variable that will be associated with the conditional 
rule set and sets the default value. These are activated when the value o f the Boolean 
variable is changed. In our example, the script file run by EMMA contains a 
‘setsebool’ statement which modifies the value of the Boolean ‘ user-read’ from its 
default setting o f ‘false’ to ‘true’ . It is this change in value which causes the next part 
of the NPC2 to execute -  the conditional policy statements in the SELinux security 
policy itself.
6.2.3 SELinux Base Policy and Conditional Statements
The NPC2 components are hosted on a platform which itself operates under the 
control of a security policy. As a result there were a number of factors to be 
considered as part of the security policy development. For example, the components 
of the NPC2 must be defined within the existing protection profile so the target 
platform literally permits the new applications to run and access the resources they 
require. Furthermore, the test environment which is manipulated by the NPC2 is 
hosted on the target platform and must also be covered by a suitable security policy. 
In short, the following tasks had to be considered and addressed as part o f  the security 
policy development phase.
• Host platform security
• Security o f the test environment
• Application Security
• Creating the conditional environment
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This is presented in Figure 67 which summarises the policy configuration required for 
the demonstration.
B oolean  V ariable
N PC 2 policy 
m o d u le s
S e c u re  
In te r-p ro cess  
C om m unication  
(SIPC ) policy
B ase line  secu rity  policy provided by 
T arg e ted  R e fe re n ce  Policy
Figure 67: NPC2 Policy Structure
Although logically the NPC2 policy modules are considered as entities separate from 
the baseline security policy, in practice they are a part of the overall package enforced 
by the operating system kernel. The relationships between the conditional rules and 
the Boolean variable mean that the conditional rules within the policy are not active 
(unless the Boolean value is True) although the policy module itself, where the rules 
are defined, is both loaded and active. The second task, developing security policy for 
the test environment, is described in Section 6.2.5. The remaining three are discussed 
in the sections which follow.
6.2.3.1 Host Platform  Security
The NPC2 demonstrator was hosted on the Fedora Core 6 version of Linux with 
SELinux enabled. After installation, the SELinux reference policy was downloaded 
from Tresys [67] and used to build the baseline security policy. As described in the 
Literature Review, a significant amount o f effort has been invested by third-party 
developers in creating and maintaining a Reference Policy for SELinux installations. 
This is a set of individual policy modules designed to secure applications and services 
that could reasonably be expected to run on a Linux system. To assist with policy
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development, it is possible to select either the targeted or strict policy builds and then 
customise in accordance with the organisation’s security goals and the requirements 
of the target platform. For our demonstration, the targeted policy was selected. This 
contains policy modules to secure network related services and applications. SELinux 
can be run in one o f two modes: enforcing and permissive. During the development 
of security policies permissive mode is generally used because this records policy 
violations in the audit logs but does not stop the system from running. The developer 
can utilise audit messages to update the policies accordingly and rectify bugs. Once 
the system is ready for deployment enforcing mode is generally switched on. This 
mode also records policy violations; however the kernel enforces the rules as defined. 
Quite clearly, if  mistakes have been made in the security policy modules the system 
can quickly become unusable, even to the Root user! The results recorded in Section 
6.2.6 were collected once the enforcing mode had been turned on. If the device had 
been operating in permissive mode the access denied message shown later in Figure 
71 would not have been displayed (because the policy would have allowed this 
activity whilst recording the violation). This message was generated when 
SHIMMEE attempted to read the message queue on the 2IC computer.
SELinux is a good development environment for the NPC2 security policy because it 
provides flexibility and allows an administrator to tailor the security configuration in 
accordance with specific requirements. New policy modules can be created as 
organisational requirements demand and loaded either as part o f  the baseline build or 
independently during run-time. However, there are benefits over and above these 
practical issues. In the literature review we described how SELinux enables flexible 
Mandatory Access Control through type enforcement. Every object on the system is 
assigned a ‘type’ as part of its security context (which in full comprises user id: role: 
type: security classification). The type is the most important determinant in 
permitting access. For example, if  a subject’s type is not authorised for an object’s 
type it will not be permitted access irrespective o f the user id or their role on the 
system. This is precisely why the Root user can effectively lose access on the system 
when enforcing mode is switched on, if  the security policy has not been defined 
correctly. In each of the new security policy modules created specifically for the 
NPC2 we declare the ‘types’ necessary to allow each application to run and declare 
the types for any system resources it requires to fulfil its task. Types are associated
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with physical objects and different methods o f object access such as read, create or 
write are specified. Consider the following extract in Table 2 from the security policy 
module for the EM ‘EMMA’. For ease o f reading line numbers have been inserted.
1
2 # Declarations
3 #
4 type emma_t;
5 domain_type(emma_t)
6
7 type emma_rw_t;
8 files_type(em m a_rw_t)
9
10 tm t i im i t t tH t t t t t t f t i t t f t t tm
11 # local policy
12 #
13 Allow emma_t em m a_rw_t: file manage_file_perms;
Table 2: Example of SELinux policy for EMMA application
On lines 4 and 7 the domain types emma_t and emma_rw_t are declared. These are 
associated with physical objects on the system through a separate but associated file  
context policy file.
Line 13 is an access control rule which specifies that any object with the source type 
of emma_t is granted the permissions specified in the macro manage_file_perms to a 
class type ‘file’ o f target type emma_rw_t.
In this example, if  there were other objects assigned the emma_t type they would also 
acquire these permissions to any object labelled with the emma_rw_t type. As it 
happens, our policy is restricted, only the Environment Monitor EMMA and the 
associated script file have these labels therefore no other object has access. For 
example if  SHIMMER attempted to write to the script file it would be denied access. 
SHIMMER has a different type mq_sender_t which is not authorised for the 
emma_rw_t object type.
Under this regime it is possible to separate objects on the system in accordance with 
the type they have been assigned. Effectively the ‘type’ defines a virtual boundary or 
container to hold all objects with the same designation. The NPC2 components are
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isolated from each other, unless access has been specifically enabled through an 
external interface, and from other objects on the system.
6.2.3.2 Application Security
As stated previously, it was necessary to create security policy modules for each of 
the NPC2 applications to allow them to run on the target platform and access the 
necessary resources to fulfil their individual tasks. The new modules were compiled 
as part of the SELinux targeted reference policy build, and the overall policy itself 
was built as a series o f loadable modules. For the purposes of development this is a 
useful approach since it allows us to load and unload modules independently of each 
other and make changes as necessary. Once the system is deployed, the developer can 
select between the loadable module approach or a single monolithic policy file. There 
are advantages and disadvantages with each approach and the choice would very 
much depend on the nature o f the deployment, the extent to which policy maintenance 
was expected and the expertise available to manage the system.
6.2.3.3 Creating the Conditional Environment
As stated in [57, p. 186] “ ...the ability to change Boolean variable values in a running 
system is what enables us to vary the value o f conditional expressions and hence gives 
us conditional policies...”. It is precisely this functionality that we leveraged as part 
of the NPC2 installation. In our autonomous solution the act of defining Boolean 
variables and adding conditional statements to the security policy module was only 
one part o f  the task. The value o f the Boolean variable needed to be updated 
‘remotely’, that is, by some means other than keyboard input by a human user. The 
SELinux language uses the command ‘ setsebool’ to change the value of Boolean 
variable and commit the change on the system. This action causes the operating 
system kernel to use the new value immediately without a system reboot. In our 
solution, the setsebool command and associated parameters were put into a script file. 
This file is called by EMMA whilst acting in the role o f EvM.
The Boolean variable needs to be defined and assigned an initial default value. This 
was achieved by manually inserting a new Boolean ‘ userread’ in the Booleans file
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which also has the advantage that the Boolean will persist across system reboots. The 
default value was set to false. The script file called by EMMA contains the following 
statement which clearly changes the Boolean value to true.
setsebool userread true
Since EMMA is running the script file and acting on behalf of the user, it is necessary 
to provide the process with the appropriate permissions to carry out the task. The 
necessary rules were included in the security policy module to allow EMMA to run 
setsebool, write to the Booleans file and change the value of userread. Within the 
security policy module securing the message queue read process, a conditional 
statement was inserted as captured in Table 3:
if (userread) {
allow mq_reader_t tmpfs_t: file read;
}
Table 3: Conditional Statement in SHIMMEE security policy
In the SELinux policy, the domain type mq_reader_t has been associated with the 
SHIMMEE application. Since the default value o f userread if  false, mq_reader_t and 
therefore SHIMMEE, will not normally be allowed to read the temporary file system 
where the message queue is written. Once the Boolean value is changed to true, this 
condition will be reversed. Figure 71 in Section 6.2.6 shows the messages generated 
when this policy module is enforced.
6.2.4 Validation
Validation is a core feature o f this research since we are seeking to provide a balance 
between the pursuit of flexibility and the requirement for assurance. In earlier 
sections we described how the NPC2 itself could be used in the risk assessment 
process as a means o f revealing any weakness arising from modifying the separation 
and sharing profile o f a system. Note that for the purposes of our research, the NPC2 
has not been subjected to the rigorous software engineering approach that would be 
expected and required from a fielded system or for security certification. We therefore
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explore different aspects of the design that lend themselves to validation and identify 
where specific measures have been put in place to assist with this process. Validation 
has been considered at a number o f levels, specifically:
• Logging and auditing
• Validation of security policy
• Testing
6.2.4.1 Logging and Auditing
The Environment Monitor and Event Manager components, which were developed 
specifically for the NPC2, produce output which can be directed to the screen, an 
application log, or both. Error messages and application logging messages are both 
captured, and provide some confirmation o f the application’s behaviour as it is 
running. The ability for each application to be able to write to its own log is an 
activity that must also be included in the SELinux security policy. Unauthorised 
access attempts are recorded in the SELinux audit logs. This allows the system 
administrator to monitor and confirm that only the NPC2 components themselves are 
able to use the logs. Note that SELinux access denial messages are recorded in the 
logs, that is, when the conditional statement is activated to allow SHIMMEE to read 
the message queue we do not see a corresponding ‘access granted’ message. 
However, events related to the change in Boolean value and subsequent policy reload 
are both recorded. An extract from the audit log file taken during one o f the test runs 
is shown in Table 4.
type=MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1194444205.117:41): bool=userread val=1 
old_val=0 auid=0
type=USER_AVC msg=audit(1194444205.147:42): user pid=3320 uid=0 auid=0 
subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 m sg-avc: received policyload notice 
(seqno=3): exe=7bin/dbus-daemon" (sauid=0, hostname=?, addr=?, terminal=?)' 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1194444205.117:41): arch=40000003 syscal!=4 success=yes 
exit=2 a0=6 a1=bf8bee36 a2=2 a3=bf8bee38 items=0 ppid=3543 pid=3544 auid=0 uid=0 
gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=
Table 4: Extract from Audit Log file
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Figure 6 8  is a screen shot of the access denial message recorded in the audit log when 
SHIMMEE is not permitted to read the message queue. To obtain Figure 68 the 
se a u d it  tool developed by Tresys [ 6 8 ]  was used. This provides a graphical interface 
and accessible means of viewing SELinux messages written to the standard Linux 
audit log file.
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Figure 68: Screen shot of AVC error using seaudit graphical tool
6.2.4.2 Validation of Security Policy
Within the SELinux community there has been a good deal o f activity to develop 
tools which assist in the development and validation of security policy. The SELinux 
Integrated Development Environment (SLIDE) is one example to emerge from 
ongoing research and development from Tresys [69]. This is an open-source 
graphical tool running as a software plug-in to Eclipse [70] designed to assist the user 
with writing (or modifying) security policy modules. As part of the build process 
various validation routines are performed on the security policy code which check for 
faults such as syntax errors which will prevent the policy from compiling. Of course, 
successful compilation does not mean that the policy is good or even accurate 
therefore it is necessary to confirm that it does secure the right resources in the 
required manner. As described in Chapter 2, Linux is a complex operating system 
therefore the SELinux policy will itself be complex in order to secure the plethora of 
objects and services on the target platform. This poses a significant challenge to the 
policy developer who is required to search through the rules looking for possible
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inconsistencies or simply trying to answer the question ‘who has access to what and 
where did the access came from’. To assist with validation, Tresys have developed an 
additional graphical tool named apol [71] specifically for policy analysis. This can be 
downloaded as open source software as part o f  the SETools download [72]. It should 
be noted that the tool itself requires an investment in learning before real benefit can 
be derived. However, having mastered the interface it is possible to drill down into a 
policy and perform validation checks. Figures 68 and 69 provide examples o f the 
policy analysis tool in use to show a couple o f cases from our compiled security 
policy for the demonstration. The search criteria used to obtain Figure 68 verified the 
policy rules associated with the source type em m aj on the target type emma_rw_t. It 
can be seen from Figure 69 that a total o f  2 rules match the search criteria. They also 
confirm the rules declared in the EMMA security policy module. Had the policy 
analysis tool returned more rules it would have been necessary to track back through 
the policy to determine the origin o f  what would be, in this case, an error.
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Figure 69: Screen shot from apol policy analysis tool
Figure 70 is another example taken from the policy analysis tool but in this case we 
are looking at the permissions o f  the type m q _ r e a d e r _ t  on the temporary file tm p fs used 
by the message queue. Recall from the previous section that m q _ r e a d e r _ t is associated 
with the SHIMMEE application.
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Figure 70: Screen shot from apol showing access control rules
Figure 70 shows quite clearly that the rule displayed is a conditional rule which is 
currently disabled. The results in Figure 70 confirm our expectation o f the security 
policy for m q _ rea d er_ t; that is, it only requires read access to this object and any other 
result would have been erroneous.
6.2.4.3 Testing
For the purposes o f our research it was necessary to perform tests to confirm the 
correct functioning o f the NPC2 applications and correct application o f  the security 
policy in accordance with our case study. As described above, validation o f the 
security policy also forms a part o f  this testing. It is recognised that for a more mature 
development o f the concept and certainly i f  evaluation of the solution were being 
sought, more rigorous testing both o f the components and the security policy would 
be required. For example we would expect to utilise the results o f the risk assessment 
process, where different threats are identified, as a means o f  devising a range o f 
penetration tests. This approach would enable us to confirm the strength and 
applicability o f the security controls proposed during the risk assessment phase and 
harden the defences as appropriate. A full scale set o f penetration tests would be 
inappropriate at this stage o f the development; it is sufficient to conduct preliminary
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tests to confirm the initial design and functionality of the NPC2. The test results are 
described in Section 6.2.6 which contains and discusses experimental results from one 
of the demonstrations o f the NPC2.
6.2.5 Test Environment
In Figure 60 the NPC2 was shown in the context o f the external environment. This 
diagram identifies protected resources that is, those objects on the system to which 
access will be controlled via the security policy. O f course it is this protection that 
will ultimately be manipulated by the NPC2 as conditions change in the environment. 
In order to demonstrate the NPC2 in action a test environment is required which 
provides the resources and policies for the NPC2 to interact with. We recognise that 
the case study is contrived in that there was no test environment to begin with. In 
order to show the NPC2 it was necessary to create the environment to be protected in 
addition to the means for protecting it! As shown in Figure 61 temporary storage is 
required to hold situational awareness data received from other devices on the 
network. It was concluded the best way o f  achieving this was using a message queue. 
This also provided a physical resource which could be secured through security 
policy. Additional research revealed existing work conducted by Tresys on Secure 
Inter-Process Communication (SIPC) using SELinux [73]. The authors provided 
example applications and security policy modules to accompany the work which we 
subsequently used and adapted to form the basis o f our test environment.
The SIPC package included management applications developed in the C 
programming language to create and destroy the message queue and applications to 
both write to and read from the queue. As shown in Figure 65, for the demonstration 
the policy decision and enforcement points are associated with the message queue 
read process. When this process makes a read request the security policy is consulted 
and the rule is enforced to either permit or deny access (depending on the status of the 
Boolean variable). If the access request is denied, a message is written to the audit 
log.
The applications from Tresys required little modification to run in our test 
environment. The most significant change was to the accompanying SELinux
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security policy modules. It was necessary for example, to include permissions for 
services such as Netlink which was used in NPC2 test environment, but not the 
original. Our demonstration is based on a network configuration where data is being 
shared between devices. Every object on an SELinux system is labelled with a 
domain type including a representation o f the network interface. The security policies 
were modified to include permissions related to networking services and protocols to 
enable the domain types to send and receive in this case, user datagram packets 
(UDP). The simple but most powerful change to the policy was adding the 
conditional statements to the policy associated with the message queue read process.
6.2.6 Experimental Results
The visual and dynamic nature of the NPC2 demonstrator causes some difficulties for 
presenting experimental results in a static medium such as this thesis or indeed 
conference papers. Whilst running the demonstrator it was possible to verify the 
correct operation of the NPC2 components because we could perform a visual check 
on the output devices. When the Commander Device was functioning in the network, 
the situational awareness data was displayed as a moving icon on the screen. At the 
same time, the icon was static on the 2IC device and recorded ‘permission denied’ 
messages when the read process, SHIMMEE, attempted to read the message queue. 
This message corresponds to an Access Vector Cache (AVC) denial message 
generated by SELinux and recorded in the audit log on the 2IC machine. We could 
therefore confirm that the security policy was being correctly enforced. When the 
Commander device was removed from the network, the NPC2 components functioned 
as designed. This was visually obvious because the situational awareness icon began 
to move on the 2IC output device once the policy change permitted the situational 
awareness messages to be read from the message queue. However, how can we 
illustrate the results o f this dynamic behaviour in a meaningful way in the thesis? The 
answer is o f  course, that it is not possible. Therefore the evidence we provide for the 
demonstrator is contained in a series of messages taken from the 2IC device when the 
demonstration was run. These are captured in Figure 71 which has subsequently been 
annotated. An explanation o f each number is provided beneath.
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Figure 71: Screen shot from 2IC device; demonstration of NPC2 components
m message generated by EMMA when process subscribes to SEADOVE for events 
related to Commander Device.
message generated by EMMA when process is informed that Commander Device
is no longer available.
message generated by EMMA acting in role of Event Manager. Running the
script file will eventually trigger the change in security policy.
message generated by security sub-system. At this point the SELinux policy 
denies access to the message queue for the read process and thus denies the ability to 
read the situational awareness data that would provide location (geographical 
position) information. At this point, the Situational Awareness icon will be stationary 
on the 2IC device.
the value of the Boolean variable (u s e r r e a d )  is being modified from fa l s e  to true.
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when 5 occurs the read process is able to read the queue and receive data. 
Message also shows a connection being established with the queue and the amount of 
data that can now be received.
message generated by the script file, returns the new status of the Boolean
variable ‘userread’.
6.3 Summary and Conclusions from Results
The objective of this practical experimentation was to establish whether or not the 
NPC2 could be engineered into a working prototype that allowed us to demonstrate a 
change in the capability o f the user in accordance with security policy and in response 
to changing events of interest in the external environment. In short, a proof o f concept 
was required to support the theoretical work preceding this chapter. We conclude that 
the results documented throughout this chapter provide evidence that the NPC2 
architecture described in Chapter 5 can be implemented. Moreover, the whole 
concept of autonomously changing the capability o f a user, in accordance with pre­
defined conditions, can be achieved through our implementation o f the NPC2 thus 
generating support for our original objective o f engineering a more fit for purpose 
security solution. However, whilst this implementation has achieved what was 
originally intended, it is also recognised that there are a number of ways in which the 
work could and should be developed. The next section introduces some of the more 
important areas.
6.3.1 Enhancements to the Practical Experimentation
One area, which is an important aspect o f the NPC2 architecture, is the security of 
messages between the various NPC2 components. Our initial prototype, which uses a 
Netlink socket to pass messages between SEADOVE and EMMA, does not include a 
security solution for the actual messages themselves. Since no other process uses the 
Netlink socket created for our purpose, it is unlikely that a message could be 
eavesdropped. However, we would not make any claims regarding the security o f this 
approach and recognise that a more robust and secure solution needs to be found. This 
outcome does nonetheless underline one o f the advantages and successes of the NPC2
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architecture. Our method o f implementation is only one of many possibilities. The 
NPC2 architecture is a pattern that can be applied to a problem and does not dictate 
any implementation methodology or technology. In another example the Environment 
Monitor and Event Manager could be constructed completely differently and therefore 
lend themselves to a more robust security solution for the messaging function.
As described in Section 6.1.2.1 for the first demonstration of the NPC2 it was 
considered appropriate to pre-configure some o f the input data used by the NPC2 
components. For example, the text file consulted by EMMA is populated with 
information pertaining to members o f a community. O f course the whole philosophy 
of the ad-hoc network is that information is not known at the outset, and the devices 
discover each other and build up a picture o f the community through the routing 
protocols. However, we judge that our decision to use pre-configured data does not 
detract from the success o f the implementation for the following reasons. The 
primary objective for our prototype was to prove that the NPC2 architecture could be 
realised in a working solution and in order to do this, the various components require 
data with which to work. We considered that in the first instance, how the 
components acquired this data was a secondary issue to actually demonstrating that 
the concept of the NPC2 worked in practice. Furthermore, when constructing the 
demonstration it was necessary to pay attention to our target market (the military 
community) which operates within a strict hierarchy and pre-defined knowledge of 
other network members in their immediate group. Our use o f pre-configured lists was 
therefore a realistic and reasonable approach to take for an early demonstration model. 
An extension of the NPC2 would work more closely with the characteristics specific 
to an ad-hoc network. We anticipate that in order for the NPC2 to function in a less 
deterministic manner it will be necessary to re-engineer components such as the 
Environment Monitor module to include greater decision making capabilities and 
‘intelligence’. For example, if  the event o f interest remains the same, that is loss of 
the Commander, the Environment Monitor may need to establish exactly who the 
Commander is within the network before it can setup the monitoring part of the 
process. If all devices are participating in the monitoring process they will o f course 
need to share their individual results and corroborate that the Commander is actually 
absent and not just out o f  range to one or two users. The type o f extension described 
would probably not be a realistic or appropriate solution for our target market at this
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time, but it would be a useful piece of future work to allow the NPC2 to operate in 
other environments such as civilian emergency services for example.
At the presentation o f [24] a question was raised regarding the revocation o f rights, 
that is, what happens in the event that the Commander returns to the agile group? This 
scenario was considered as part of the demonstration but owing to time and resource 
constraints, not practically addressed. Theoretically it should not be an issue although 
it would need to be tested as part of further development. The NPC2 Environment 
Monitor registers an interest for certain users/devices therefore it can be configured to 
detect not only the absence o f the Commander but also their return. However, this 
behaviour could introduce other challenges related to trust depending on how and why 
the Commander was absent initially. For example, the device and user may have 
parted company and its return to the network may be suspicious. It is expected that 
some form of authentication between the user and device and the device with other 
network users will be in place. This process would need to be successfully managed 
and communicated before the NPC2 policy trigger mechanism could activate a change 
in rules. Managing authentication is beyond the scope o f this thesis. Nevertheless, this 
could affect the security policy and level o f  access permitted and without doubt, offers 
a good deal of scope for further work.
As part o f its normal operation, the NPC2 would need to revoke previously granted 
permissions on the 2IC device and verify the success o f this update. Given that the 
NPC2 architecture is technology independent it is assumed that the security policy can 
invoke any change in permissions that are necessary. In practice, the success o f this 
operation is dependent on the functionality o f the underlying security infrastructure 
which in our demonstrator is provided by SELinux. One component in the SELinux 
architecture is the Access Vector Cache (AVC). The AVC improves performance by 
storing access control decisions made by the security server for subsequent use. In 
theory it is possible to revoke previously granted permissions because the AVC is 
invalidated whenever a policy is loaded. Revocation does not work in all cases; for 
example access to connection-orientated sockets is only validated on initial access and 
not subsequent use therefore a change in policy will not be observed (Mayer et al, 
2007, p.43). In our example the message queue ‘read’ call is continuous and 
constantly checked against the AVC. When the policy is reloaded via the NPC2
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trigger mechanism the AVC is cleared. The new access rules are applied when the 
read process subsequently requests access to the message queue. When the 
Commander returns the replacement policy could essentially reflect the original rules, 
that is, access to the message queue is not permitted on the 2IC device. Alternatively, 
a completely different set o f permissions could be enforced.
Without doubt the development o f SELinux policies is a challenging task which 
requires substantial knowledge o f the target platform, the application to be secured 
and the security policy language itself. This issue has been recognised within the 
community over the past few years. As mentioned previously, the targeted and strict 
SELinux policies were developed specifically to secure standard software components 
and services included with a Linux distribution. However, i f  an organisation has 
bespoke software which needs to be secured it is necessary to write new modules to 
cover these applications and services — not a trivial task. Furthermore the policy 
language and environment itself continues to evolve as enhancements are added to the 
supporting infrastructure or indeed as new policies are written. During the course of 
this research we encountered a number o f  changes which certainly hindered the 
learning curve in an already challenging environment. It should also be remembered 
that Linux itself, being an open-source solution, evolves at a fairly rapid rate. During 
the time o f our investigation we started writing policies for the Fedora Core 4 
distribution and presented our prototype solution on Fedora Core 6. This was by no 
means the most up to date version o f the operating system at the time, either. 
Eventually we considered it necessary to establish a stable build on which to develop 
the policies rather than keep updating the environment. The security features of 
SELinux are integrated with the operating system kernel therefore changes to the 
build impact security. The decision to adopt software updates or patches is of course 
a problem that each organisation will address differently according to its own 
requirements and goals. It is not an area which should be ignored or taken lightly.
The SELinux community have been swift to develop toolsets and frameworks 
designed to ease the burden of policy management. There are graphical development 
environments such as SLIDE [69] which guide the policy writer through the process 
of developing a new policy module. The tool assists with naming domains for 
processes and resources required by the application. Furthermore, numerous
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interfaces have been written and incorporated into SLIDE. When used, these pieces 
of code expand into appropriate access control rules, specific to the interface, when 
the policy is compiled. The policy developer obviously needs to know which 
interfaces to select and Tresys have been conscientious in providing meaningful 
names; but having done so, the developer is relieved from writing or modifying policy 
code unless specific tailoring is required. On a cautionary note, whilst these toolsets 
are successful in disguising some o f the development idiosyncrasies, we would argue 
that a substantial amount of knowledge is still required to write policy modules with a 
degree of certainty they will behave as expected and provide the level of security 
necessary. We conclude that policy development is likely to present the largest 
overhead in evolving the NPC2 and potentially one o f the biggest obstacles to 
acceptance of the SELinux implementation.
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Chapter 7: Scalability of the Approach
A holistic approach has been adopted in this research where the NPC2 has been 
applied at an abstract level in the modelling and risk analysis phases and at a practical 
level in the implementation o f a prototype system. This approach strengthens the 
research in that it demonstrates the potential o f the NPC2 in different development 
phases of the fit for purpose security solution. In this chapter we explore the extent to 
which the NPC2 can be scaled in all aspects o f our approach.
The first part of the chapter focuses on the modelling and risk analysis approach and 
in particular we look at how the concept o f  the NPC2 can scale in models that are 
either larger (involving more domains), more complex in the number and type of 
conditional connections between domains or indeed both. Our work with scalability 
and modelling continues by looking at the use and impact o f the NPD concept in a 
larger configuration. The chapter concludes by investigating issues surrounding the 
development and implementation of multiple NPC2 components in a system and the 
effect this may have on the NPC2 architecture.
Scalability is an important issue for a number o f reasons. One o f the characteristics of 
the Information Age is the use o f pervasive computing devices and the ability for a 
user to potentially construct and participate in numerous ad-hoc relationships for the 
purposes o f information sharing: a trend which is beginning to blur the perceived size 
and boundaries of a traditional network. Without doubt our work with fit for purpose 
security needs to take account of scalability in terms of the relative size and 
complexity within the network and the types o f implementation that it may be 
required to operate in. Moreover, it is necessary to look at the different domains of 
interest a user may potentially be involved with, particularly from the perspective of 
temporary membership, and assess the extent to which our proposed additions to the 
modelling techniques accommodate this behaviour. The NPC2 begins to capture the 
essence of the ad-hoc network by showing the existence of a temporary connection 
between different domains o f interest and the NPD concept adds further definition 
through its representation o f a temporary community that may be occupied by one or 
many individuals. Through the environment and portal constructs in the DBSy
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notation we can show whether a domain, temporary or otherwise, can be accessed 
from the same platform or one which is separate through either technological and 
possibly geographical means. Given the increasing profile o f ad-hoc networking it is 
important to explore the applicability o f  the NPC2 and NPD concept to a greater 
extent in this environment. In this section on scalability it is intended to draw out the 
relevance o f  these constructs in modelling ad-hoc and changing relationships between 
domain members. We believe this can reveal useful information regarding the 
suitability o f  a domain approach in the boundaryless or de-perimeterised world [2].
In terms o f implementation it is necessary to understand how we would approach the 
task of engineering either multiple NPC2 installations into the network or indeed 
scaling the capability o f  one NPC2. We need to qualify how the constructs may 
interact with one another since their conjunction might produce quite unexpected and 
undesirable results. O f course the models have a significant role to play in revealing 
potential connectivity between domains as a result o f introducing temporary changes 
to the separation and sharing profile. The technologies available to engineer a solution 
may prevent us from working with multiple NPC2 installations: issues which are 
explored in Section 7.2.
7.1 Scaling the Non-Persistent Capability Concept in DBSy Models
From our research it is known that DBSy collects individuals with compatible 
characteristics and information requirements into logical groups called domains and 
our models have, so far, been based at this level o f abstraction. In Chapters 3 and 4 
the parent domain for the agile mission group was refined into two sub-domains. This 
enabled us to accommodate the different external connectivity capabilities o f the sub- 
domains and calculate risk accordingly. Initially we were concerned that the domain 
approach would be too coarse to capture the plethora o f connectivity relationships 
which we believe are characteristic o f the Information Age. Since domains may be 
occupied by one or many members, effectively the ‘node’ level can be represented, if  
necessary, through a single domain. It is recognised that a model could quickly 
become unmanageable if  many individual exceptions are included. They should 
therefore be minimised as far as possible. Difficulties may arise when refinements to 
the model are captured within the connectivity matrices. Our approach of modelling
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each sub-domain or child-domain as an independent entity enables an accurate 
representation of the relationships. However, as a result, the matrices may become 
very large, perhaps running into hundreds o f nodes, and therefore difficult for the user 
to manipulate. Whilst computational problems can largely be overcome by 
technological means, large matrices may be cumbersome for the system designer to 
visualise and interpret meaning. This modelling problem is not confined to scalability 
and domain refinement; it is conjectured that similar challenges will present 
themselves if  the different connection types are included in the risk assessment 
process and matrix calculations. It is therefore an aspect o f scalability which needs to 
be addressed.
Our exploration of scalability also includes the NPD. In our case study we recognised 
that our initial model implied that all members o f Domain AX were permitted to 
communicate with Domain B when the NPC2 was switched in this direction. This 
was not, in fact, the case. The NPD used in conjunction with the NPC2 allowed us to 
show the relationship between all o f the domains, that is, that Domain AX does not 
communicate directly with Domain B but actually uses an ad-hoc domain which in 
reality would be occupied by the 2IC when the NPC2 is switched in that direction. 
O f course the NPD could be scaled in numerous ways to represent additional ad-hoc 
networks (and their relationship with the existing system) or indeed additional 
connections and connection types between existing domains. In this section we begin 
to explore the affect of doing so on both the modelling process and risk assessment.
The DBSy risk analysis process considers the type o f connection between two 
domains and this identification assists the system designer in selecting a suitable 
security control to help mitigate risk. Our initial risk analysis in Chapter 4 
deliberately ignored the type o f connection since it was sufficient to focus the 
calculations on the existence o f a connection rather than its use. Having demonstrated 
the affect o f the NPC2 on compromise path analysis in Chapter 4 it is considered 
appropriate to conduct a more detailed investigation where, like DBSy, we also model 
the type of connection over and above the simple existence o f a path. This will allow 
us to assess the impact o f the NPC2 and its ability to scale up to manage different 
types of connection. As described in the previous paragraph, it is important to
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determine and address any difficulties that scalability within the models subsequently 
introduces to the matrix calculations.
To summarise, scalability in the modelling and risk analysis process is investigated in 
three different ways. An enhanced version o f the original case study is used to 
examine the following permutations:
• Additional NPC2 constructs
• Additional NPD connections
• Permitted connection types
7.1.1 Additional Non-Persistent Capability Concept Constructs
In this section the original case study is extended for the case where a conditional 
connection is applied between Domains B, C and AY. Figure 72 shows the InfoSec 
Architecture model and shows quite clearly that AY is permitted to communicate with 
Domains C and B; Domain B is permitted to communicate with AY and C and 
Domain C is permitted to communicate with B and AY.
Agile Group AYAgile G roup  AX
AX AY
Islanp B
Island A
HQ
C ollaboration
p a rtn e r
Island C
Figure 72: Model of extended scenario
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A visual check o f Figure 72 informs us that there are 10 potential compromise paths 
arising from the permitted business connections between domains. This assumes 
maximum permitted connectivity. However, the permitted connections in this 
scenario are conditional. The actual state o f connectivity is captured in the revised 
InfoSec architecture model in Figure 73.
Agile Group AY
Agfle G roup AX
HQ
AYAX
^ I s la n d
Island A
Collaboration
partner
Island C
Figure 73: Revised case study model using NPC2
Figure 73 is based on the following requirements:
• Domain AX is permitted to communicate with either Domains AY or B but 
not both simultaneously. Figure 73 models the condition where the NPC2 
construct permits connectivity between Domains AX and AY as shown by the 
position on the conditional connector.
• Domain AY is permitted to communicate with either Domains B or C but not 
both simultaneously. Figure 73 models the condition where the NPC2 
construct permits connectivity between Domains AY and B as shown by the 
position on the conditional connector.
• Domain B is permitted to communicate with either Domains AY or C but not 
both simultaneously. Figure 73 models the condition where the NPC2 
construct permits connectivity between Domains B and C as indicated by the 
position on the conditional connector.
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The connectivity matrix C15 contains the direct, single step connections which could 
form potential compromise paths. As shown in (47) there are 6  potential paths.
Cl5
0 1 0  0 
1 0  1 0  
0 1 0  1 
0 0 1 0
..(47)
(47) exhibits some interesting properties. For example, we have correctly modelled 
the requirements concerning simultaneous connectivity by allowing AY to connect to 
B but not C and allowing B to connect to C but not AY. However, this presents a 
problem when completing the connectivity matrix. It is shown that B has a connection 
with AY and C, which actually contravenes the policy. In fact this connection only 
exists because bi-directional connectivity is assumed therefore the path between B and 
AY is regarded as the ‘return’ path when communication has been initiated by AY -  
an interaction that is totally in accordance with the policy. This is a subtle but 
important distinction first identified in [23] because it illustrates the limitation with 
policy refinement from a DBSy model. Before requirements can be refined, it is 
necessary to capture all stakeholders and their potential interactions. In [23] we found 
that stakeholders can be identified from the DBSy models relatively easily but 
establishing potential interactions is more difficult since we can only see the existence 
or not o f a connection. The example in Figure 72 is a perfect example o f this issue 
since in order to understand the flow o f communication and thus establish 
conformance to the security requirements, additional information about the interaction 
is required. To an extent it is possible to glean this detail from Figure 72 since the 
NPC2 controlling connectivity between Domains AY and B is clearly associated with 
Domain AY. Thus, when the connection is established an action will verify that a 
connection does not already exist with Domain C. However, this verification would 
not extend to confirming that Domain B has no ongoing connection with C before 
communication is established. It would be necessary for the policy conflict to be 
recognised at Domain B so before communicating with Domain AY, Domain B 
relinquishes its connection with C. Indeed this would be the case since the NPC2 
associated with B would control the connectivity. Does this mean that the matrix
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representation is incorrect or should we be content that the model is unable to capture 
the situation at the level required but fulfils a need in alerting the system designer at 
the policy refinement stage? This question is followed up later in the section.
(48) contains the results for the case C?5 This calculates indirect connectivity when the 
path length is equal to 2  and yields a total o f 1 0  paths.
C =15
1 0  1 0  
0 2 0 1 
1 0  2 0 
0 1 0  1
...(48)
Total connectivity for this configuration is calculated in (49) and gives 16 potential 
compromise paths.
C = C  -hC15 to( 15 15
1 1 1 0
1 2 1 1
1 1 2 1
0 1 1 1
...(49 )
When considering higher order connectivity some interesting points regarding 
potential compromise paths and the relationship to our defined security requirements 
arise. For example, in C?5 we can see that a connection exists between Domains AY
and C but not B. Although this particular path was not defined in the model it is 
curious that it conforms to the security policy anyway! Furthermore Domain B has no 
connectivity with either AY or C and so its state has changed completely.
For completeness, we analyse the condition where the matrix contents accurately 
reflects the policy, that is, the NPC2 associated with Domain B prevents the return 
communication with AY because it, Domain B, has an existing connection with 
Domain C. In other words, there is no connection with AY even though AY is able to 
initiate the connection. C16 in (50) shows a total o f 5 potential compromise paths.
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C16 =
0 1 0  0 
1 0  1 0  
0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0
...(50)
This analysis moves our investigation into a different realm. Up until this point, all 
the connectivity matrices have been symmetric, that is the entries are symmetric about 
the diagonal. C16is asymmetric and will therefore show different behaviour when the 
contents are enumerated in multi-hop configurations. In the case o f  2 hop 
connectivity the following matrix Cj26 in (51) is obtained.
C =16
1 0  1 0  
0 1 0  1 
0 0 1 0  
0 0 0 1
(51)
c = c +c16 tot 16 ^  16
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
(52)
C 26 shows a total of 6 potential compromise paths. (52) calculates a total o f 11 paths
for this configuration which is significantly less than (49) where the symmetric 
version of the model revealed a total o f 16 potential compromise paths.
Asymmetry occurs in the matrix when a communication between two domains is uni­
directional. Until now, bi-directional communication has been assumed whereby two 
domains are able to communicate with each other albeit through a single point of 
control. The output in C16 simply indicates that the security requirements are being 
correctly interpreted because the NPC2 at Domain B is controlling simultaneous 
connectivity between Domains B, AY and C.
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Uni-directional communication may be a result o f deliberate planning, that is, a data 
diode is placed between two domains to limit information flow to one direction. An 
InfoSec Business model for this configuration is shown in Figure 74. It illustrates the 
business requirement where information may flow from Domain Low to Domain 
High-1 (as shown by the data diode on the permitted business connection) but not the 
reverse. Domains High-1 and High-2 have a two-way business connection. The 
matrix C17 for domains D 17 = [Low, High-1, High-2] is shown in (53).
High-1Low
High-2
Figure 74: InfoSec Business model using diode
C17 =
0  1 0  
0  0  1 
0  1 0
...(5 3 )
(5 4 ) calculates connectivity for the case Cf7 where the path length is equal to 2 .
C =17
0  0  1 
0  1 0  
0  0  1
...(5 4 )
Total connectivity is given in (55) and shows a total o f 6  potential compromise paths.
C l  7 tot -  C l  7 +  C 17
0  1 1 
0  1 1 
0  1 1
(55)
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This case is interesting because the higher order connectivity clearly shows the 
potential for a compromise path between the High and Low domains and from the 
InfoSec model it is known that the permitted business connection is in one direction 
only. This serves as a reminder concerning the trustworthiness of the one-way diode 
between Domains Low and High-1 -  there is always the potential to exploit this 
means o f communication if  it exists. Furthermore, the case underlines the dilemma 
facing security architects that the benefit and requirements o f sharing must always be 
balanced against the risk of compromise -  albeit against seemingly considerable odds.
Having started a discussion on asymmetry in the connectivity matrices, the idea is 
extended to include an NPC2 and provide some conditions on the ability to share. It 
is quite conceivable for example, that the High-1 domain may, under certain 
circumstances, require the permitted business connection with the Low Domain to be 
bi-directional. However, we could further state that in this situation, it is no longer 
permitted to communicate with Domain High-2. The InfoSec business model for this 
configuration is shown in Figure 75.
High-1Low
High-2
Figure 75: InfoSec Business model with diode and NPC2
There are o f course some issues with this model. The NPC2 has been placed, quite 
correctly, adjacent to and under the control o f Domain High-1. It shows quite clearly 
that normally it is permitted a bi-directional business connection with Domain High-2 
as indicated by the position of the conditional connector on the NPC2. Exceptionally 
this would be changed to permit the temporary business connection with Domain Low 
at which time the connection with Domain High-2 would no longer be available.
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However, the one-way connection between Domains Low and High-1 still exists 
which cannot be incorporated in this model. It is possible to modify the connections 
shown out o f the NPC2 to connect both Domains Low and High-2 on the default path 
with Domain High-1. This does not imply that Domain Low is connected to and can 
therefore communicate with Domain High-2 through the conditional connector but 
that both domains are connected to High-1 when the conditional connector is switched 
in this direction. When the exceptional policy condition is activated, the conditional 
connector is switched to permit only the temporary path between Domains Low and 
High-1. This alternative configuration is shown in Figure 76.
High-1Low
High-2
Figure 76: Alternate permitted path using diode and NPC2
In Section 7.1.3 a similar situation is described where the conditional connector is 
required to show two different permitted business connections. However, unlike the 
earlier models, Figure 76 captures a default case between two different domains. It is 
appreciated that the structure could become cumbersome and difficult to read if  the 
number of connected domains continues to grow, and in such situations an alternative 
representation of the NPC2 may be required. A concluding observation arising from 
Figure 76 is the potential for error which may exist when interpreting the permitted 
connections. The NPC2 is associated with Domain High-1 as shown by the input 
point between the Domain and the NPC2. The NPC2 therefore controls connectivity 
between Domain High-1 and other domains connected to the NPC2 on the output 
point. However, it is recognised that there is a possibility of mistaking the connection 
between the output point on the NPC2 and Domains Low and High-2 as a permitted 
business connection which is not permitted in this case. It is proposed that familiarity
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and training with the NPC2 notation will help to overcome potential 
misunderstanding.
The connectivity matrix for the exception to the policy is shown in C 18 for domains
Dis = [Low, High-1, High-2]. The Low and High-1 Domains have bi-directional 
communication and High-1 is not permitted to share with High-2. (56) shows 2 direct 
compromise paths.
1^8 ~
0  1 0  
1 0  0  
0 0 0
...(5 6 )
Indirect, 2-hop connectivity for Qg is shown in (57) and gives a total o f  2 potential 
compromise paths.
C =18
1 0  o'
0  1 0
0 0 0
..(57)
Total connectivity is calculated in (58) and gives 4 potential compromise paths.
1 1 0  
1 1 0  
0 0 0
..(58)
These results indicate that the NPC2 has made a positive contribution to capturing the 
different conditions in Figures 75 and 76. It allows us to differentiate between the 
cases where a domain may need to swap from its default policy o f uni-directional 
connectivity to a bi-directional configuration. Furthermore, the impact o f this change 
on the number of potential compromise paths can be assessed through the matrices.
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7.1.2 Additional Non-Persistent Domain Connections
This section broadens the investigation to explore the use of additional NPD 
constructs within the model and the case where additional connections between 
existing domains and the NPD exist. The aim is to qualify the extent to which this 
concept can be applied to ad-hoc networks where there is likely to be a proliferation 
of different and temporary communities set up for the purposes o f resource sharing.
Of course one of the challenges of fit for purpose security lies in making predictions 
and assumptions about what may reasonably happen and how the system may need to 
change in order to accommodate changes to the separation and sharing requirements. 
There will always be an element of unknown; therefore it is believed that postulating 
about change and modelling the likely impact is a useful way o f managing uncertainty 
and potential change in a controlled manner.
The next model presents the case where Domain AY has the capability to operate in 
an ad-hoc network where in reality this ‘capability’ may include community 
administration (establish, destroy) and/or community participation (exchanging 
information). At this level of detail we are only concerned that the domain may share 
information with the community using messaging when the capability is invoked. 
Note that in this variation of the model, Domain AY does not have a permitted 
business connection with Domain C except using the ad-hoc domain. However, it has 
a permanent connection with Domain B and a temporary indirect connection via the 
NPD. This configuration could be used as a means to temporarily share information 
necessary for all three parties but not information that Domain C, for example, would 
normally be permitted to see. The example assumes that other participants may 
include Domains B and C. These are actually outside of our scope of control, since 
the focus o f interest is the agile mission group consisting o f Domains AX and AY. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to reason about the potential risk if  either one or both of these 
domains were connected. The temporary business connector has been used to connect 
Domains AY, B and C to the NPD construct since it would only be formed under 
particular conditions and probably as an exception to the baseline operation o f the 
system. It does not have any dependencies with existing domains; that is, the policy 
does not state that AY may not hold a connection with the NPD and Domain B
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simultaneously therefore it is unnecessary to include the NPC2 notation in this part of 
the model. Where used, the NPC2 permits Domain AX to share with Domain AY, 
which is the baseline policy. This arrangement is captured in Figure 77 where the 
domains are represented as Di9 = [AX, AY, ADHi, B, C].
A X AY
Island A
E l'
Ad-
hoc1
Island C
Figure 77: Multiple connections with NPD
The compromise path analysis of Figure 77 calculates both cases where the NPD is 
active or absent since this will affect the number of potential paths and the way in 
which security controls are applied. The results for matrix C19are shown in (59) 
where the NPD (ADHi) is active.
C =19
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
..(59 )
In (59) there are a total of 11 direct potential compromise paths. Connectivity for a 
path length of 2  is calculated in (60) and shows 28 paths.
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c  =19
1 0  1 1 1  
0 3 2 1 1
1 1 3  1 1
1 1 1 2  2
0  1 0  1 1
• (60)
Total connectivity is 39 paths as calculated in (61).
c = c  + r19/0/ 17 ^  17
1 1 1 1 1
1 3 3 2 2
1 2 3 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
0 1 1 1 1
...(6 1 )
In the complement of this case the NPD is inactive. Matrix C20 in (62) shows a total
of 4 direct potential compromise paths. In this configuration, Domain C is not 
permitted to share with any other domain.
r  =20
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
(62)
Finally (63) calculates C20. The total number o f compromise paths only increases by 
3 from 4 to 7.
1 0 0 1 0
1 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
In (64) this gives a total o f 11 paths.
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c =c +  c 2 -20tot 2 0  ^  ^ 2 0
1 1 0  1 o '
2 2 0 1 0
0  0  0  0  0
1 1 0  1 0  
0  0  0  0  0
...(64)
Of course there are other combinations o f connections that could be considered. For 
example, ADHi could be active and in use by Domains B and C but not AY. 
Although this would not open a direct compromise path with Domain AY it would 
affect it indirectly via Domain ADHi’s connection with Domain B, or if  we consider a 
hop count o f three, the connection with Domain C.
From the work documented in this section, it is concluded that the NPD construct 
provides a useful method by which system stakeholders may speculate about possible 
connectivity between domains. The enhanced level of information can be used to 
make more informed decisions about the design o f the security solution. The NPD 
can be used with multiple connections to existing domains in the model to assess the 
impact of enabling this capability on the domains in our focus o f  interest. Given the 
results above, the security analyst may decide that whilst Domain AY is permitted to 
work in an ad-hoc community this ability is subject to certain restrictions and they 
must relinquish the permitted connection with Domain B at this time. Importantly, 
with our approach, they can be armed with the information necessary to make this 
type of decision prior to the requirement arising.
7.1.3 Permitted Connection Types
In this section the investigation is extended to consider the type o f connection which 
exists between domains. DBSy differentiates between email, shared storage and other 
methods o f sharing data for business use. Extending our approach to consider the 
distinction between connections is an important aspect of the work since each will 
have a unique means o f addressing risk introduced through the connection type in 
addition to sharing common security controls. Where multiple connection types exist, 
the number o f potential compromise paths will also increase. The NPC2 is, by 
definition, a non-persistent capability. This alludes to an enforcement mechanism,
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controlled by a policy, which permits a subject to perform a particular task. This could 
include establishing a connection for the purposes o f information sharing, reading 
messages, writing to a data store or other activities. Granularity o f  capability is not 
provided in the DBSy models; instead the means o f sharing data between domains is 
identified without specifying the interactions that define ‘sharing’. This subject is 
addressed in [23] and [24].
This part o f the analysis follows through the modelling process and applies our 
principles of expressing non-persistent connections using the NPC2. It is 
hypothesised that by combining the dynamic properties o f a connection and its type 
we will achieve a greater granularity o f expression with the DBSy models that will 
ultimately be reflected in the policy itself. Furthermore, this more detailed analysis 
will influence the technical opportunities for introducing more ‘intelligence’ into the 
NPC2 when it is realised in a tangible form. For example, a connection between two 
domains could be modelled where sharing is permitted using email but not database 
unless conditions in the environment dictate otherwise. As shown in this section, the 
type o f situation described can be captured using the NPC2. Although this 
connectivity can be captured in a matrix (or possibly sub-matrices within a single 
matrix) as part o f the risk assessment process, implementation o f such capability 
requires the ability to detect the need for two methods o f sharing and resolve any 
conflict that may arise. The solution may require more than one NPC2 in a practical 
solution with an implicit requirement for communication and co-operation between 
the installations. The examples in this section allow us to explore and comment upon 
any ramifications this may pose for the notation and practical implementation.
Figure 78 includes different types o f connections between domains. The original 
scenario only permitted messaging capabilities. In Figure 78 Domain AX is permitted 
to share data with Domain AY using both messaging and shared storage. The DBSy 
notation represents shared storage as a filing cabinet. Our other original conditions 
remain, that is, Domain AX is permitted to communicate with Domains AY and B but 
not both simultaneously. This is not captured in Figure 78 which shows maximum 
permitted connectivity.
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AYAX
Island  8
Island A
Figure 78: Use of multiple connection types
Figure 79 captures the conditional nature o f the connection.
AX AY
Island B
Island  A
Figure 79: M ultiple connection types and NPC2
In Figure 79, Domain AX has a permitted business connection with Domain AY using 
both messaging and filestore as a means o f sharing data. The position o f the 
conditional connector construct indicates that this path is active, that is, the baseline 
policy is in force. Before performing the risk assessment on this configuration, an 
additional case is considered. It reflects the original case study where in the event that 
AY is unavailable, AX is permitted to share with Domain B. However, the domain 
may only share via messaging. The default separation and sharing policy is 
maintained in the model but is o f course inactive, and therefore not included in any 
risk assessment calculations. This model is shown in Figure 80.
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Island A
Figure 80: NPC2 permits messaging capability only
For the risk assessment process, the same procedure as described in Section 4.1 is 
followed. The AG and FOI are identified for the model and inbound connections 
from the former to the latter are isolated. During this process, only direct connections 
are considered. As with previous models, our concern lies with compromise paths 
arising from business connections, that is, we do not look at threats occurring through 
the infrastructure which are omitted from the figures which follow.
In the first case maximum permitted connectivity is calculated. Figure 81 shows a 
total of 2  compromise paths.
Messaging
Messaging
Focus ofAttack Group
Figure 81: Compromise paths showing maximum permitted connectivity
AX and AY normally have connectivity and from the previous analysis o f similar 
models in this thesis, it is known that an indirect compromise path between AX and B 
will exist as a result. For completeness the business connections between Domains 
AX and AY are shown in Figure 82 although their impact on the model will not 
become apparent until higher order connectivity is calculated. Figure 82 therefore still 
shows a total of 2  potential direct compromise paths.
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M essaging
—  S h a r e d  _  
S to r a g e
Attack G roup
Focus of 
Interest
M essaging
Figure 82: Compromise paths for multi-connection types; includes Domains AX and AY
In accordance with our earlier examples the models are redrawn using the conditional 
connector construct to add information about the temporary nature of the path 
between Domain AX and other domains. Figure 83 illustrates the example where AX 
is permitted to communicate with Domain B using messaging (as dictated by the 
position o f the conditional connector). There are 2 potential direct compromise paths 
in this configuration.
A ttack G roup
Messaging
F o cu s  o f' , '' - 
In te rest
M essag in g
Figure 83: Compromise paths using multiple Connectors and the NPC2
The configuration in Figure 84 shows AX permitted to communicate with AY using 
both shared storage and messaging. There is 1 potential direct compromise path 
between Domains AY and B.
Messaging B
F o cu s  of 
in te rest
Figure 84: Compromise paths where NPC2 permits multi-connection type
■ y :
_  Shared  ,-------
-=  ^ -------
A ttack G roup
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Finally, in Figure 85 Domain AX is permitted to communicate with Domain AY 
using messaging only. The total number of direct compromise paths remains at 1 
between Domains AY and B.
Attack Group — --ocu s of
» J. AInterest
Messaging
Figure 85: Compromise path where NPC2 permits messaging only
The above figures identify some difficulties with expressing multiple paths and the 
conditional connector. Essentially, the conditional connector is concerned with 
allowing a path or not and at its conception was therefore related more to the 
infrastructure than the connection function. Since it is now necessary to express both 
the existence or not or a connection and its function the construct requires some 
revision. Either, we use two constructs -  one representing the selection of path, and 
the other the selection of function; or we combine the two capabilities into one 
construct (as shown currently in the diagrams). In practical terms the different 
selection processes will be realised in multiple devices. For example, a path could be 
selected via a router (where the permitted paths are predefined) or perhaps a firewall 
(where the permitted network addresses are inserted as rules). The ability or not to 
use messaging or shared storage with another domain could be defined in a number of 
ways; the capabilities of the user when they log on or the type o f traffic that is passed 
through a firewall are just two examples.
One of the benefits of DBSy lies in its simplicity and uncluttered approach to 
documenting systems. In order to uphold this philosophy it is proposed that the 
InfoSec architecture models are presented as in Figures 79 and 80, where the 
conditional connector indicates the permitted path between domains. From this 
construct, the permitted business connector will be joined to appropriate sharing 
constructs such as messaging, shared storage and so on. The compromise path 
diagrams will simply use the conditional connector construct as shown in Figures 83,
Page 169
84 and 85 and in accordance with DBSy guidelines, the path will be labelled to 
indicate the type of path and corresponding compromise that occurs between domains.
Although it is possible to address documentation details in the diagrams, when the 
models are represented as connectivity matrices we again encounter some interesting 
challenges; particularly when modelling higher order connectivity. Previously, the 
existence or absence of a connection has been shown in a direct or single hop matrix 
as ‘1’ or ‘O’ respectively. However, the models used previously in our calculations all 
considered domains as a single entity and merged all types o f connections together. 
How do we express multiple types o f connection in a matrix?
One approach is to split the instance o f Domain AY into two elements: AYi and AY2 , 
which represent the messaging and shared storage capabilities respectively. The 
Domains are represented as D2i = [AX, AYi, AY2, B] for Figure 84. Connectivity is 
shown in C2X. In (65) a total o f 6  potential compromise paths exist when the NPC2 
permits sharing between Domains AX and AY.
C -  ' “ '21
0  1 1 0  
1 0  0 1 
1 0  0 0 
0 1 0  0
...(6 5 )
(6 6 ) calculates indirect connectivity for the case C2X and shows 10 compromise paths.
C =21
2 0 0 1 
0 2 1 0  
0  1 1 0  
1 0  0 1
. . . ( 66)
In (67) the total number o f compromise paths is 16.
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2  1 1 1  
1 2  1 1  
1 1 1 0  
1 1 0  1
...(67)
By representing the two different types o f connection in AY as individual elements of 
the same domain, we are in fact operating in harmony with the design principles of 
DBSy. Additional notation in DBSy includes ‘cloned’ domains which can be used to 
model a number of domains with the same security characteristics. Connections
individually depending on the information the system architect is trying to portray. A 
version of a connectivity matrix and the InfoSec business model may both be required 
in order to interpret the diagrams accurately.
C22 in (6 8 ) models the case where conditional policy using an NPC2 permits sharing 
between Domains AX and AY via messaging only. There is no permitted connection 
between Domains AX and B. The compromise path model for this configuration was 
shown in Figure 85. The Domains are represented as D2 2  = [AX, A Y I, AY2, B]. (6 8 ) 
shows that the total number of direct compromise paths is reduced to 4.
(69) calculates C22. The number of potential compromise paths increases from 4 to 6 .
between the clone and other domains may be shown as a single element or
0 1 0  0 
1 0  0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0  0
. . . ( 68)
C“  "  0  0  0  0  
1 0  0 1
1 0  0 1 
0 2 0 0 ...(69)
The total for this configuration is 10 as calculated in (70)
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c 22 tot - r  + c2 22 ^  ^ 2 2
1 1 0  1 
1 2  0 1 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0  1
...(7 0 )
Finally C23 in (71) is the connectivity matrix for the case in Figure 83. Here the
NPC2 permits sharing between Domains AX and B. The domains are represented by 
D2 3 = [AX, AYi, AY2 , B]. A total of 4 potential compromise paths are given for this 
configuration.
C =23
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
...(7 1 )
C23 in (72) shows connectivity when the path length is equal to 2.
C =23
1 1 0  0  
1 1 0  0  
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2
...(72 )
Total connectivity is given by (73) and yields 10 potential compromise paths.
c - c + r 2^ 2 3 tot 23 ^  23
1 1 0  1 
1 1 0  1 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0  2
...(73)
In summary, when another level o f refinement is considered in the DBSy models and 
the type of connection, as opposed to the mere existence o f a connection is captured, it 
is still possible to express the details in the InfoSec and compromise path models and 
connectivity matrices. It is recognised that our additional constructs, whilst adding to 
the completeness and accuracy o f the representation, do complicate the models. The
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connectivity matrices themselves could also become more complicated in cases such 
as C21 and C22 where individual connections are treated as independent entities 
within the models. To overcome this difficulty we suggest merging suitable rows and 
columns in the matrix. Provided there is no loss of information, this approach gives 
the option of viewing either a collapsed or expanded version o f the connectivity 
matrix depending on the level of detail required by the user. To illustrate this point we 
take C21 for domains D21 = [AX, AYI, AY2, B] and merge rows and columns AYi 
and AY2 . This operation yields a 3 x 3 matrix structure shown in C 24 for domains 
D2 4  = [AX, AY, B]. If the process is accurate the number and distribution o f potential 
compromise paths in C24 should be the same as that shown in C21.
0 2 0
c =24 2 0 1
0 1 0
.. (74)
(74) shows a total of 6  potential compromise paths with the same distribution as the 
results obtained in (65). Interestingly, the process o f merging causes a natural 
departure from the use of ‘0’ and ‘1’ in the single-hop connectivity matrix. The 
content now shows the actual number o f connections as opposed to the connectivity 
status of the domains. It can be stated that when C,y > 0 a potential compromise path 
exists. Of course this level of detail does not necessary reveal the position of the 
paths, but for the system analyst, it is possible to estimate with a greater degree of 
certainty which domains require greater emphasis for security controls by looking at 
the number of actual connections.
We continue the work started in Chapter 4, which investigated the use o f a Boolean 
representation of the NPC2 and combine this idea with the practice o f merging and 
expanding the matrix. The same configuration as that shown in Figure 80 is used 
where the NPC2 permits sharing between AX and B using messaging only, b 
represents the conditional (active) path, b represents the conditional (inactive) path. 
For the purposes of calculating connectivity, b = 1 and b = 0 . The example in C25
yields a total of 4b + 2b + 2 potential compromise paths as shown in (76).
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c  =25
0  b b b
b 0  0  1
b 0  0  0
b 1 0  0
..(75)
Substitution for b and b into (76) yields a total o f 4 potential compromise paths. The 
result is consistent with C23 where the connections were modelled as regular 1 or 0.
total = A b-\-2b-\-2 -2b  + 2 
total = 4
In C26the rows and columns containing AYi and AY 2  are merged to reduce the size of 
the matrix. Like our previous example in C24 it is necessary to ensure that the matrix 
structure can be collapsed without loss o f information irrespective o f whether the 
connections are represented with a ‘O’, ‘1’ or a Boolean variable. (77) shows a total o f 
2b + 2b +2 potential compromise paths and it can be seen that the integrity o f the 
matrix has been maintained between C24 and C26. Again, the total can be simplified to
4 by substituting for b and b .
r  =
26
0  2b b 
2b 0  1
b 1 0
...(7 7 )
total = 4 b +2b + 2 = 2b + 2 
total = 4
...(78 )
To summarise, the contents o f this subsection show that complexity introduced 
through scalability need not present an issue within the modelling process. It is 
possible to merge rows and columns within the matrices where the configuration 
lends itself to this process, that is, individual objects to be merged must be a sub-set or 
child of the same parent domain. This process does not lose any o f the original 
information but includes a level o f detail appropriate to the recipient. This is true not
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only when the original entries in the connectivity matrices are positive integers, but 
also when some of them symbolise conditional connections represented by Boolean 
variables.
To complete this section on permitted business connections and scalability a different 
role for the NPC2 is considered where it is used to remove capability rather than 
enhance it. The purpose of this example is to show the capacity for the NPC2 to scale 
to accommodate different uses whilst preserving its overall philosophy: that of 
changing capability on a temporary (and conditional) basis. In our next configuration 
the baseline security policy allows two domains to share using both shared storage 
and messaging which is shown by the position o f the conditional connector. The 
exception to this policy, as captured by the temporary business connector, is to permit 
sharing by means of messaging only, that is, the NPC2 indicates revocation o f the 
ability to utilise shared storage when conditions change. This scenario is captured in 
Figure 8 6 .
AX AY
Island B
island A
Figure 86: NPC2 used to remove permitted business connection
The InfoSec Architecture model clearly shows that in this case Domain AX actually 
has no direct permitted business connection with Domain B at all. Its ability to share 
is restricted to the agile group. As with the earlier examples, one way of 
differentiating between the different connections in the connectivity matrix is to treat 
each mode of sharing as a different entity. This is shown in C2l where AYi represents 
the permitted business connection between AX and AY using messaging and AY2  is 
the shared storage connection. In a similar case, Figure 78, we treated the messaging 
connection as a sub-set of Domain AY and did not create a separate vector in the 
matrix to contain the status o f connectivity between Domains AY and B. In C27 all of 
the connections are considered independently o f one another and not as a sub-set of
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the Domain. It was considered more important to experiment with the approach for 
this example because unlike Figure 78, in this case Domain AX never has any direct 
relationship with Domain B. We are currently undecided as to how much this affects 
the modelling technique and result and therefore need to consider other similar cases 
and make comparisons before drawing any conclusions. For now, we consider 
C27 which is able to capture and differentiate between all instances o f connectivity
illustrated in Figure 8 6  for the Domains D2 7  = [AX, AY, AYi, AY 2 , B] and yields 6  
potential compromise paths.
r  =
27
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
(79)
The matrix in C28 shows connectivity when the NPC2 is used to revoke the business 
connection using shared storage (AY2 ) between Domains AX and B.
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
This activity does not have any impact on the ability for Domains AY and B to share 
and we can see that the number o f potential compromise paths is reduced to 4 
reflecting the revocation o f sharing using the shared storage capability between 
Domains AX and AY.
As a last remark on this configuration it should be noted that the model suggests that 
any member of Domain AX has the ability to share information with Domain B when 
AY is unavailable. This anomaly was noted in Chapter 3 where it is known from the 
original case study that not all domain members have equal status all o f the time. Our
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proposed solution to address the discrepancy and incorporate the dynamic dimension 
is of course through the NPD.
We conjecture that this process can be further enhanced if  other information including 
probability and a risk value can be included in the models and connectivity matrices. 
As stated in Chapter 4, a part of the risk analysis process includes looking at the type 
o f connection and the domains being connected in order to determine the connection 
level of the link and the strength o f security control that is necessary to secure it. A 
very simplistic but nonetheless useful approach is to consider the likelihood o f an 
attack using measures derived from the perceived motivation and capability o f the 
attacker and the impact o f an attack to the affected user. As described in Chapter 4, in 
order to illustrate the potential value o f the NPC2 and NPD it is not necessary to 
include all possible methods by which a connection could be compromised into our 
assessment of risk. What is important is looking at how  and where dynamic or 
changing security requirements can be incorporated into the process Our work is 
based on the notion that the ability to share varies depending on events in the 
environment and the NPC2 is used to show a temporary and/or conditional ability to 
share between two domains. The development o f a fit for purpose security solution 
would be assisted by knowledge of the probability that a connection may be required 
and some indication o f its impact if  the path is permitted. It is expected that a value 
for the impact would be derived from a threat assessment process. In the defence 
community this could include Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) InfoSec Standard 1 
(IS 1) [74]. Output from a threat assessment such as IS1 would take the form o f a 
descriptive value such as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’. This could be converted to a 
numerical scheme representing risk in accordance with the needs of the user. This 
section illustrates how such values can be applied to the models and connectivity 
matrices to accommodate a more flexible approach to the security solution. For the 
purposes o f our illustration it is not necessary to perform this threat assessment and in 
the example that follows, values for the impact weighting have been assumed. In 
Figure 87 the example InfoSec model includes the weighting value expressed as wl0W
and whigh which corresponds to the perceived level of risk. The letter b is associated
with a temporary connection to show it is Boolean.
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AX AY
ADH
Figure 87: InfoSec Business model showing Boolean and risk weighting values
Figure 87 shows that Domain AX may, under certain conditions, share data using 
messaging with an ad-hoc domain as captured by the NPD. Because this capability is 
conditional and an exception to the baseline security policy, the temporary business 
connection is annotated with b to represent Boolean. Furthermore, we anticipate that 
the connection when active will have a high risk weighting because the ad-hoc 
community is untrusted and perhaps the nature o f the link means that strong security 
controls can not be applied. By contrast the connection between Domains AX and 
AY is a constant and has a low risk weighting. When b=  1 Domain AX is permitted to 
share with Domain ADHi in addition to AY. Connectivity for this configuration is 
given in C2 9 for the Domain configuration D2 9  = [AX, ADHi, AY].
0 b w high
r  =29 0 0
_b w high 0 0
..(81)
By using this augmented notation in the matrices it is possible to add more 
information about the nature of the potential compromise path which could be used in 
the security planning process. For example in C29the presence of the conditional
connection between AX and ADHi completely changes the risk profile o f the system. 
In this state, ADHi presents a risk to AX but more importantly, it also presents an 
indirect risk to Domain AY with whom it is not permitted to share data. This is
visible in (82) for the case C29.
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...(82)
(83) calculates the total risk weighting for this case.
...(8 3 )
The summation o f (83) is 2 )  + 2b(w„igll + w,3,„ + wh„whlgh)
The results show that the level o f complexity in the models increases rapidly when 
higher order connectivity is calculated. It would not be practical to calculate such 
cases manually, but using software developed in MATLAB [43] the content can be 
simplified to improve the legibility and usefulness to the analyst. A less cursory 
glance at (83) gives a clearer indication that the potential risk to Domain AY would be 
very high when the Boolean is true and connectivity is permitted with the ad-hoc 
Domain ADHi. It is also very clear which part of the risk is the inevitable result of 
permitting a business connection and which element can be controlled through the 
Boolean permitting the NPD connection.
To complete this section some preliminary studies are performed on the combined use 
o f a probability value with the Boolean, that is, a measure of how likely the activation 
of this connection will be. Within an agile environment it is assumed that this value 
will itself change over time and in accordance in events but nonetheless, an initial 
estimation of the probability yields some useful results and enlightens us regarding 
the potential usefulness o f  this approach. The probability is given as piow, p high where
0 <  p l o w ,  p h ig h  <  1 .
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AX AY
I E N bpiowWhfgh
s
\
Figure 88: InfoSec business model showing probability, risk weighting and Boolean values
ugure 8 8  shows that the probability of the conditional connection between Domains 
\X  and ADHi is low. However, when the connection is active the risk weighting is 
ligh. Conversely, the probability of connectivity between Domains AX and AY is 
ligh but the risk is low.
n Figure 8 8  the risk value for each connection may be expressed as rx and r 2 where:
...(8 4 )
...(8 5 )
8 6 ) presents the matrix C30 for Figure 8 8 , where domains D 3 0  =  [AX, AY, ADHi].
r\ = Phigh™lo» 
ri = bPim.wMgh
C 30 =
0  b p h„whieh
Ph,gkw tm  0  0
b p hwwhlgh 0 0
. . . ( 86)
rhe vulnerability of this configuration is defined as the total o f the elements in the 
natrix. (87) calculates the vulnerability for C30.
vi0 = + 2bpl0Wwl:t h = 2(r, + br2)
(87)
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As shown in (87) the equation can be simplified using the r-notation in (84) and (85).
It is known from Chapter 4 that b represents an inactive conditional connector 
therefore the results in (87) confirm that when connectivity between Domains AX and 
ADHi is not permitted, connectivity and thus potential compromise paths, are quite 
low. However, when the conditional connector is active as shown by b in the 
matrices, the results shown in (8 8 ) are obtained. For the purposes o f  calculating 
connectivity, b = 1 .
c„ =
 ^ P  high t>P,o»W Mgh 
P u gi,w h »  0 0
. . . ( 88)
bplow ^ high 0 0
Vulnerability for (8 8 ) is calculated as the sum of all elements in C31. The results are 
given in (89) where we also simplify using the r-notation o f (84) and (85).
v3\ = 2Pu*hwu,« + 2bphwwhlgh = 2(rt +br2) ...(8 9 )
The permitted connection between AX and ADHi presents an indirect compromise 
path to Domain AY which is clearly when C31 is calculated in (90).
C =31
P high^low  +  bP low W high 
0
0
0 0
Phigh ^ low  bP  high ^ lo w  Plow  ^ h igh
bP highW lowPlow™high bPlow  ^ h igh
...(9 0 )
Total connectivity for C31 + C31 is given inC 31,0, and shown in (91).
C  =31/of
2
P  high ^ low  bPlow  ^ high
Phigh ™low
Phigh ^ lo w  
2
Phigh ^ lo w
'low ^  highbP
bPhigh W low Plow  ^ h igh
bP low ^ high bPhigh ^ lo w  Plow  ^  high bp low ^  high
(91)
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The vulnerability o f the configuration of (91) is cumbersome but can be simplified in
(92) by using the r-notation in equations (84) and (85)
i for = 2[>| + r? + b(r2 +rxr2 + r l )] (92)
(92) shows that the proliferation o f connections and correspondingly increased level 
o f risk from the additional compromise paths when the conditional connection, the 
NPD, is permitted. This is the element o f (92) prefixed by b.
Ptow> Phigh >wiow’whigh may assume any value in a range defined specifically for a 
scenario. For example, as a result o f  an earlier threat assessment process, it may be 
considered that the weighting o f the connection defined as wlow, whigh may range from
1 -  10 where 1 represents the lowest weighting and 10 the highest. Furthermore,
observation of network behaviour and connectivity may lead the system designer to 
conclude that the probability o f a connection being active is given as piow, p high where
0 < piow, phigh < 1. These values can be used to further illustrate the effect o f  applying 
the NPD concept. We take the case where p x = 0 . 1  and p high = 0.9 and w/0W = 2 and 
w = 7 . Substitution o f these values into (84) and (85) enables us to calculate the 
cost o f each link in Figure 8 8 . In this case, r, which connects Domains AX and AY 
has a cost o f 1.8 and r2 , the conditional connection between AX and the NPD ADHis 
has a cost o f  0.7. Numerically, the conditional link is the lower risk link in this case. 
The values for rx and r, can be used in (93) and (94) to calculate the actual cost to 
each domain (in terms o f risk) o f  permitting each connection. The results of 
substituting rx =1.8 and r2 = 0.7 into (87) is shown in (93)
2[(1.8) + 6(0.7)] = 3.6 + 1.46 (93)
Since b = 0 the vulnerability in this case is 2rx which is 3.6.
The results of substitution into (89) are shown in (94).
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2[(1.8) + 6(0.7)] = 5. (94)
In (94) the NPD is permitted therefore b — 1 . This increases the level of vulnerability 
from 3.6 in (93) to 5 in (94) a difference o f  1.4. The Boolean values are left quite 
deliberately in (93) and (94) because o f  the significant visual impact. The security 
architect can immediately see the affect of permitting the temporary connection and 
the contribution that each link adds to the total. The calculations in (93) and (94) are 
for direct connections only. In (92) the vulnerability arising from indirect (2-hop) 
connectivity was calculated because it was recognised that the NPD, when active, 
would impact Domain AY. The result o f substituting the probability and weighting 
values into (92) is shown in (95).
2[5.04 + 6(2.45)] = 10.08 + 4.96. — (95>
When b = 1, total vulnerability for (95) will be 14.98. When b = 0 , that is the NPD is 
inactive, total vulnerability will be 10.08.
Again, we have separated the Boolean element o f the equation because it allows us to 
differentiate between the minimum risk, which excludes the Boolean element and the 
additional cost o f permitting the NPD. In the case o f (95) minimum risk is 10.08. The 
NPD would contribute an additional 4.9 when permitted - an increase o f about 50%.
The example described above demonstrates very clearly the effect o f permitting the 
NPD. The minimum risk is inevitable and arises from the permitted business 
connection between Domains AX and AY. However, the system architect has some 
control over the maximum risk since it is known from (94) and (95) how much 
additional risk will be incurred if  and when the Boolean element is activated. Armed 
with this information stakeholders can make more informed decisions about the 
conditions under which the connection may be permitted and its use. The security 
policy may state for example, that sensitive data may only be sent to AY because the 
weighting o f the link is low. However, because its availability is high this could 
potentially give an attacker greater opportunity to intercept or otherwise breach the 
security o f the link. The ‘high’ weighted but conditional link may, in some instances,
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be at least as secure because the probability o f it being active is low and there is only 
a small window of opportunity for the attacker to become aware and attempt to 
subvert the connection. In Figure 8 8  only one part o f the NPC2; the conditional 
business connector, was applied. Given the results in (93), (94) and (95) it may be 
desirable to utilise the conditional connector element o f the NPC2 to only permit one 
connection or the other between Domains AX , ADHi and AY. Under this regime the 
potential for a high risk and low risk link to be active simultaneously is removed.
7.1.4 Preliminary Conclusions
The examples given in this section are not overly complex but do provide sufficient 
evidence to allow us to form some preliminary conclusions. The NPC2 has the ability 
to scale to larger configurations involving different sets o f  possibly related conditional 
connections between domains. Furthermore, it can also scale to include additional 
functionality. Although it was first conceived to show a temporary change in the 
separation and sharing profile and be used to elevate a subject’s capabilities, the 
NPC2 could also be used to indicate a temporary change which results in the 
revocation o f the ability to share.
Although our additional constructs complicate the DBSy models they do add benefit 
by enhancing the comprehensiveness and veracity o f the models. Scalability also 
results in greater complexity within the connectivity matrices. However, we have 
established a method to address this by merging vectors within the single-hop 
connectivity matrix where appropriate and possible. This work resulted in the use of 
values other than ‘0 ’ and ‘ 1 * since we were looking at numbers o f connections as 
opposed to the existence (or not) or a connection. By moving away from our earlier 
approach we conceived the idea o f representing the NPC2 state as a Boolean variable. 
This approach shows that the potential for connectivity and removes the need to 
consult a separate and additional matrix.
Finally our work combines the inclusion o f probability and risk weighting values 
alongside positive integers and Boolean variables in a single matrix. In [40] Hayat et 
al proposed the use o f a risk ranking system based on the severity of the risk which 
could be used to assist with the placement o f security controls. Unlike Hayat et al, our
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assessment o f risk considers the conditional properties o f the link in addition to a risk 
weighting value. In the matrices we include the probability of a conditional 
connection being active (and therefore permitted) or not. This can have a profound 
effect on the risk profile of the system and the subsequent design o f the security 
solution. Whilst it is unusual to mix real and Boolean variables in a matrix, provided 
care is taken, the work in this chapter shows that the approach we have adopted can 
significantly increase the utility of the matrices and comprehensiveness o f information 
presented to the system analyst.
Although some potential difficulties have been identified when the NPC2 and NPD 
are scaled, we maintain the view that by capturing change within the InfoSec models 
and connectivity matrices the system designer is given ‘advance warning’ about 
security issues which can be used to influence the design o f the system. Some 
problems may be overcome through technology as part o f the implementation or in 
other cases this improved level of information could be used to influence procedures 
governing the way in which the system is operated.
7.2 Scaling the Non-Persistent Capability Concept in Implementation
The previous sub-sections described the use o f more complex scenarios and the 
impact on use o f the NPC2 as part o f the modelling and risk analysis process. The 
models showed that it is possible to capture increasingly complicated conditional 
requirements. However, the ability for the NPC2 implementation architecture to 
accommodate growth without becoming unusable is a matter for further investigation. 
It should be noted that within the time constraints for this research it has not been 
possible to physically construct larger configurations involving multiple NPC2 
installations: therefore this work would form part o f our future research. We are fully 
aware of the challenges that could arise from scaling the implementation. The 
problems are described in this section, accompanied by proposed solutions.
In order to assess whether the NPC2 can physically scale certain questions need to be 
addressed including, for example, how closely coupled the NPC2s are with one 
another. If they are tightly coupled for instance, then the impact o f  each NPC2 must 
be considered within the context o f other devices in the system. This could quickly
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become unmanageable for the system designer in assessing all possible interactions 
and interrelationships between elements o f the system. Secondly, it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which we could or indeed should reuse components within the 
NPC2 architecture to perform other tasks. If each NPC2 is unique in function, adding 
other NPC2s into the system could result in a management and development overhead 
that could render development impractical. Finally, our notion o f fit for purpose 
security is aimed at eliciting the smallest change possible to achieve the desired 
change to the security profile of the system. The NPC2 in our demonstration example 
is used to modify the capability of one subject, the 2IC, when conditions necessitated 
this change. In the small agile groups our work targets, it is quite probable that the 
number o f subjects affected by a change will be small. However, we recognise that in 
order for our solution to be scalable it is necessary to consider the situation where 
changes to security will affect a larger number o f subjects in the system. There are of 
course a number o f ways in which this can be achieved without affecting the core 
components of the NPC2. This aspect o f scalability, along with the coupling and 
reuse o f components are all addressed in the sub-sections that follow.
7.2.1 The Non-Persistent Capability Concept and Multiple Subjects
It is entirely feasible that a single event triggered by the Environment Monitor could 
cause multiple refinements to the security policy. It is also the case that the security 
policy itself can be associated with many users who will all be affected by the 
changes. This association could be on a ‘per user’ basis although a more popular and 
manageable approach is to employ the use o f Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
[75]. In this model a role representing a job function in the organisation can be 
occupied by one or multiple users. Access permissions assigned to the role are 
automatically inherited by all occupants. The amount o f overhead for system 
administrators is thus reduced since a single change made to the permissions of a role 
potentially affects a large number o f users. O f course no solution is perfect, and the 
role itself must be carefully managed so that permissions are actually appropriate for 
all of the occupants. Where the number o f users becomes large, it is possible to get 
disparity between some o f the occupants and their capabilities. As shown in Figure 
57, Chapter 5, the security policy component belongs in part to the NPC2 and in part 
to the external environment. Effectively it is managed by the standard system but
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manipulated by the NPC2. We conjecture that provided the security policy sub­
system is sufficiently flexible to allow us to assign a (modified) security policy to one 
or many users without the system becoming unmanageable then we do not foresee 
any major issues that would prevent us from scaling the NPC2 to multiple subjects.
SELinux was used for our demonstration environment. As described in the literature 
review, SELinux is based on type enforcement technology where a domain type is 
assigned to all objects on the system. This is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship 
as used in our design. Multiple objects can belong to the same type. Under this 
regime, type enforcement behaves in a similar manner to RBAC since it is possible to 
affect many associated objects with one permission change. In future work it would 
be possible for us to extend the reach of our security policy and create an example 
where it is appropriate to label a number o f objects with the same domain type. We 
could then confirm, by checking through application log files, that when the security 
policy change is triggered through normal operation o f the NPC2, all o f the associated 
objects receive the permission change.
7.2.2 Coupling of Non-Persistent Capability Concept Components
The extent to which NPC2 components are dependent on each other largely depends 
on the requirements o f the system. For example in Figure 73 and the connectivity 
matrix C15 some interesting properties were observed when the security policy
requirements were modelled. Recall that Domain AY was not permitted a business 
connection with both Domains B and C simultaneously and the NPC2 correctly 
showed this exclusive condition with the position o f the switch. However, Domain B 
was also controlled by an NPC2 that did not permit simultaneous business 
connections between Domains C and AY and itself. We had the case where Domain 
AY could quite legitimately hold a permitted business connection with Domain B; 
however, unknown to Domain AY, Domain B also had a perfectly legitimate business 
connection with Domain C. On the face o f it this contravenes the security policy 
because effectively Domain B would appear to have a connection with both. In 
Section 7.11 we proposed that the modelling process used was possibly too coarse to 
capture the level o f detail in such a situation. However, it fulfilled a need in that the
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system designer is alerted to a potential issue that should be resolved through the 
implementation. So, how might we approach a solution?
Essentially, this is a problem of conflict resolution where two different and legitimate 
sets o f  conditions occurring at the same time, result in a potentially illegal operation. 
We contend that the NPC2s do not necessarily need to be aware o f each other’s rule 
sets, only their own behaviour. The NPC2 controlling whether Domain B is permitted 
a business connection with Domains AY and C would verify outstanding capabilities 
before permitting sharing to take place. This situation is a standard task for the 
Reference Monitor component within the security sub-system where the security 
policy protecting an object is checked when an access request is made by the subject. 
The policy decision is taken and enforced dependent on the outcome o f this 
verification process.
The ability to resolve policy conflict is very much dependent on the expressiveness of 
the underlying security policy language. As the complexity o f the system increases so 
it becomes correspondingly more difficult to account for all o f  the interactions within 
the system. In our example, when the read process requested access to the message 
queue the security policy protecting this object was verified. All o f the time the 
Boolean variable was set to false, the request was denied and this access decision 
enforced. This is an area which would definitely require further exploration as part of 
future work because the ability to resolve multiple conflicts using the NPC2 is 
unknown.
There are also potential issues which originate from the communication infrastructure 
and environment itself. If  the communications protocol used for messaging requires a 
response from the destination device, this low level activity may be in conflict with 
the security policy. We provide an example in Section 7.1.1 Figure 74 where the 
InfoSec business model shows a one-way communication between the Low and High- 
1 Domains. In this configuration messages originating from the Low Domain cannot 
be acknowledged by the High-1 Domain because this will contravene the security 
policy. This is not necessarily a scalability issue, but just as we encountered with our 
demonstration example, the case does provide another example where the system 
designer has to be fully aware o f the environmental factors that will both influence
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and be influenced by the InfoSec models. O f course in such a situation it would be 
necessary to find other solutions. If the passing o f messages between Domains Low 
and High-1 was critical for example, then we may elect to send the message a number 
of times to increase the chances o f it being received since we are unable to confirm 
reliability by any other means. This is not an efficient use o f network bandwidth but 
is an option nonetheless.
7.2.3 Reusability
The NPC2 has deliberately been designed so that each component can act 
independently if  necessary and be configured to detect and manage other events. The 
set-up itself is therefore implementation specific although the core codebase should be 
applicable for any implementation environment with minimal change. Although the 
elements o f the NPC2 are being used to deliver a flexible security solution, only some 
o f these elements are part of the actual security mechanism itself. The Environment 
Monitor and Event Manager are designed to interact with the resident security system 
to initiate a change in the policy rules on detection o f the pre-defined condition(s). 
They perform an essential role in the decision making process and are responsible for 
triggering the change in security policy. This is why the communication between 
each component and the resident security system itself must be trustworthy. The 
resident security system could consist o f any technology provided it presents the 
appropriate interfaces to our NPC2 applications to enable manipulation o f the 
underlying rules. In our solution we have elected to use SELinux because this 
provides the open development environment and flexibility that we require. Had a 
different technology been adopted, development o f the NPC2 interfaces would have 
been quite different.
The Environment Monitor in our demonstration system is a one-to-one relationship, 
that is, the software is monitoring the environment for a specific behaviour that will 
be compared against our threshold and trigger the policy change. However, as shown 
in our architecture in Chapter 5 there is an opportunity to extend this concept. We 
propose this could work as follows:
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• Many events are monitored and managed by an overall event manager. Each 
event triggers a different policy change and thus a different capability.
• Many events could be fused by the overall event manager. The result o f this
fusion process could be a single or multiple policy change(s).
• Some combination o f the above where multiple events (but not all) are fused
and others are managed independently to result in multiple policy changes.
Quite clearly this model introduces significant complexity in terms o f development. 
The Event Manager needs a certain degree o f ‘intelligence’ to process different 
events. However, it has the potential to be a highly configurable middleware solution 
with the opportunity to ‘plug in’ any type of Environment Monitor within the Event 
Manager.
7.3 Summary of Scalability
This chapter can be summarised as follows. The main emphasis of our work has been 
directed towards scalability and the NPC2 and NPD concept within the modelling and 
risk analysis process. The notation can be used in larger and more complex 
configurations using multiple NPC2 constructs or in the case of the NPD, multiple 
connections with existing domains. Moreover, the NPC2 can be used to capture 
different types o f connection and show where their use is conditional and temporary. 
In all o f these cases we believe that the models have not become over complicated nor 
have they lost the clarity o f expression which is a desirable characteristic of this 
graphical approach. System designers are presented with a more informed view o f the 
system under different states and through the use o f the connectivity matrices can 
easily calculate the potential number o f compromise paths when changes to the 
separation and sharing profile become necessary. The risk analysis process identified 
potential issues with the matrix calculations in that they can become large and 
possibly unwieldy. Our solution is to merge elements o f the matrix where appropriate. 
Sub-domains of a parent or what we term ‘child’ domains can be combined to provide 
a condensed view o f the matrix without loss o f information. This approach can be 
utilised irrespective o f how connectivity is represented in the matrices. Finally, whilst 
we have not had the opportunity to progress larger models to the implementation
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phase, some of the challenges have been outlined that we believe should be addressed 
if multiple NPC2s are distributed in a system or the functionality of a single NPC2 is 
extended.
From the work described in this section we conclude that sufficient evidence has been 
collected to support the claim that the concept o f the NPC2 and NPD will scale, at 
least in the modelling process. Theoretically we believe scalability of the NPC2 and 
implementation is sound. However this has yet to be confirmed through practical 
experimentation.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Further Work
The purpose of this final chapter is to reflect on the programme o f research and in 
doing so, draw conclusions regarding the success o f the study and present 
opportunities for further work. This raises an interesting question. Our research deals 
with concepts inside o f a complex and broad subject space. As the work has evolved 
it has naturally become more qualitative than quantitative although established 
mathematical techniques have been applied through our use o f  matrices to model 
connectivity matrices in Chapters 4 and 7. The discursive nature o f  the approach is a 
natural consequence o f the psychology and working preferences o f the author, but we 
believe is also appropriate to the research area. So, in a study such as this how do we 
measure and communicate the success o f our work? In order to answer this question 
we return to the original research problem and our work, documented in this thesis, 
which has been carried out to solve it.
In 2.1 the research problem asks “ ...what options are available for engineering 
solutions appropriate to the Network Enabled Capability military initiative?...” Our 
background research led us to conclude that a more radical approach to security was 
required. Furthermore, we proposed that the answer lay in developing f i t  fo r  purpose 
security which recognises that in contemporary military operational environments, 
security must adapt and respond to the changing needs o f an organisation, whilst still 
meeting requirements for appropriately high levels o f assurance. Furthermore, the 
military tend to operate in hostile and resource-constrained environments where 
changes to the security o f the system may quickly become a management overhead 
and unnecessary distraction for the user. This provided another motivation for our 
research where fit for purpose security could also be viewed in terms of robustness. In 
accordance with Ashby’s law of requisite variety [5], a system with many options is 
better equipped to deal with change. Therefore if  we engineer the opportunity for the 
system to adopt a different security policy under particular circumstances, we 
conjecture that not only may it survive for longer without the need for human 
intervention it will also provide security that is fit for purpose when required.
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As described in Chapter 1 we proposed that fit for purpose security involved 
manipulating a secure platform in a way that could be understood whilst affording the 
opportunity to modify the security profile in accordance with user requirements. 
Measuring the impact o f change involved having the means to describe and model 
updates to the security policy so that the effect of flexibility could be understood and 
risk mitigated where necessary. We proposed that assessing security under different 
states afforded the designer an opportunity to select appropriate security for that state. 
This can increase both efficiency and effectiveness o f the controls. Security requires 
the synthesis of security policy, architecture and mechanism. Therefore, it was 
necessary to examine each of these areas and determine how flexibility could be 
described and verified within the security policy and then practically engineered 
through architecture and mechanism. This holistic approach enabled us to develop a 
methodology for providing the necessary flexibility.
Early on it became obvious that the key was security policy; however, this would only 
provide one component in a much wider solution. Flexibility requires a degree of 
intelligence which involves detecting and acting upon an event o f  interest in the 
environment. In our case, the action is a change to a user’s capability controlled by the 
security policy. Each element within this chain depends on the others to deliver the 
overall fit for purpose vision. Our solution to this problem lies in an intelligent 
connector, the NPC2. In Chapter 3 we showed how the NPC2 could be represented in 
high-level graphical models such as DBSy through an addition to existing notation. In 
this role the NPC2 captures temporary and conditional permitted business connections 
that may be required when certain conditions prevail in the external environment.
A fundamental part o f the fit for purpose security vision is the provision o f the ability 
to reason about the level of potential risk that flexibility introduces into the system. In 
Chapter 4 it is shown that the NPC2 provides this ability: examples are given 
demonstrating how the NPC2 can be incorporated into the risk analysis process to 
calculate the effects o f modifying the separation and sharing profile o f a system. In an 
attempt to employ analytical techniques that are formalisable -  and therefore 
potentially certifiable -  connectivity matrices are used to model the way that sharing 
can take place between different domains in the system. In both Chapters 4 and 7 it 
was shown that the matrix elements are not restricted to a ‘1 ’ or ‘0 ’ (representing the
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presence or absence o f a connection). In Chapter 4 Boolean values (representing the 
conditional nature of the NPC2 connection, were used. In Chapter 7 the ideas were 
extended to include numerical probability values (representing the reliability of 
particular communication links), or numerical penalty values (reflecting a weighting 
o f the risks associated with particular sharing arrangements) in the matrices. In total 
all 4 representations were used simultaneously and provided care is taken with the 
mathematics, this approach results in an enhanced view of the potential and actual risk 
to a system under dynamically changing conditions. Moreover, the results have a 
strong visual impact. The system analyst is able, in certain cases, to easily identify the 
minimum and maximum risk and the contribution made by the non-persistent 
constructs. We conclude that this level of detail has unprecedented benefits to system 
stakeholders in the design and execution of fit for purpose security.
In addition to demonstrating ways in which the NPC2 can provide the conceptual 
basis for flexible security, our work has examined ways in which the concept can be 
implemented and engineered into a working solution. In Chapter 5 a modular and 
technology independent architecture was presented which describes the components 
required to construct the NPC2. As stated previously, although absolutely 
fundamental and central to flexible security, the security policy itself is one part o f a 
wider strategy in the engineering solution. Ultimately the policy is used to manipulate 
the underlying security controls and infrastructure because it contains the rules which 
are implemented by the security enforcement agents. However, the change process 
needs to be triggered. Given that one o f our design objectives was robustness we also 
sought to build an autonomous system which removed the human from the loop. 
Chapter 5 shows the security policy encompassed by processes to monitor the 
environment (for the event of interest), manage the observed event, and trigger the 
change in security policy. From this point, the security policy itself is responsible for 
instantiating a new rule set which gives the change in permitted (user) capability. The 
NPC2 architecture describes the functionality required from individual components in 
the stack. Chapter 6  documents an example implementation hosted on the SELinux 
platform which proves that the objective o f  the NPC2 and the proposed architecture 
can be physically engineered and shown to work. Although small-scale, the example 
successfully demonstrated each o f the NPC2 elements working together to achieve an 
autonomous change in security. As a result, the subject controlled by the security
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policy was permitted to share data it was previously separated from. Chapter 7 
presented some o f the challenges that would need to be addressed in order to scale the 
implementation in larger and more complex scenarios. Since there was not an 
opportunity to pursue this area of work, it clearly presents an opportunity for further 
study and possibly an opening for collaboration with other parties.
The research has been taken a stage further by the introduction o f another new 
concept, the NPD aimed at modelling ad-hoc collaboration activities and their 
potential impact on risk. Although it has not yet been carried through to 
implementation, the NPD has been shown to be useful in high-level modelling and 
risk analysis using the same test environment as the NPC2.
During the course of the research a number o f problems have been identified which 
remain unsolved. The research question embraces a vast and complex subject area and 
there was neither time or in some cases the expertise to address all o f  the issues as part 
o f this programme. To complete this chapter we present some o f the challenges 
which we believe are worthy o f further investigation and will contribute to this 
interesting and useful area o f work.
At the presentation o f [24] the question of using the NPC2 in domains other than the 
military was raised. It is recognised that the defence environment is very demanding 
because o f the requirement to provide ‘provable’ security. Quite rightly any notion of 
flexibility is likely to be regarded with reticence. In a commercial environment the 
NPC2 would be equally useful and could probably be integrated more readily because 
there are less stringent needs for high assurance. During the research we have been 
mindful o f but not driven by other markets because it appeared that if  the concept 
could be successfully demonstrated in a military context, other business sectors 
should, in theory, offer significant opportunities and potentially a less demanding 
development environment. At the time of writing an up-lift to [24] is in progress for 
submission to the Journal o f Information Warfare [76]. In this version we consider the 
NPC2 in the context o f other work [77] which targets adaptive access control in a 
hypothetical financial brokering system. From the description o f the requirements it is 
apparent that the NPC2 could be applied in this application domain. The work o f 
Cheng et al in [77] is principally concerned with the classification o f resources and
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having adjustable ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ boundaries between classifications based on the 
calculated level o f risk. By comparison, the NPC2 is designed to change user 
capability rather than the classification of a resource. Nonetheless, in a scenario such 
as the brokerage system it could operate in either capacity. The NPC2 would normally 
work with the underlying security sub-system to modify security permissions. 
However, provided the functionality was in place, it could equally be used to 
reclassify objects and deny/permit access through this mechanism. A preliminary and 
cursory look at other application domains indicates that the NPC2 has wider 
application. One o f our recommendations is that the concept is exploited not only in 
the military environment but also in potentially more accessible civilian and 
commercial domains.
As a result o f our collaborative research with De Montfort University we concluded 
that it would be useful to combine a graphical and intuitive modelling approach such 
as DBSy with a formal security policy framework such as SANTA and that 
furthermore, this conjunction would widen the appeal o f both approaches to different 
stakeholder communities. One of the disadvantages o f  SANTA is that it requires 
significant expertise o f the security policy language to express high level security 
requirements. However, as described in [22] the power and expressiveness o f the 
language was absolutely fundamental for capturing and refining changing security 
requirements such as those in our case study. The DBSy models provided an intuitive 
means o f capturing high-level separation and sharing requirements; although, if  these 
models are to be useful in the development o f implementable policy, it is necessary to 
refine the connections into a series o f potential interactions, stakeholders and 
observable attributes. It is recognised that DBSy was not intended as a security policy 
language. Nonetheless, we believe its value can be extended if  we can attach a level of 
meaning by underpinning the models with a formal language and possibly automate 
the creation of a formal policy. This also presents additional opportunities for 
verifying the security policy. System stakeholders will be able to perform a visual 
check o f the system and its potential compromise paths. This may be complemented 
by a more structured analysis using the connectivity matrices and a formal analysis o f 
the model using tools from DeMontfort University such as SPAT. This potential has 
been shown in our work where both approaches have been applied independently. Our
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conclusion is that additional work to combine the two could yield significant benefit 
to system developers and system owners alike.
In Chapter 7 we began to explore the opportunities for using risk weightings and 
probability values in our calculation of potential compromise paths. This concept is 
not new; we know for example that Hayat et al proposed the use o f a risk ranking 
system in [40] which is based on the severity o f the risk. However, what 
distinguishes our approach from others is our conjunction of weighting values with 
the notion o f temporary and conditional connectivity provided by the NPC2 and NPD 
constructs. This approach allows us to calculate the potential effect o f  permitting a 
change in capability and offers an unprecedented level o f useful information to feed 
into the decision making process which could include a risk ranking system such as 
that from Hayat et al [40]. Our practical implementation o f the NPC2 showed it was 
possible to create a system which autonomously changes capability and the security 
profile. We suggest that output from the risk and probability calculations could be 
used by an Environment Monitor as part of its decision making process. Armed with 
this information and other parameters, the decision could be taken to permit (or deny) 
sharing to take place without necessarily involving the human user. Although there is 
still a lot o f work to be done in the area of risk assessment and flexibility, we propose 
that extensions to our ideas which utilise risk and probability metrics in addition to the 
Boolean representation o f a connection would provide valuable insight into designing 
secure systems in the future. Finally, the NPC2 and NPD can both have a significant 
influence on the proliferation o f connections in a network and our view of 
connectivity growth patterns. We believe this may challenge existing theories in this 
area such as those espoused by Metcalfe [46] and Briscoe et al [47]. We currently 
have a paper in production which explores this interest further and will be published 
separately from this thesis.
Although our implementation of the NPC2 was successful, it is recognised that 
numerous opportunities exist for augmenting the prototype system either using the 
same technology as that in our example or completely different technology. Once we 
had shown fit for purpose security working through practical implementation o f the 
NPC2, we were not at liberty to explore other aspects of the case study that were 
deemed to be of interest. For example, given that the devices are operating in an agile
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mission group it is possible for them to all contribute to the environment monitoring 
process. Our prototype was deliberately small-scale and relied on one member, the 
2IC, to gather intelligence. It would be useful to extend the study and investigate how 
the collaboration process between all members could be engineered and processed 
using the NPC2. In theory our research leads us to conclude that it is possible; indeed 
Chapters 5 and 7 describe ways in which the NPC2 could be scaled in larger 
configurations. One o f the proposals included using multiple inputs to the 
environmental monitoring and event management processes. Furthermore, we could 
trigger many changes to the security policy affecting one or multiple users. All of 
these activities would result in additional capability and interest to the practical usage 
of the NPC2.
The prototype solution o f the NPC2 was hosted on and used the security capabilities 
of SELinux. This is feature rich and offers many possibilities for extending the 
functionality of the NPC2. For example, we elected to show a temporary change in a 
subject’s authorisation on the system. This approach was quite deliberate since the 
objective was to cause minimal disruption and change to the security profile o f the 
system. SELinux supports features such as labelling network packets. Some work 
has already been done on combining this capability with security policy to restrict the 
processing o f packets to those of a pre-defined type [78]. We see an opportunity to 
combine this work with the NPC2 and envisage the scenario where, under certain 
conditions detected by the Environment Monitor, the Event Manager triggers a 
security policy update which permits packets with a certain label type to be processed. 
Another idea is to use the Event Manager itself to initiate the packet re-labelling 
process. This also has the result of permitting or denying processing (based on the 
label assigned). Both o f these examples could be of use in a coalition environment 
where there may be a disparity between the types o f information that can be shared, 
the label or context that has been applied and the security policy. Equally, the 
approach has potential application in other non-military contexts such as the futuristic 
brokerage scenario described in [77] which was described in earlier paragraphs of this 
chapter. In our view, the possibilities for application are really only limited by 
imagination.
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There are numerous other environmental conditions that could be explored to provide 
policy trigger agents. Our scenario was based on elevating user capability in the event 
that a Commander was unavailable. Alternatives could include, but are not limited to, 
detected changes to the level of trust. In our scenario it is known that Domain AY is 
permitted to share with Domain B; however, it may not share with Domain C. Quite 
clearly there is a trust issue which raises the concern o f information leakage between 
the two domains. There may be instances where it is necessary to place more trust in 
Domain C in which case simultaneous connectivity may be permitted. Certain events 
in the environment could be detected by autonomous sensors that change the way our 
agile mission group perceives its world, regards the level o f trust in other members 
and subsequently the way it is required to operate. Our research scope has deliberately 
excluded trust because it is a vast and complex research area in its own right. 
However, it would certainly be an interesting extension to the work and one where we 
might opt to incorporate trusted platform technologies, such as those mentioned in 
Chapter 2, into the practical implementation o f the NPC2.
Although there are very obvious opportunities to build more ‘intelligence’ into the 
Environment Monitor and Event Manager this is not something we have explored as 
part of this research. The whole philosophy behind our work is balancing flexibility 
with high assurance and our solution has therefore needed to operate at the more 
deterministic end o f the flexibility scale. This approach should improve the 
acceptability of our ideas into a community which is necessarily conservative. There 
is however, a requirement to examine other cases for the NPC2 where it is permitted 
to adapt to the environment. In such a scenario it is postulated that the Environment 
Monitor and Event Manager would be provided with security goals and then allowed, 
within certain boundaries, to calculate the ‘best’ way o f achieving those goals. By 
continuing to detect and utilise information from the environment the security policy 
could be updated to reflect changing needs that allow the goal to be maintained. Of 
course this presents a very large challenge for risk analysis and calculating the impact 
o f the security model on the overall system and is one major reason why the approach 
was not explored for the NPC2. Our controlled flexibility allows the stakeholders to 
calculate impact at different states and refine the separation and sharing model 
accordingly. They can therefore have more confidence in the behaviour o f the system 
when certain conditions are activated. A less deterministic model could quickly
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become unmanageable, and we believe this would undermine the level of 
acceptability in a high assurance marketplace. Having said this, we do believe that a 
less deterministic NPC2 is a possibility for the future and certainly in non-military 
domains, particularly as research continues in fields devoted to investigating the 
security of enabling technologies such as Agent-based systems [52].
The research areas described in the preceding paragraphs can be categorised into 
different fields o f interest. For example, extending the NPC2 within the SELinux 
platform, exploiting the technology into other markets and larger scenarios or 
adopting different technologies would clearly be of interest to industrial partners; 
probably as a series o f industrial projects. By contrast, investigating the whole area o f 
compromise paths including calculating growth, attaching probabilities to anticipated 
behaviours and assigning risk metrics would probably be better placed as either a 
purely academic project or perhaps a shared academic and industrial project. A 
number o f academic institutions are actively researching the security o f Agent-based 
technologies and continuing work could easily be conducted through a combination o f 
academic and industry based research. Irrespective o f who does the future work, we 
believe the subjects described are sufficiently interesting and useful to warrant further 
investigation.
This work commenced with a bold view that flexibility and high assurance were not 
usually considered as compatible partners because o f the potential for unexpected and 
non-deterministic behaviour wreaking havoc in the level o f confidence that users had 
in their own system and that o f their communicating partners. However, it was also 
proposed that strict and inflexible separation did not provide a satisfactory answer 
since this impedes the capacity to share information and respond to changing 
requirements. Through our work with the NPC2 (in particular) and the NPD we 
believe that a compromise can be reached, which goes some way towards making the 
conjunction of flexibility and high assurance more palatable. Although there is still a 
lot of work to be done in this area, our research and the results documented 
throughout this thesis leads us to conclude that an important step has been taken in 
realising greater flexibility in security solutions within a demanding stakeholder 
community. It is concluded that our work moves us one stage further in achieving fit 
for purpose security.
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Appendix A -  DBSy Modelling Notation
The tables in this section have been extracted from the Domain Based Security 
(DBSy) User Guide No 3: InfoSec Models Quick Reference Guide. This guide has 
been made available by kind permission of QinetiQ who have agreed to allow the 
author to copy and include the following symbols and their descriptions used in the 
production of the thesis. The tables which follow are by no means the complete list of 
symbols in the quick reference guide.
Infosec Business Models
Domain A logical set of facilities where software processes information on behalf 
of those people who are members of the domain. Each domain has a 
name that is unique within the model.
A domain is characterised by the minimum security requirements for its 
members and maximum security properties of data handled within it. 
People who work in a domain may share information with relative 
freedom.
Internal
Domain
Any domain that is to be implemented in 
whole or in part by a project or that is 
otherwise deemed to be part of the ‘focus 
of interest’ for the purpose of the model.
External
Domain
Any domain for which a project has no 
responsibility or that is considered to be 
outside the ‘focus of interest’ for the 
purpose of the model. (N.B. Onward 
connections may exist)
r  \
Name
V J
Connection Enables members of a domain to share information in some way with 
members of another domain. Two domains are connected if information 
may be transferred from one domain to the other.
Two-way
connection
(unspecified
type)
G K 3 9G K D A two-way connection permits 
business information 
transfer in both 
directions.
One-way
connection
(unspecified
type)
A one-way 
connection permits 
business information 
transfer in one 
direction only, as 
indicated by the 
diode (in this case 
only D1 to D2).
Onward
Connections ay-ay- D2 has further unspecified business connections.
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Environment
{ Name }
\  4
The physical place where people work and 
where equipment and media are located. 
Each environment has a name that is 
unique within the model.
Portal Enables domain members in a specific 
environment to interact with software 
acting on their behalf in a domain. The 
name is optional.
Connection types Different types of connection permit people to share information in
different ways. An icon inside the square connection symbol indicates 
the type of connection. A name may be also be used to specify the 
type more precisely.
Message
connection X Enables a person to send information to specifically nominated people.
Shared Data 
Repositories
Enables information created by members of one domain to be 
published so that members of another domain may observe it. Several 
types of repository are defined.
File store Enables people to publish and request 
named files in a hierarchical directory 
structure.
Infosec Infrastructure Models
An infrastructure model defines the “impenetrable” boundaries of a system. An impenetrable 
boundary is so strong that people outside it can be ignored in the risk assessment. For 
protection of protectively marked HMG information this means in practice either: a) Physical 
separation (with necessary tempest protection) b) Cryptography of suitable grade.
Island
v  Name ^
An isolated island represents a 
computer system that is separated 
from all other computer systems by an 
impenetrable boundary.
An island has a name that is unique 
within the model.
Causeways Causeways provide an identifiable and manageable point of connection 
between two or more islands. They allow sharing of information 
between the islands via non by-passable controls.
Two-way
causeway (  H — )X. Island A y  X. Island B J  
o r
O - - OV  Island A J  X .  Island B S
An impenetrable boundary separates 
the two islands from all other 
computer systems and ensures that the 
interaction between the islands is 
implemented by the causeway and by 
no other means.
The causeway name is optional.
One-way
causeway (  ) t > K  )X island A y  V Island B y
Data transfer is in one direction only, 
with no physical means to transfer an 
electronic signal in the opposite 
direction.
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Infosec Architecture Models
Infosec Architecture models show how the business requirements shown in an Infosec 
Business model are implemented within a security architecture depicted by an Infosec 
Architecture model.
Curved lines are used for connecting business model components to make them distinct from 
infrastructure connections.
Island A Island B
Each island supports a single domain.
If an island supports only one domain 
its name may be omitted from the 
diagram.
Island A Island B
Causeway implements two
connections
Island BIsland A
Island supports more than one domain.
Environment 1
Is la n d  6
Members of environment 1 can access 
information in D2 and D1 through the 
portal connections provided to the 
island infrastructures.
Advanced Model Notation
Refinement High level model Example refinement
Refinement of a 
single domain (B) 
to show two ___  0 ___^
components S ' — " \  / "  "N 0 ^ 3
V----------------------------B—'
domains, BX & 
BY. In this case 
only BX members 
can email domain 
A.
( A U _ § g _ f  B J
